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ABSTRACT 
 
The international community faces a growing threat from nuclear terrorism. The 
complexity of the threats of nuclear terrorism, the variety of nuclear security measures 
that States can devote resources towards to address the threats, and the limited resources 
States have to invest in these nuclear security measures make it imperative that resources 
are applied in the most effective way possible. In this dissertation, we develop a 
quantitative, risk-based methodology that States can employ to gain a better 
understanding of the nuclear threat they face, assist them in determining what nuclear 
security measures they should invest in, and facilitate communication to stake-holders to 
request and justify investment in these measures.  
 
The risk-based methodology has been developed employing a combination of pathways 
analysis, game-theory, multiple-attribute utility analysis, decision theory and risk 
analysis. The methodology was designed to account for the wide variety of nuclear 
security measures that States can invest in, the range of possible consequences from 
different nuclear threats, and the severity of these consequences to the State. In addition, 
the methodology models the adversary's strategic decision making while accounting for 
the capabilities, motivations, and disincentives that may influence which nuclear threat a 
terrorist group will attempt. 
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The methodology is introduced into a Visual Basic for Applications code, which we 
demonstrate through verification and qualitative validation tests. We then develop three 
State nuclear infrastructures with varying levels of complexity, meant to provide a 
realistic representation of real-world States. We then utilize the code to evaluate the risk 
of nuclear terrorism against terrorist threats that have different motivations for nuclear 
terrorism to demonstrate how different motivations for nuclear terrorism may affect both 
State-level risk and the State's optimal risk-reduction strategy. These risk analyses are 
then used to both evaluate various nuclear security strategies and determine which 
nuclear security measures will have the greatest risk-reduction value. Finally, we 
conduct a sensitivity analysis on capabilities of terrorist groups to understand how 
changes in these capabilities affect the State-level risk from nuclear terrorism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.A. Background 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated a new level of dedication and 
organization by a terrorist group, prompting the international community to re-evaluate 
the threat posed by terrorism. Terrorist attempts to cause widespread death and 
destruction with no regard for their own lives have prompted new nuclear security 
awareness.
1
 
 
The acquisition and detonation of even one crude nuclear device represents 
a real and urgent threat to international security. Some terrorist organizations have made 
numerous attempts to acquire the materials and expertise to make nuclear weapons. 
Various studies have shown that if a sophisticated sub-state actor was able to acquire 
enough Special Nuclear Material (SNM), it is plausible they could fabricate a crude 
nuclear device.
 2,3 
 
Nuclear weapons are not the only face of nuclear terrorism, and terrorist organizations 
are known to have sought radiological "dirty" bombs and considered the sabotage of 
nuclear facilities or materials during transport. Though they won’t cause the devastating 
loss of life that a nuclear weapon could, radiological weapons and the sabotage of a  
facility or material in transport both represent significant threats. Each has the potential 
  
2 
 
to cause severe economic consequences and public unrest. Unlike the SNM needed to 
make nuclear weapons, radioactive materials are much more widely available and 
typically do not have the level of security that sources of SNM do. A simple 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) could entail adding radioactive material to 
conventional explosives, well within the capabilities of any terrorist group. More 
sophisticated devices may utilize deadlier levels of radioactivity and cause a 
significantly larger number of deaths.
4
 In addition to the costly decontamination, the 
consequences of the sabotage of a nuclear facility may considerably impact the 
development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
5
 
 
The responsibility of securing nuclear and radiological materials and protecting nuclear 
facilities from sabotage rests entirely with the State.
6
 States can address the threat of 
nuclear terrorism in many different ways. The three main options that States have to 
reduce the risk posed by nuclear terrorism are
7
:  
 Reducing the threat through reducing adversary capabilities or intentions;  
 Improving the effectiveness of physical protection systems to reduce 
vulnerabilities; and 
 Reducing the potential consequences of malicious acts.  
 
To accomplish these options, States can employ various nuclear security measures, 
including material control systems, physical protection systems, safety systems, and 
  
3 
 
second-line-of-defense measures
a
. Managing resources among the variety of measures at 
their disposal represents a multi-faceted problem that encompasses a variety of fields. 
With limited resources, the State will want to ensure that investments made in nuclear 
security measures are the most effective at addressing the threats posed to the State by 
nuclear terrorism.
 
 
In this dissertation, we introduce, analyze and numerically test a methodology that yields 
a State-level risk metric derived from details of the State's nuclear infrastructure, security 
measures that are employed, and various characteristics of the threat. This metric is a 
quantitative value that represents the relative severity of the threat posed by nuclear 
terrorism to the State. It also provides a means to analyze the impact of various nuclear 
security measures based on the degree that these measures reduce the risk of nuclear 
terrorism to the State. This tool can assist States to optimize the allocation of resources 
for nuclear security measures and provides a mechanism to evaluate various nuclear 
security activities at the State level. 
 
I.B. Background on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism 
 
Nuclear terrorism is defined as the actual or potential use of nuclear or radiological 
materials, or attacks on nuclear facilities or transportation carrying nuclear materials, by 
an individual or a sub-state group to generate fear or destruction in the pursuit of 
                                                 
a
 Second-line-of-defense measures are security measures deployed to search, detect and identify the illicit 
movement of nuclear and radiological materials. Such measures include installing radiation detectors at 
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political objectives. The threats posed by nuclear terrorism are broken down into four 
categories based on the different characteristics of each threat. These four threats are 
defined by the IAEA as:
8
  
 the theft of a nuclear weapon; 
 the theft of SNM and development of an improvised nuclear device 
(IND); 
 the theft of radiological material and development of an RDD; 
 sabotage of a nuclear facility or transport resulting in the release of 
radioactivity. 
 
The first threat, which is concerned with a sub-state group stealing a nuclear weapon, 
only affects a small number of countries, as possessing a nuclear weapon is a 
prerequisite to this threat. Taking possession of an intact nuclear weapon is the most 
appealing option for a terrorist group intent upon acquiring a nuclear capability, given 
the many hurdles they would have to overcome to produce their own device. However, 
nuclear weapons are among a State's most heavily protected assets, and a terrorist group 
has a very low likelihood of successfully stealing an intact nuclear weapon. Even if a 
terrorist organization was able to acquire a nuclear weapon, they could not simply 
detonate it, as States have strict control measures, like permissive action links (PALs), 
that render the weapon useless without the proper authorization codes. PALs are 
designed to not be susceptible to reverse engineering or be bypassed.
9
 The other option 
for the adversary would be to scrap the weapon and remove the fissile material and other 
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useful components. However, this is not an attractive pathway because States possess 
advanced designs and technical capabilities that allow them to produce weapons with a 
smaller amount of fissile material than a non-state actor would require to produce their 
own, crude nuclear device. In addition, there are likely other sources of SNM within the 
State that are less heavily protected.  
  
The threat of an adversary developing an IND is the most complex of the four threats. 
An IND is similar to a nuclear weapon based on how it generates its energy, utilizing a 
supercritical configuration of fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. However, 
an IND is a crude nuclear device, and a terrorist is more concerned with generating some 
level of nuclear yield and less concerned with producing a device that is safe and has a 
predictable yield.  As a result safety, security, and reliability are not as significant of 
concerns in the design of an IND as they are in nuclear weapons. The type of nuclear 
material dictates the steps required to convert the material to be usable in a nuclear 
weapon. The prevailing belief among the intelligence community is that if a sub-state 
group gained possession of enough weapons usable material, highly enriched uranium
b
 
(HEU) or plutonium, they could plausibly produce an IND. Conversely, the consensus is 
that even if a sub-state group obtained enough non-direct use materials, such as spent 
fuel or uranium enriched to less than 20% U
235
, they would not likely be able to produce 
an IND.
2 
 
 
                                                 
b
 Highly Enriched Uranium is Uranium that is enriched in the fissile isotope U-235 from its natural 
abundance of approximately 0.7% to 20% or more.   
  
6 
 
The third threat of nuclear terrorism is an RDD, where radioactive sources are combined 
with conventional explosives to disperse radioactive contamination. Given the 
availability of radiological sources and terrorist familiarity with conventional explosives, 
the effort required to gather the materials for an RDD is far outweighed by the potential 
consequences a successful attack would generate.
4
 While in a majority of cases an RDD 
would not be expected to inflict many casualties, it could create significant economic 
consequences. An RDD also plays into the public's nearly universal fear of radiation 
inspired by events like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and the Cold War, meaning it has 
the ability to incite mass hysteria.  
 
The final threat of nuclear terrorism is nuclear sabotage, where a terrorist group 
undertakes deliberate acts against a nuclear facility or a vehicle transporting nuclear 
material in an attempt to cause the release of radiation. Nuclear sabotage ranges in 
scenario complexity, from relatively straight-forward acts of breaking into a facility and 
detonating nuclear or radiological material in place with conventional explosives, to an 
extremely complex task of disabling safety features on a nuclear reactor by attacking 
vital areas of the safety systems with the intent to cause a core meltdown and 
radiological release. After witnessing the amount of international attention given to the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, sabotage of a nuclear facility may appear an 
attractive option for a terrorist group. The consequences of a sabotage event would likely 
involve few casualties, but severe economic consequences and public and political 
backlash would ensue.   
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The four threats of nuclear terrorism not only differ based on the effects they generate, 
but also in the types and numbers of terrorist groups that could potentially execute each 
threat and have the motivation to do so. Table 1 summarizes the general traits of a 
terrorist group that are prerequisites to pursue each of the four threats as well as the 
number of groups that fit each description as of 2004.  
 
Because nuclear weapons and INDs are high consequence scenarios, they have typically 
received greater attention than the other threats and therefore have been analyzed in 
greater detail. Historically, there have been few documented, serious attempts by 
terrorist groups to acquire a nuclear capability. The two best known cases are the 
Japanese cult Aum Shirinkyo and the militant Islamic organization al Qaeda. Both Aum 
and al Qaeda failed in their attempts to illicitly acquire a nuclear weapon from a State 
and failed to acquire the nuclear material necessary to produce their own crude nuclear 
device.
10
 Current estimates are that the number of groups with an interest and the 
capability to pursue nuclear terrorism remain low, with four groups that have 
demonstrated an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and five groups who have the 
capability to acquire nuclear weapons or produce an IND.
11
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Table 1. Terrorist Traits for the Four Nuclear Threats
12
 
Traits 
Steal Nuclear 
Device 
Steal 
Nuclear Material for 
IND 
Sabotage 
Nuclear 
Facility 
Steal 
Radioactive 
Material 
for RDD 
Motivation 
Extreme; desire to 
cause mass deaths, 
destruction; likely 
limited to 
apocalyptic and 
politico-religious 
groups 
Extreme; desire to 
cause mass deaths, 
destruction; likely 
limited to apocalyptic 
and politico-religious 
groups 
Very high; 
desire to 
cause great 
property 
damage, 
disruption, 
some loss of 
life 
Very high; 
desire to 
cause great 
property 
damage, 
disruption, 
some loss of 
life 
Organizational 
Skills 
Very high Very high Very high Moderate 
Financial 
Resources 
High High Moderate to 
high 
Modest 
Technical 
Skills 
High High; moderate for 
some  scenarios 
Moderate to 
high 
Modest 
Number of 
groups (in 
2004) 
Few (possibly 
none currently able 
to meet all criteria 
for foreign country 
incident) 
Few (possibly none 
currently able to meet 
all criteria for foreign 
country incident) 
10+ 10-100's 
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It is important to acknowledge that scholars do not agree on the level of threat that 
nuclear weapons and INDs present. Given the historical lack of nuclear terrorism events 
and the few groups who have attempted to acquire nuclear capabilities, the likelihood 
that terrorists successfully employ a nuclear weapon or IND depends on two key 
questions. These questions are 'Would terrorists be interested in nuclear terrorism?' and 
'Could they succeed in an act of nuclear terrorism if they were interested?'. There has 
been a scholarly debate over these questions since the 1970's, with the debate being 
revived after certain terrorist events such as the sarin gas attack in Tokyo in 1995 and the 
events of September 11
th
. There is no consensus among experts about the intentions and 
capabilities of sub-state groups with respect to nuclear terrorism. This disagreement is 
illustrated by plotting the viewpoints expressed in various publications concerning these 
two questions in Figure 1
13
  
 
The answers to these two questions provide important policy implications. If sub-state 
groups both want to develop a nuclear capability and have the capability to do so, then 
devoting resources to prevent such an act is incredibly important and urgent. However, if 
sub-state groups have little to no interest in nuclear terrorism, then resources devoted to 
stopping the perceived nuclear terrorist threat might be better applied to other counter-
terrorism strategies. It is also important to understand how to balance protection against 
the high consequence, low likelihood threats of nuclear weapons and INDs and the other 
nuclear threats that have lower consequences yet higher likelihoods of occurring. A 
State-level risk assessment that incorporates terrorist intentions and motivations, like the 
  
10 
 
one presented in this dissertation, can assist States to ensure that resources are applied 
effectively across the entire threat spectrum. In addition, it can quantify how important 
the answers to these two questions are to the risk of nuclear terrorism. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Would They vs. Could They Plot for Nuclear Weapons and IND
13
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While the likelihood of nuclear terrorism is disputed by some experts, it is clear that 
nuclear terrorism is and will remain a significant international policy concern. In 2009, 
President Obama publically stated, "we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a 
nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One 
terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction."
14
 In 2010, 
President Obama and the United States brought nuclear security to the forefront of 
international awareness by hosting leaders from 47 countries at the inaugural Nuclear 
Security Summit. At the summit, Obama singled out nuclear terrorism as the most 
serious threat to international security. The Nuclear Security Summit is scheduled as a 
biennial event to keep nuclear security on the international agenda, most recently held in 
Seoul in 2012.  
 
I.C.  The International Nuclear Security Regime  
 
Currently, the international nuclear security regime is made up of a number of various  
international agreements that are either binding or non-binding. Unlike the international 
safeguards regime, which is governed primarily by the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, there is no verification regime for nuclear security or even 
performance based standards that States must meet. As Ken Luongo, co-chair of the 
Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) describes it, "The current nuclear material 
security regime is a patchwork of unaccountable voluntary arrangements that are 
inconsistent across borders."
15
  The result being that though each State is required to 
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secure their nuclear and radiological materials, the degree to which they secure them is 
up to their discretion and can vary from State to State. The main instruments that make 
up the international nuclear security regime are summarized in this section.  
 
I.C.1. The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and 
Amendment
16,17 
 
CPPNM is the only international legally binding agreement focused on to the physical 
protection of nuclear material. It entered into force on February 8, 1987, and establishes 
State obligations to protect nuclear material during international transport, in addition to 
establishing measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of nuclear 
material related offenses. It currently has 145 parties, which includes most of the nations 
using nuclear and radiological materials. To address perceived shortcomings in the 
original agreement, the CPPNM has since been amended to strengthen its provisions. On 
July 8, 2005, the amendment was adopted and awaits ratification by two-thirds of the 
State Parties to enter into force. The amendment makes it legally binding for States 
Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful (e.g. non-military), domestic 
use, storage and transport. It also provides for cooperation between States to locate and 
recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material and mitigate any radiological consequences 
from sabotage.  
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1.C.2. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(ICSANT)
18,19 
 
ICSANT is a binding legal agreement adopted at the UN General Assembly in April 
2005 and brought into effect in July 2007. The convention requires States to define acts 
of nuclear terrorism as criminal offenses. Acts of nuclear terrorism are defined by 
ICSANT as: 
 The possession of radioactive material or a device containing radioactive 
material with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or with the 
intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment; and 
 The use of radioactive material or a device, or the use of or damage to a 
nuclear facility, which releases or risks the release of radioactive material 
with the intent to either cause death or serious bodily injury or with the 
intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment or to 
coerce a person, organization or government to do or refrain from doing 
an act. 
 
ICSANT also has some requirements for States to provide protection against these 
events, stating that "States Parties shall make every effort to adopt appropriate measures 
to ensure the protection of radioactive material."  
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1.C.3. UN Resolution 1540
20
 
 
Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted by the United Nations Security Council 
in April 2004. It established obligations for UN member States to take and enforce 
effective measures against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
their means of delivery and related materials. The three primary responsibilities of States 
under UNSCR 1540 are: 
 Prohibit support to non-State actors seeking such items; 
 To adopt and enforce effective laws to prohibit the proliferation of such 
items to non-State actors; 
 Prohibit assisting or financing such proliferation, and to take and enforce 
effective measures to control these items, in order to prevent their 
proliferation. 
 
1.C.4. Non-Binding Agreements 
 
In addition to these legal agreements, a number of voluntary agreements exist that 
encompass nuclear security. Included in these are a number of guidance documents 
released by the IAEA related to the security of nuclear and radiological materials, two of 
which are the most significant. The first document is "The Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5)" which provides 
guidance for States in establishing physical protection systems. INFCIRC/225 covers the 
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physical protection of nuclear materials in use, storage and transport. Its 
recommendations have been incorporated into the domestic laws of many States. While 
typically non-binding, the provisions in INFCIRC/225 are required for Agency-
sponsored cooperation and assistance programs.
21
 The second IAEA publication is the 
"Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources" 
(IAEA/CODEOC/2004), which recommends the establishment and maintenance of 
regulatory controls over all  radioactive sources that may pose a significant threat to 
individuals, society, and the environment.
22
 As of June 30, 2008, 92 States had written 
the IAEA stating that they fully endorse the code of conduct.
23
  A comprehensive list of 
the binding and non-binding legal instruments related to nuclear security are available at 
http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/legal_instruments_list.asp?s=4&l=28.   
 
1.C.5. The IAEA's Role 
 
Some States with nuclear and radiological material lack the necessary expertise or 
resources to effectively secure their nuclear infrastructure. In addition to releasing 
guidance documents, the IAEA assists States, upon request from that State, to evaluate 
and help improve the State's nuclear security regime. Through its advisory services, the 
IAEA assists requesting States in establishing the infrastructure required to protect 
against nuclear threats. The Agency also assists States in their ability to detect and 
respond to nuclear terrorist activities, and identify potential threats and vulnerabilities to 
nuclear and radiological materials.
24
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I.D.  Research Motivations 
 
The international nuclear security regime faces two major obstacles. The first is that 
there is no international standard or verification regime for securing nuclear materials. 
Second, it is up to each State to determine what level of nuclear security is adequate. The 
nuclear security summits are part of a larger, international awareness campaign designed 
to demonstrate to States that nuclear security threats are urgent and require their 
attention. However, even if a State acknowledges nuclear terrorism as a significant 
security issue, it may not take precedence over other issues that threaten their national 
security.  Naturally, a State with issues like famine, corruption, or disease may be 
reluctant to devote resources to securing nuclear materials instead of addressing these 
other issues. Therefore, it is imperative that States have the means to fully understand 
the threat of nuclear terrorism as it pertains to other national security issues. 
Additionally, nuclear security is costly and there is no global consensus on what security 
measures are optimal as each situation is unique to the threats and nuclear activities 
specific to that State. When addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism, States need 
assurance that the limited resources they devote to nuclear terrorism are used in the best 
way to reduce their risk.  
 
When States do not have the means to devote towards nuclear security, they can request 
assistance through the IAEA. The IAEA's nuclear security efforts are largely dependent 
on voluntary contributions to its Nuclear Security Fund, which has a somewhat 
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detrimental effect on the IAEA's ability to most effectively allocate resources for nuclear 
security assistance. Between 2002 and 2004, approximately 89% of the IAEA's nuclear 
security activities were supported by voluntary contributions. Many of the voluntary 
contributions came with stipulations on how the contributions could be used. In 2002 
and 2003, less than five percent of the contributions were provided without conditions. 
The result is that the IAEA is not always able to direct funding to areas where it is most 
needed. The United States, the largest single contributor to the IAEA's Nuclear Security 
Fund, has expressed concerns over the lack of results-oriented reporting on how 
contributions are used.
25
 To date, the IAEA has not developed a satisfactory approach 
that measures the effectiveness of its nuclear security services.
26
 However without a 
transparent, results-oriented mechanism to report back to donors, the IAEA is limited by 
restrictions placed on funds. In the 2006-2009 nuclear security progress report, the IAEA 
stated that "the need for programmatic prioritization is, to a certain degree, overtaken by 
the specific conditions assigned by a State providing financial contributions to the 
Nuclear Security Fund. Separate contributions agreements have been negotiated with 
donors, taking into account programmatic considerations as well as wishes and 
conditions by the donor State or group of States."
27
  
 
I.E. Research Objectives 
 
The primary objective of this research is to develop and demonstrate a methodology  for 
assessing State-level risk that can provide recommendations for nuclear security 
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measures based on their risk reduction value. An objective security risk metric can have 
a number of potential benefits. One benefit is that applying the methodology to a State's 
nuclear infrastructure can yield a concrete justification for why certain nuclear security 
measures should be employed in a State. The risk-metric can also be used to request 
additional funding or support for the implementation of improved nuclear security 
measures through objectively demonstrating the benefit of the proposed measures. 
Additionally, the ability to determine each State's performance through a State-level risk 
metric can be used as justification when directing funding to the State or States where 
funds would have the maximum impact. Lastly, a methodology of this sort would allow 
a State to better understand the impacts of risk transfer when modifications are made to 
security systems. For these reasons, a methodology that addresses the impact of all of the 
potential nuclear security measures across the entire nuclear infrastructure of a State will 
be a powerful tool that can assist the IAEA and member States to most effectively secure 
the nuclear sector.     
 
I.F.  Overview of Chapters 
 
In this chapter, we provided background information on nuclear terrorism and the 
international nuclear security regime. We also described the objectives and potential 
implications of this research.  
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Chapter II explains the theory behind the solution method for determining a State-level 
risk metric. It includes background information on security risk analysis and a summary 
of recent work applicable to nuclear security. 
 
In Chapter III, the solution method is explained. This includes an overview of the 
methodology, including assumptions and limitations. It also describes what information 
is required and how it is used to determine a State-level risk metric.  
 
In Chapter IV, we show the results of verification and validation tests conducted on the 
code. Because no benchmark data exists, this methodology cannot be validated in the 
traditional sense. Instead, we demonstrate that the code acts as expected and that given 
problems where the solution is intuitively obvious, the code produces the correct result.  
 
In Chapter V, we introduce three fictional States having varying complexities of nuclear 
infrastructures. We then simulate a variety of State-level nuclear security strategies and 
evaluate their effectiveness. Finally, we present the results of the tests conducted on 
these States. 
 
We finish our discussion in Chapter VI with a summary of results as well as general 
conclusions and recommendations.   
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CHAPTER II 
SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS 
 
Security Risk Analysis (SRA) is a well-established practice that facilities and enterprises 
use to verify that they are sufficiently protecting assets. A variety of methods exist that 
are used to assess the vulnerability and risk from potential threats.
28
  The application of 
SRA can provide a consistent and repeatable process to analyze security risks, provide 
useful insights into potential vulnerabilities, and assist in determining the most effective 
ways to mitigate these vulnerabilities. SRA results are used as part of a risk-informed 
decision process and play a vital role in ensuring that risk is being effectively managed.  
 
II.A.  Probabilistic Risk Analysis  
 
Every action has risk associated with it. Risk is "the likelihood of specified undesired 
events occurring within a specified period arising from the realization of a specified 
hazard."
29
 Risk assessments are performed on actions or systems to understand what 
adverse events could occur and the frequency with which they are expected to occur. 
Any risk assessment seeks to answer three basic questions: 
1. What can go wrong?  
2. How likely is it? 
3. What are its consequences?   
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These three basic questions are known as the triplet definition of risk, which was 
introduced by Kaplan and Garrick in the first issue of Risk Analysis.
30
 This definition of 
risk is the basis for Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). PRA is a systematic process that 
integrates information about design, operational practices, historical information, human 
interaction, and component reliability to determine likelihood and severity ratings for 
potential adverse events. PRA was first applied to study the reliability of nuclear reactors 
in the Reactor Safety Study released in 1974,
 31
 and since has been used as a major tool 
to assess risks and inform risk management decisions by many government agencies and 
private companies.
 32
 
 
The answer to the first question of a risk assessment requires technical knowledge of 
possible detrimental outcomes of a given activity or action.
33
 There are two methods of 
answering this question. The first method is deductive analysis, a top-down approach 
that takes a system failure and analyzes behaviors of that system that could contribute to 
the failure. The second method is inductive analysis, a bottom-up approach that analyzes 
the failure of individual components of the system to determine the likelihood of overall 
system failure.
34
 The first question of risk assessments feeds into the second and third 
questions through developing and quantifying accident scenarios, which are chains of 
events that link an initiating event to an end-point detrimental consequence. PRA can be 
performed for either internal initiating events, which are events such as system failures 
or operator error that occur during the normal mode of operation, or external initiating 
events, which are events like natural disasters.
33 
Accident scenarios are typically 
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represented by event trees and fault trees. Event trees are inductive reliability analysis 
tools that graphically explore system responses that could occur following some 
initiating event. Event tree analysis shows all plausible operating paths from an initiating 
event to illustrate ways in which the system either succeeds or fails. As shown in Figure 
2, the likelihood of system success or system failure is determined from the likelihood of 
success or failure at each subsequent event. The likelihood of reaching each end-state 
can then be found by simply tracing each branch in the event tree. Fault trees are 
deductive reliability analysis tools that graphically depict the sequence of events that can 
lead to an undesirable event. Fault tree analysis can provide a quantitative estimate of 
system reliability by generating a symbolic logic model of failures and faults. The 
probability of a fault or failure at each individual component is then combined to 
determine the probability of some top-level event. An example of a fault tree is 
displayed in Figure 3
34
. The results from event and fault trees are a set of probability 
density functions for the expected frequency of occurrence from various adverse events, 
which typically are represented per year. An example for a nuclear reactor is shown in 
Figure 4, where each probability density function represents the likelihood of a specific 
accident type.  
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Figure 2. Example Event Tree
34 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Example Fault Tree
34
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Figure 4. Example PRA Probability Density Function for Nuclear Reactor
29
 
 
 
 
The final step of risk assessment is to determine the consequences of adverse events if 
they occur. These are typically expressed using an attribute that the analyst is trying to 
prevent, such as expected number of deaths or expected financial loss. For events that 
have occurred a large number of times, the consequences can be determined from 
historical data. For events that are rare or have not yet happened, their consequences are 
determined using models or subject matter experts (SME). The expected consequences 
of each event are then multiplied by the  expected frequency of that event to yield risk. 
The result is a risk curve, which can be used as a means for comparison to other systems. 
The risk curve in Figure 5 compares the annual risk of deaths due to various man-made 
systems.
29
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Figure 5. Risk of Fatalities From Man-Made Systems
29
 
 
 
 
II.B.  Security Risk Assessments 
 
PRA is used to analyze safety risks. However, enterprises must also evaluate security 
risks. Risk in the context of security carries a slightly different meaning than safety risk, 
and is defined as "the anticipated consequences over a period of time to a defined set of 
targets, resulting from a defined set of threats, and considering the vulnerabilities of the 
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specific targets."
 35
 Unlike safety risks, which include the vulnerability of the system and 
the consequences of an adverse event, security risks also require the intent to cause the 
adverse event by some threat. Therefore, security risk exists at the intersection of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences.
35
 This means security risk can be addressed in three 
different ways. Security systems can be upgraded to decrease the likelihood that a threat 
succeeds in creating an adverse event and consequences can be minimized through 
mitigation techniques. Security risks can also be addressed by minimizing the 
capabilities and intentions of the threat to cause an adverse event. In the context of 
terrorism, counterterrorism is the strategy applied to decrease the threat. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Security Risk is the Intersection of Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequences
35
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Much like with PRA, the triplet definition of risk is consistently used as a common 
framework for SRA, evidenced by its utilization in government agencies and private 
sector organizations such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE), and most of the nuclear electric utilities.
36
  
 
In SRA, the first question of risk assessment, "What can go wrong?", is addressed 
similarly to that of PRA. For nuclear terrorism, this question has already been answered 
by the four threats introduced in Chapter 1. However the second question "How likely is 
it", is much more difficult to address. Typically, this question is broken down to "How 
likely is it that an adversary decides to attack?" and "How likely is the adversary to 
succeed given they initiate an attack".
28 
The likelihood an adversary decides to attack is 
the initiating event of SRA. Unlike PRA, where an initiating event is a random, 
uncontrollable event, initiating events in SRA are the result of strategic and planned 
decisions made by an adversary. The adversary can purposely act in deceptive or 
unpredictable ways and can alter their attack strategy based on countermeasures taken by 
the defender. Because an intelligent adversary can make strategic decisions, the 
likelihood they decide to attack will depend to some degree on the likelihood they will 
succeed. The likelihood an adversary succeeds depends on the attack scenario they plan, 
their resources, and their capabilities. For many high security facilities, such as nuclear 
facilities, the lack of data on previous attacks requires SRA to rely on the characteristics 
of potential adversaries, which is derived from the intelligence community. The 
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intelligence community continuously monitors and assesses the activities and 
capabilities of different terrorist organizations, both domestically and internationally. 
This information is evaluated in an attempt to determine the capabilities, resources, and 
intentions of terrorist organizations and how these translate into their decision to attack 
various targets. However, this intelligence information can be incomplete or inaccurate. 
Additionally, given the same information analysts can disagree on the likelihood that an 
adversary will attack, which was conveyed by Figure 1 in chapter 1. Therefore, an 
essential aspect and an ongoing challenge in SRA is how to best incorporate relevant 
intelligence information into meaningful inputs.
32
  
  
The final question in SRA, "What are the consequences?", are solved similarly to PRA, 
employing the use of consequence models and SME. However, the  adversary adds 
additional complexity to the problem. For example, the potential safety consequences of 
exposure to a strong radiological source, like a Cobalt-60 teletherapy unit, are straight 
forward to calculate because it is fixed and enclosed a heavily shielded container. The 
consequence analysis therefore only has to consider the effectiveness of well defined 
safety features against a bounded set of potential accident scenarios. Conversely, the 
security risks of that same source are much more complex to analyze. In the security 
context, the consequences now depend on who decides to steal the source, what 
capabilities they have to weaponize the source, and what targets they may decide to 
attack. This requires the analysis of an essentially unbounded set of attack scenarios, all 
of which may have very different consequences.   
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Though fault trees and event trees have been employed in SRA, the ability of the 
adversary to optimize his attack strategy and adapt to security upgrades necessitates 
different modeling techniques that can better capture this dynamic relationship. A 
combination of models are typically applied to SRA problems to determine the second 
question of risk analysis, "How likely is it?". Three mathematical methods commonly 
used to determine the likelihood that an adversary will attack are Bayesian network 
analysis, multiple attribute utility analysis, and game theory. The probability of success 
given an attack is determined using pathways analysis. In many cases measured data 
either does not exist or would be impractical to determine, and SME are employed to 
provide informed data to use in these mathematical methods. 
 
II.B.1. Bayesian Network Analysis 
 
A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical representation of the probabilistic relationships 
among variables of interest. The relationships between variables are expresses using 
Bayes' Theorem, which calculates the probability of one event occurring based on 
whether a prior event has occurred. If both   and   are events, and the probability of 
each event occurring respectively is known, if   occurs then the probability that   
occurs is determined using Bayes' theorem in Equation 1. 
 
        
          
    
       (1) 
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BNs assimilate information that can be either measured (objective information) or 
inferred (subjective information). Bayesian networks offer the ability to combine 
objective and subjective data and update results as new threat data is received. BNs also 
account for subjective assessments of how intelligent adversaries may modify future 
attack strategies and deviate from historical patterns.
37
 A simple  example of a Bayesian 
network is displayed in Figure 7, where four pieces of evidence about an adversary are 
assimilated to determine the likelihood that the adversary chooses a particular pathway. 
Each piece of evidence influences the likelihood of the adversary choosing pathway 1. 
The input is the degree of belief that each individual piece of evidence is either true or 
false. Bayes' theorem then assimilates this information into the likelihood of the event 
based on the evidence provided. As any piece of evidence changes, the network can be 
updated to reflect these changes and determine the impact of the updated evidence on the 
event of interest.  
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Figure 7. Simple Bayesian Network Using Netica
38 
 
 
 
II.B.2. Multiple Attribute Utility Analysis  
 
Multiple Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) 39,40 is a mathematical modeling tool that 
can assign scores representing preferences among alternative choices in a decision 
situation. The model  assumes that the relative desirability of a particular alternative 
depends on how its attributes are viewed. Attributes are any measurable characteristic 
that may influence a decision. For example, attributes for buying a car would be 
characteristics about cars that the decision maker thought was important, such as price, 
reliability, safety ratings, fuel economy, color, etc. Each attribute is weighted based on 
its importance to the decision maker. A utility function is also assigned to each attribute, 
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which represents how the decision maker views that attribute. In the car example, the 
utility function for gas mileage may be represented by Equation 2, where the utility of a 
car with gas mileage of 50 mpg would be 1.0 and the utility of a car with gas mileage of 
10 mpg would be 0.2.  
 
                   (2) 
 
These utility functions would then be assigned weights based on the relative importance 
of each attribute to decision maker in making the decision being analyzed. The utility 
functions and weights corresponding to each attribute can be assimilated in two ways, as 
the MAUA function has both an additive and multiplicative form. The additive form is 
given by Equation 3. 
 
              
 
   
         (3) 
 
The constants    are the weighting factors assigned to each attribute and n is the total 
number of attributed being evaluated. The multiplicative form of the MAUA function is 
given by Equation 4. 
 
                       
 
                         (4) 
 
where   is a scaling parameter that satisfies Equation 5. 
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               (5) 
 
 
The additive form of the MAUA function is a simplification of the multiplicative form 
where the sum of all of the   weighting factors is equal to unity.  
 
The additive MAUA function is essentially a weighted average. This has a potential 
drawback where the relative impact to the final result is directly related to the value of 
the weighting factor   . If    is 0.01, that attribute only has a 1% impact on the final 
utility value. For security applications, this means that the method will not perform 
correctly in limiting cases. For example, if one attribute of a terrorists decision to 
develop a nuclear weapon is the type of nuclear material, and this attribute is weighted 
with 10% importance compared to other attributes, the difference between weapons 
usable material with a utility value of unity and uranium ore with a utility value of 
essentially zero will only affect the overall utility value by 10%. This is not an accurate 
representation of reality. Conversely, the multiplicative MAUA function behaves 
differently. For limiting cases where an attribute's utility value approaches unity or zero, 
it will drive the overall utility value in that direction. This demonstrates correct behavior 
for limiting cases, however the drawback is that the multiplicative method is less 
sensitive to changes in attribute utility functions with intermediate values.
41
 The use 
multiplicative or additive MAUA therefore should be based on the characteristics of the 
decision being analyzed. 
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II.B.3. Game Theory 
 
Game theory is the study of multiple player decision problems. In security problems, the 
two players are the terrorists who represent the attacker and the State who represents the 
defender. An important assumption in game-theoretic models is that the utilities of 
different consequences must be derivable for each player, which requires knowledge 
about the adversary's goals and decision process. The use of game theory in SRA is 
somewhat controversial. It assumes that players are rational and intelligent, which may 
not be accurate if players are not as sophisticated as they are given credit (e.g. they 
miscalculate the consequences of their actions).  Typically terrorists are modeled as 
utility maximizers, an assumption that is intended to default to the worst case and 
therefore add in some conservatism to the results. This makes sense from the perspective 
that defending against the worst an adversary could do is not a bad thing. However, it 
can potentially lead to less than optimal allocation of resources. Despite these potential 
drawbacks, game theory has contributed to a number of studies  in SRA, mainly because 
of its ability to capture the dynamic nature of security problems. These concerns do 
highlight the importance of understanding what game theory does. Given a set of 
opponents and their respective goals, game theory yields the optimal way for each player 
to play the game, not how the game will actually be played. When applying game 
theory, it is vital to both define the goals of the adversary and defender as accurately as 
possible, but also assess the impacts of the adversary behaving in less than optimal 
ways.
32
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II.B.4. Pathways Analysis 
 
Pathways analysis is a systematic technique to analyze the different combinations of 
actions that an adversary could take to cause undesired events. It requires technical 
knowledge about how an adversary would accomplish a set of consequences in addition 
to knowledge about the system being analyzed.  Each pathway can be evaluated by 
breaking it down into the individual tasks required to complete each path. Each 
individual task is then analyzed to determine the likelihood that the adversary succeeds. 
Analyzing how the adversary can succeed at each task requires scenario analysis, which 
details how an adversary will accomplish each pathway task. For example, a pathway 
element may be that an adversary gains entry into a facility. The subsequent scenario 
analysis must consider all ways that could allow the adversary to complete this task. 
Potential scenarios could include falsifying credentials to gain access, analyzing the 
facility layout to find covert ways to sneak into the facility without detection, or using 
force to attempt to defeat the guard force. Scenario analysis requires assessments of the 
adversary's ability to accomplish each of these scenarios, as the adversary will attempt 
the scenario that gives them the best chance for success.  
 
For complex systems there will typically be a large number of pathways and 
subsequently an even larger number of scenarios. This may make it impractical to model 
every potential scenario. In this case, some sort of screening methodology must be 
introduced to eliminate the pathways that are of least concern. However when not 
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analyzing an exhaustive set of pathways, care must be taken to ensure that the subset of 
pathways and scenarios analyzed is representative of all potential pathways. 
 
II.B.5. Subject Matter Experts (SME) 
 
A SME is an individual who is an expert in particular field or topic. SME can be applied 
to a variety of issues in SRA. They can evaluate metrics that cannot be measured with 
any statistical validity, such as the utility functions of terrorists for MAUA or game 
theory, or can be employed when acquiring sufficient data on a value would be too 
costly or time consuming. SME will look at information about a system and give a 
subjective, qualitative assessment. This can then be translated into a quantitative value to 
use in SRA. When SME are used to determine likelihood or risk values, the results run 
the risk of reflecting “classic biases grounded in the nature of the last attack or in a 
professional familiarity with some terrifying scenarios.”42 Biases can be minimized by 
eliciting a number of experts in a variety of fields or by eliciting the most qualified 
experts in each particular field.
42
 
 
II.C. Current Approaches in Security Risk Analysis 
 
While SRA approaches share a common framework based on the triplet definition of 
risk, they differ based on the specific details that each approach uses to define the threat, 
how they evaluate the likelihood of events, and the methods used to combine these into 
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meaningful risk calculations. The consensus among the literature is that a SRA approach 
must meet three key criteria. First, the approach must model the terrorist group as an 
intelligent adversary that makes strategic decisions to achieve their objectives. Second,  
the approach must dynamically model proposed security upgrades, allowing the 
adversary to change their decisions based on where resources are applied by the 
defender. Finally, the approach must provide results that can be easily communicated to 
stakeholders. Currently, there are no studies in the open literature that apply all of these 
criteria to the effectiveness of nuclear security measures at the State level.  
  
An overview of three SRA approaches is provided. These methodologies were selected 
because they were the most relevant to this work. Other SRA approaches are available in 
references 44-53. 
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II.C.1. Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems
28,52
 
 
M. L. Garcia introduces a methodology to design and evaluate the Physical Protection 
System (PPS) of a facility. The methodology calls for the development of a Design Basis 
Threat (DBT), which is derived from a threat assessment and defines the details of the 
threat the facility must protect against. A typical DBT includes information about the 
threat such as the number of adversaries, their weapons, equipment, training, etc. The 
DBT is used as a basis to test the components of the security system.  The IAEA 
recommends the use of a DBT as the basis of a State's physical protection system at 
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nuclear facilities.
53
 Garcia's methodology requires a very detailed characterization of the 
facility being tested, down to the level of the construction materials in each building, and 
any security equipment installed on all fences, walls, doors, etc.. Once this is done, the 
methodology divides the facility into layers, with the outer layer typically being offsite 
and the final layer being the location of a target. Layers are definable areas between a 
location off-site and the target on-site. For a simple facility, this will typically include at 
minimum the layers shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Security Layers Diagram 
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The features that make up the border between each layer are then defined. For the 
example in Figure 8, a fence and gate typically define the barriers that separate off-site 
and on-site. Additionally, the target will likely be stored in a vault or safe in the target 
room. The next step is to determine the time it would take to breach each layer, which is 
referred to as the delay time. Adding the delay times at each layer yields the time 
required to go from off-site to the target, which is the total adversary task time (TATT). 
 
In addition to installed features, the security system relies on a response force, which 
could be on-site guards or the local police force. The response force is described by two 
pieces of information. The first is the response force time (RFT), which is the time it will 
take the response force to respond to an alarm. The second is the probability of 
neutralization (PN), which is the probability that the response force can defeat the 
adversary defined in the DBT. The RFT is used to determine the critical detection point 
(CDP), which is the last security layer where TATT remaining is greater than RFT. The 
CDP is therefore the last point at which the adversary can be detected to allow the 
response force to interrupt the adversary. For example, if it will take 120 seconds for an 
adversary to breach a safe to get to the target and RFT is 100 seconds, as long as the 
adversary is detected attempting to open the safe the response force can interrupt them. 
However if RFT is 150 seconds, even if the adversary is detected opening the safe they 
will have achieved their goal before the response force arrives. 
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The CDP is then used to determine the probability of interruption (PI), which is the 
probability the response force will interdict an adversary attempting to reach the target. 
This requires the security elements that detect the adversary breaching each layer to be 
defined. PI is then determined by finding the joint probability of detection for each layer 
outside the CDP.  
 
PI and PN are used to calculate the effectiveness of the security system, represented by 
PE, the value of which is determined using Equation 6.    is a quantitative value 
representing the effectiveness of the security system and is equivalent to the probability 
that an adversary succeeds given they decide to attack. 
 
                    (6) 
 
Risk can then be calculated using this value and incorporating the probability the 
adversary decided to attack (  ) and the consequences of a successful attack  (C) 
 
                  (7) 
 
The major strength of this approach is that all of the values used to determine    can be 
based on measured data. All detectors can be tested to determine the probability of 
detecting an adversary passing that detector, barriers can be tested to determine how 
long it takes to breach each barrier, and the response force and adversary force can be 
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modeled to simulate   .
 
This aspect of the methodology is one of the main reasons it is 
the basis of the approach employed at US nuclear facilities to calculate the probability 
the adversary will succeed if they attack.
54
  
 
While this methodology calculates a very precise value for the probability the adversary 
succeeds given an attack, the probability that the adversary decided to attack cannot be 
treated with the same precision. As a result, the application of this methodology is most 
useful for calculating conditional risk rather than absolute risk. In addition, everything in 
Garcia's methodology is based on the DBT, meaning the security system may be 
sensitive to changes in the DBT.
55
 Also, this method is strictly a facility based approach, 
meaning the risk at each facility is considered in isolation. When looking at risk from the 
State-level, it is imperative to understand how upgrades at individual facilities affect risk 
to the State as a whole. Security upgrades at a particular facility will decrease the risk at 
that facility, but may simply cause the adversary to attack somewhere else causing the 
risk to other facilities in the State increase. This transfer of risk within the State could 
offset any risk reduction value received by upgrading the one facility, negating or 
minimizing the benefit of these resources on the State-level risk. 
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II.C.2. Probabilistic Modeling of Terrorist Threats: A Systems Analysis Approach 
to Setting Priorities Among Countermeasures
42
 
 
Pate-Cornell and Guikema introduce an approach that incorporates risk analysis, systems 
analysis, decision analysis, and game theory that can be used to evaluate 
countermeasures intended to address terrorist threats from a national level. The approach 
used multiple levels of systems analysis in order to be detailed enough to support 
decisions among various countermeasures. At the highest level, Pate-Cornell and 
Guikema introduce an overarching model that consolidates the massive amount of 
information about the different threat scenarios and the objectives and capabilities of 
different terrorist groups. The top level model is used to determine the targets 
adversaries will choose and an assessment on the effects of different attacks on these 
targets. The second-level system analyzes the potential targets to determine the 
vulnerabilities of each of them. At this level, the interdependencies among various 
networks and systems (for example the dependency of communications systems on 
electric power) that could be potential targets are captured in order to identify the most 
effective measures to increase the robustness of these systems. The third level assesses 
the consequences of various attack scenarios. The main objectives of the model are to 
determine the priority of U.S. infrastructure components that need to be strengthened, 
the most effective ways to reduce the capabilities of the threat, and prioritize what types 
of intelligence information should be collected. 
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The top level model is represented by the influence diagram in Figure 9. The influence 
diagrams show the variables that affect the respective decisions of different terrorist 
groups and those of the U.S. The first step in the analysis is to probabilistically combine 
the actions of different terrorist groups with assessments of their objectives and the 
consequences to U.S. interests. This step identifies all classes of attack scenarios, 
essentially answering what can go wrong. It then assesses the likelihood that these 
classes of scenarios will occur based on the intent, chance of adversary success, and 
relative attractiveness to the terrorist. These attack scenarios are then prioritized based 
on their likelihood and expected damage to the US if they occur (based on the U.S. point 
of view). These three steps satisfy the three essential questions of risk analysis. The final 
step is to model the dynamics of the problem as a game, by periodically updating the 
model with new information to represent learning by both the terrorist organization and 
the State defender.   
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Figure 9. Influence Diagram Representing an Overarching Model for Prioritizing Threats and 
Countermeasures 
 
 
The dynamic, game-theoretic stage of the model uses data that represent the beliefs of 
U.S. experts regarding the actions and the value systems of different adversaries. This is 
because the model is built to support U.S. decisions based on U.S. knowledge. The first 
step in the dynamic portion of the analysis is to assess the expected utility of each attack 
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scenario for various potential adversaries. The utility to each terrorist group is assumed 
to be the sum of the damages (e.g. casualties inflicted or economic damage inflicted) 
caused by successfully completing that scenario. The expected utilities are then 
normalized to provide the probability of terrorist actions for each group, applying the 
simplifying assumption that each terrorist group only plans one type of attack for each 
time period analyzed. It is also assumed that the modeled terrorists behave as rational 
decision makers, choosing scenarios that yield a higher level of utility. At the same time, 
the disutility
c
 of a successful attack based on the U.S. perspective is determined. This 
dynamic model analyzes the benefits of various countermeasures by modeling how the 
application of each countermeasure affects the probability of attack or the consequences 
of an attack.   
 
Pate-Cornell and Guikema then expand this approach to include a two-sides influence 
diagram, shown in Figure 10. This allows the terrorist utility functions to be modeled 
independently of U.S. disutility values (equivalent to consequence values). They then 
apply this method to fictional scenarios and display the results. The first result is the 
marginal probabilities of different attack scenarios, displayed in Table 2. This is then 
used to determine the expected disutility to the U.S. of each attack scenario, displayed in 
Table 3, by combining these probabilities with the consequences associated with each 
attack scenario. 
                                                 
c
 Utility is the net benefit of some action to the decision maker. Disutility, therefore, is the negative effect 
(or loss) felt by the decision maker. In security problems, the adversary benefits from damages inflicted on 
the defender.  
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Figure 10. Single-Period, Two-Sided Global Influence Diagram 
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Table 2. Marginal Probabilities of Attack Scenarios Without Countermeasures (Status Quo) 
 
 
 
Table 3. Expected Disutilities of Attack Scenarios Without Countermeasures (Status Quo)
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The values in Table 2 and Table 3 are then used as a baseline risk value, which is used to 
determine the cost-effectiveness of various countermeasures by modeling these 
countermeasures in the system and evaluating the resulting decrease in expected 
disutility (U.S. benefits). 
 
II.C.3. Risk Analysis For Critical Asset Protection
56
  
 
McGill et al. propose an asset-driven risk assessment framework that is intended to 
assist in deciding how to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. The framework 
is broken into five steps. The first is scenario identification, where an exhaustive set of 
plausible threat scenarios for an asset are defined. The second step is the consequence 
and criticality assessment, where the losses associated with a threat scenario are 
estimated assuming adversary success. McGill et al. propose five consequence 
dimensions, displayed in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Asset-Level Consequence Dimensions
 
 
 
 
 
The result of the consequence assessment is the loss ( ) given adversary success, 
calculated using Equation 8. 
                         (8) 
 where: 
      = the maximum credible loss (in units lost per event) 
    = the physical vulnerability for a given threat intensity 
    = the effectiveness of response and recovery capabilities 
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The values in Equation 8 are determined using systems modeling techniques such as 
event trees or fault trees, or can be elicited from experts knowledgeable in appropriate 
fields. To determine total losses, the consequence assessment then incorporates the threat 
intensity using a probability density function for a finite number of threat intensity 
levels, like the one in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Threat Intensity for a Given Delivery System 
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The total losses,   , are then determined using Equation 9. 
                   (9) 
 where: 
    = the probability of imparting threat intensity level j  
    = the total loss assuming adversary success (from Equation 8) 
 
The consequence assessment is followed by a security vulnerability assessment that 
evaluates the probability that the adversary is detected and successfully defeated by the 
security system. The security vulnerability assessment is similar to that of Garcia, 
calculating the probability of security system effectiveness as the product of the 
probability of interruption (PI) and probability of neutralization (PN). The probability of 
adversary success is then calculated using Equation 10, which includes the probability 
the adversary is successful even if the security system fails (  ). 
 
                       (10) 
 
The product of probability of adversary success (  ) and total expected loss for each 
attack profile (  )  yields the conditional risk (   . 
 
The fourth step is the threat likelihood assessment, which assesses the annual rate of 
occurrence of plausible scenarios. This step is used to take available information about 
the adversary and translate them into quantitative values that are used to determine the 
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relative attractiveness, the adversary's perceived expected utility, and the actual expected 
utility for each attack scenario.  The final step is a benefit-cost analysis where proposed 
risk mitigation actions are evaluated based on the ratio of the expected improvement in 
risk level and the cost of the actions.  An overview of these five steps is given in Figure 
12. 
 
McGill et al. recommend using an annual attack frequency in their model, but point out 
the inherent difficulty in deriving an accurate estimate for the frequency given the 
complexity and dynamic nature of security problems. However, they have built the 
model in a way that they can make calculations based on the relative attractiveness of 
targets without trying to estimate the frequency of attacks. While no longer yielding a 
value for total annual risk, ignoring the frequency of attacks will still provide insights 
into the relative contribution to total risk.
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Figure 12. Overview of Asset-Driven Risk Analysis 
 
 
II.C.4. Literature Summary 
 
The consensus among the literature is that a SRA approach has three key requirements. 
First, the approach must model the terrorist group as an intelligent adversary that makes 
strategic decisions to achieve their objectives. Second,  the approach must dynamically 
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model proposed security upgrades, allowing the adversary to change their decisions 
based on where resources are applied by the State. Finally, the approach must provide 
results that can be easily communicated to stakeholders. Currently, there are no studies 
in the open literature that evaluate the effectiveness of all State-level nuclear security 
measures and meet all three of these requirements.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
III.A.  Overview of Methodology  
 
The methodology requires a large amount of information about the state infrastructure 
and the adversary. There are three major portions that must be defined. These are the 
adversary characteristics, details about the State infrastructure, and the State's utility 
functions. Once the necessary inputs are defined, pathways are generated and analyzed.   
A flowchart of this methodology is shown in Figure 13.  
 
Each of the four threats of nuclear terrorism require an adversary to accomplish a variety 
of sequential tasks that are specific to that threat. For example, to create an IND the 
adversary must acquire SNM, a viable weapon design, and the non-nuclear components 
for that design. Depending on the properties of the SNM that the adversary acquires, 
multiple processing steps (such as fission product removal, metallurgy, machining, etc.) 
may be needed before the SNM is weapons usable. Therefore, the characteristics of the 
nuclear material will dictate what potential pathways the adversary must take to execute  
one of the four nuclear threats. Because each threat has unique pathways, pathways 
analysis is used to calculate the risk for each threat. The probability of the adversary 
successfully completing one of the four threats can be derived from the product of the 
probabilities of adversary success at each subsequent task along the pathway. 
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Figure 13. Methodology Flowchart 
 
 
 
Each nuclear threat also carries potential consequences that are unique to that threat. 
This methodology uses four separate consequence categories, which are: 
1. Loss of life - the total number of deaths associated with an executed 
threat;  
2. Economic Loss - The net present value of the monetary loss directly or 
indirectly resulting from an executed threat. (property damage, 
decontamination costs, business down time, etc.);  
3. Loss of Infrastructure - The impact that the loss of a target would have on 
the ability for society to function; and 
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4. Secondary Consequences - Consequences that do not fit in the previous 
three categories but are of significant concern to the stakeholder (e.g. 
political consequences).  
 
III.B.  Methodology Inputs 
 
The essential information about the State's nuclear infrastructure is summarized in this 
section. The adversary inputs require expert opinion to estimate capabilities and 
motivations of the adversary.  
 
III.B.1.  Adversary Inputs 
 
Adversary inputs are related to their motivations, capabilities and resources. The 
motivations behind an organization's choices for nuclear terrorism influence the type of 
nuclear threat the adversary is most likely to choose to achieve their goals. Similarly, an 
adversary is more likely to attempt a path where the expected benefit of success is worth 
the potential for failure. The likelihood of completing a path depends on the capabilities 
and resources of the terrorist group and the perceived benefit of successfully completing 
the path depends on the group's goals.   
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III.B.1.i.  Adversary Capability and Resource Inputs 
 
The capabilities and resources of a terrorist organization related to nuclear terrorism will 
be best characterized by the intelligence community, as there is little to no historical data 
from which to draw conclusions. Capabilities are defined in the code based on the 
assessed likelihood of a sub-state group to complete various processing tasks associated 
with different nuclear threats. This assessment would be performed by State intelligence 
and terrorism SME
d
.  For example, to machine weapons usable SNM to a usable shape 
for an IND, a terrorist group must be able to construct a makeshift facility and acquire 
the necessary equipment (e.g. a lathe capable of shaping Uranium), acquire the expertise 
to successfully use the equipment, and do all of this without being detected by the State. 
The likelihood of successfully machining a part therefore is the product of the 
probability of creating a facility and successfully using the facility, both without being 
detected by the State. The tasks defined in the methodology are theft of material, 
conversion, reprocessing, enrichment, machining, metallurgy, IND weaponization using 
gun-type or implosion assembly methods, and RDD weaponization. The four inputs 
associated with each of these are listed in Table 5. Theft of material is not defined in 
Table 5, because this task is dependent on the particular facility and therefore is captured 
in the facility inputs. 
                                                 
d
 These values should not be considered hard values, but rather educated guesses. The sensitivity of the 
final risk value to these assumptions is calculated to determine how risk changes based on capability 
assumptions.    
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Table 5. Assessed Likelihoods Adversary Capabilities and Resources Inputs 
Assessed Task 
Likelihood 
Probability 
Build 
Probability 
Use 
Probability Not-
Detected 
Processing 
Attempts 
Conversion   
       
       
    
       
Reprocessing   
    
   
    
   
    
       
Enrichment   
       
       
    
       
Machining   
       
       
    
       
Metallurgy   
       
       
    
       
IND 
Weaponization: 
Implosion 
  
     
   
     
   
     
        
IND 
Weaponization:  
Gun-Type 
  
    
   
    
   
    
       
RDD 
Weaponization 
  
       
       
    
       
 
 
Breaking the probability of success into constituent parts allows each parameter to be 
treated individually which more easily reflects areas of weakness or strength of the 
adversary or the State. For example, a high value for   
     may indicate weaknesses in 
the State's ability to enforce export control and dual-use technology laws and a low value 
for   
     represents a lack of technical knowledge by terrorist group that is necessary to 
complete the task. For tasks where   
     is low, the adversary may seek dual-use 
facilities within the State's infrastructure if   
     is sufficiently large and such facilities 
exist. 
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These values are used to determine the overall probability of success along a path. The 
only way the adversary can move on to the next task is if they successfully complete the 
current task without detection. If the adversary is detected, the State interdicts and stops 
the threat scenario from progressing. If the adversary fails the task but is not detected, 
the task can be retried if the adversary has the resources to try again. The resources of 
the terrorist group are considered in the model by defining a variable,      , as the 
maximum number of times that an adversary would be able to attempt a task. Combining 
this information, the probability of completing a task is determined by the event tree in 
Figure 14, where the probability of failing the task is denoted by       and the 
probability the State detects the adversary is   
    .   
 
 
 
Figure 14. Task Event Tree 
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The probability of success for an individual task is a geometric series, and can be 
calculated using Equation 11. 
 
  
           
      
 
      
           
      
    
           
     
        (11) 
 
Examination of Equation 11 shows that if the adversary has inadequate resources to 
complete a task (      = 0), the adversary does not have the capabilities to complete a 
task (     
    = 0), or the State is guaranteed to detect an adversary attempting the task 
( 
 
    
=0), then there is no chance of adversary success (  
     = 0).  
 
 
III.B.1.ii.  Adversary Motivations Inputs 
 
Terrorist motivations are incorporated into the model through Multiple Attribute Utility 
Analysis (MAUA). Each motivation or disincentive is described in Appendix A
e
, along 
with the terrorist group or groups that have demonstrated each. The input required is 
how well each motivation or disincentive corresponds to the goals of the terrorist group 
being modeled. These inputs are summarized in Table 6 and correspond to a weighting 
value that is applied to the utility functions associated with that motivation or 
                                                 
e
 The information in Appendix A is based on research conducted by Kristin Childress, a Master's student 
at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University 
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disincentive.  For example, if the group is highly motivated by apocalyptic beliefs then 
the apocalyptic belief input would be "high". 
 
 
Table 6. Motivation and Disincentive Inputs 
Motivation/Disincentive 
Alignment 
Input   
 
 
Perfectly aligns with 
motivating factors of group 
High 5 
Moderately aligns with 
motivating factors of group 
Medium 3 
Slightly aligns with 
motivating factors of group 
Low 1 
Does not align with 
motivating factor of group 
None 0 
 
 
 
Each motivation and disincentive has been assigned a relative utility value based on how 
well they indicate the intention of the modeled terrorist group. Each motivation and 
disincentive has also been weighted based on its relative importance to the decision to 
conduct nuclear terrorism. The motivations and disincentives along with the assigned 
weights and utility values are summarized in Table 7. 
 
The weights are designed so that                                     . The utility of 
each nuclear threat is determined by applying Equation 12, where       is the utility 
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function value for threat   from and motivation or disincentive   from Table 7 and  
  
  is the scaling weight from Table 6. 
 
                   
         
  
       (12) 
 
In Equation 12,   has value 5.00006, which satisfies Equation 13. 
 
              
  
              (13) 
 
The relative likelihood that the adversary will attempt each nuclear threat based solely 
on how each threat meets the adversary's motivations and disincentives is then 
determined using Equation 14. 
 
          
  
                  
    (14)     
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Table 7. Motivations and Disincentives for Nuclear Terrorism 
Motivations                                         
Prestige of Successful 
Capabilities  
0.25 0.12 0.2 0.02 0.02 
Manipulate Adversaries 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.04 0.04 
Apocalyptic Beliefs 1 0.2 0.2 0.08 0.1 
War on Own Nation 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
War on Another Nation 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.06 0.06 
Redress Conventional 
Military Asymmetry 
0.5 0.2 0.2 0.06 0.06 
Ensure Security 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.08 0 
Mass Devastation/Chaos      
                -Deaths 2 0.2 0.2 0 0.02 
                -Other 1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.16 
Religious Imperative 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.06 0.06 
Manipulate Policy 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.06 0.12 
Fascination of Nuclear 
Weapons  
1 0.2 0.2 0 0 
Fascination of 
Radiological Weapons 
1 0 0 0.2 0 
Fascination of Sabotage  1 0 0 0 0.2 
Disincentives                                         
Fear of Retaliation on 
Base of Support 
1.25 0 0 0.14 0.06 
Fear of Attracting 
Attention 
1.25 0 0 0.14 0.04 
Alienation 1.25 0 0 0.06 0.04 
Contradict Goals of 
Group      
            -Mass killings 2.25 0 0 0.2 0.18 
 -
Contamination 
of territory or 
environment 
0.5 0 0 0.12 0.04 
Lack of Religious 
Mandate 
0.75 0 0 0.16 0.12 
Internal Group Division 1.2 0 0 0.06 0.06 
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III.B.1.ii.  Other Adversary Inputs 
 
Other adversary inputs are: 
1. Domestic Group: This is a Boolean input that has a value of true or false, which 
indicates whether the terrorist group being analyzed is a domestic or international 
terrorist group. If the terrorist group is domestic, then the latitude and longitude 
coordinates where they are known to operate are also input if they are known. 
 
2. Consequence Preferences {  
     
     
     
  }: The consequence preferences of the 
terrorist group being analyzed are a numerical weighting value between zero and 
unity corresponding to how well each of the four consequence categories represent 
the group's goals for inflicting damage. An example of consequence weighting for 
three different groups is given in Table 8. The primary objective of group 1 is to 
cause loss of life, with secondary objectives being to destroy the State's infrastructure 
and inflict economic damage. Group 2 is interested in creating mass panic and fear 
among the State's stakeholders and population through any means necessary, and 
does not have a preference of how they achieve these objectives. The third group 
only wants to cause economic losses.  
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Table 8. Consequence Weights for Sample Terrorist Groups 
Consequence Weights Loss of Life 
Loss of 
Infrastructure 
Economic 
Loss 
Secondary 
Consequences 
Group 1 1 0.5 0.5 0 
Group 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
Group 3 0 0 1 0 
 
 
 
3.  Risk Attitude: The risk attitude of the terrorist group being analyzed. There are 
seven options that can be input for risk attitude. Each option corresponds to different 
weightings for the probability of success and consequences that describe how the 
adversary evaluates strategic objectives.  The seven options are displayed in Table 9.   
 
 
Table 9. Risk Attitude Exponent Values 
Risk Attitude a,b 
Extremely Risk Seeking 5,0 
Moderately Risk Seeking 3,0 
Slightly Risk Seeking 1,0 
Risk Neutral 0,0 
Slightly Risk Averse 0,1 
Moderately Risk Averse 0,3 
Extremely Risk Averse 0,5 
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III.B.2.  State Infrastructure Inputs 
 
The State's nuclear infrastructure is composed of a variety of facilities, including the 
nuclear fuel cycle and medical and industrial facilities that possess and use radiological 
materials. Each facility likely has unique security and MC&A characteristics applied to 
each material that they possess, and the nuclear threats that each material could 
potentially be used for are dependent upon the material's properties.  
 
III.B.2.i. Nuclear Weapons Inputs 
 
Intact nuclear weapons are the most attractive target for a terrorist group intent on 
nuclear terrorism. Two inputs are required for nuclear weapons. These are: 
1. Expected yield: {  } the maximum designed weapon yield, in kilotons (kT); and  
2. Engineered control effectiveness:      
    If the State possesses nuclear weapons, 
additional measures used to disable them in the event of a theft must be defined. 
For example, the effectiveness of PALs or similar control systems employed on 
nuclear weapons. This is captured by the methodology by defining a probability 
of non-State use of nuclear weapons.  
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III.B.2.ii. Special Nuclear Material Inputs 
 
This methodology requires the following inputs to characterize SNM:  
 
1. Number of SQ's:       The number of significant quantities of uranium or 
plutonium present at the facility for each type of material. A material is of a 
different type if it either has significant chemical, isotopic or physical differences 
or is located in an area of the facility that is under unique security or accountancy 
systems. For example, uranium oxide and uranium metal stored in the same 
location are different types of materials and are listed separately. Additionally, if 
some uranium metal is stored in a heavily secured vault and identical material is 
stored in a less secure processing location, they are considered two different 
materials. 
 
A significant quantity is defined by the IAEA as "the approximate amount of 
nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive 
device cannot be excluded. Significant quantities take into account unavoidable 
losses due to conversion and manufacturing processes and should not be 
confused with critical masses."
 57
 Therefore, at least one SQ of SNM is required 
for the material to be usable in an IND. The IAEA defined SQ amounts are 
displayed in Figure 15. Though it has been argued that less nuclear material than 
the IAEA's definition of an SQ is required for use in a nuclear weapon
58
, and that 
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other materials besides those listed could be used in a crude nuclear weapon,
59
 
for the purpose of demonstrating this methodology we consider only uranium and 
plutonium. Any other fissile materials of interest could easily be incorporated if 
desired. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Significant Quantities of Nuclear Materials 
 
 
2. Number of Items: {    The total number of a particular type of item present at 
the facility under identical protection measures. 
 
3. Total Mass Per Item: {  } The mass of one entire SNM object in kilograms, for 
example one fuel assembly or one can of UO2 powder.  
  
70 
 
4. Activity Per Item: {  } The total activity of each item in units of Curies. This is 
used to determine the usefulness of SNM as an RDD material and not used in the 
IND evaluation. 
 
5. Dose Rate: {      The dose rate from SNM is the quantity of radiation absorbed 
per unit time. The methodology uses the dose rate in units of Sieverts/hour 
measured at one meter from the surface of the source. 
 
6. Uranium Enrichment:       Enrichment is the weight percent of the fissile 
isotope U-235 in uranium. Enrichment affects the production of a crude nuclear 
device in a number of ways. Primarily, higher enriched uranium requires 
significantly less material to form a critical mass. This is shown in Figure 16. In 
addition, nuclear weapons require some amount of assembly time for the SNM to 
reach its optimal supercritical configuration. For implosion type weapons the 
assembly time is on the order of 1 µs and for gun-type devices it is on the order 
of 1 ms. If the fission chain reaction is started before the weapon has reached its 
final supercritical configuration, usually the result of a spontaneous fission 
neutron, the device may initiate prematurely leading to a fizzle. If it fizzles, a 
nuclear weapon fails to reach its designed yield, though it may still result in a 
significant explosive yield.  Uranium-238 has a spontaneous fission rate that is 
approximately 1000 times greater than uranium-235. Therefore the more U-238 
present the greater chance that the nuclear device will fizzle. Figure 17 displays 
  
71 
 
the probability of a spontaneous-fission-free millisecond in a bare critical mass of 
uranium based on U-235 enrichment.
 60
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Critical Mass of a Beryllium-Reflected Uranium Sphere As a Function of U-235 
Enrichment
60
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Figure 17. Probability of a Spontaneous-Fission-Free Millisecond in One Bare Critical Mass of 
Uranium of Varying Enrichment
60
 
 
 
 
7. Plutonium Quality: {     Quality is the weight percent of fissile plutonium 
isotopes Pu-239 and Pu-241 present in a mass of plutonium. Quality is an 
important measure for the attractiveness of plutonium for use in a nuclear 
explosive device for similar reasons as enrichment is for uranium. Like uranium 
enrichment, lower quality plutonium necessitates a larger critical mass. However 
the relationship between quality and critical mass, displayed in Figure 18,  is not 
as simple as that for uranium enrichment.
 61
 With plutonium weapons, the 
greatest concern is predetonation (which causes the weapon to fizzle), because 
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the spontaneous fission rate of the fissile isotopes Pu-239 and Pu-241 are similar 
to that of U-238. Referencing Figure 17, this means that a gun-type device using 
plutonium is almost guaranteed to fizzle.
60
  Implosion type assembly was 
developed for plutonium to overcome these predetonation issues. As the quality 
of plutonium gets worse, the predetonation issues become more and more 
significant.
62
 This is because Pu-238, Pu-240 and Pu-242 have spontaneous 
fission rates approximately 100,000 times greater than Pu-239, Pu-241 and U-
238. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Bare Critical Mass for Unreflected Metal Spheres for Various Qualities of Pu and 
Enrichments of U 
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8. Chemical Reactivity With Air: {Fast, Slow, None} Some chemical forms of 
SNM are chemically reactive with air. If the material has rapid reactions with air 
it must be kept in an inert atmosphere. If the material slowly reacts (i.e. corrosion 
or oxidation) it will increase the difficulty in handling and processing that 
material.
41
 The inputs used in this methodology to describe chemical reactivity 
rates are fast, slow, and none. 
 
9. Requires Active Cooling: {True, False} This input is a Boolean input and can 
have a value of true or false. Some nuclear materials generate heat and require 
active cooling to prevent damage and material release. Materials that require 
active cooling require complex portable cooling systems in order to transport 
them.
41
  
 
10. Processing Steps Required: Of the many types of nuclear materials present 
throughout the State's nuclear infrastructure, few if any will be in a form directly 
usable in an IND. The processing steps required details the types of processing 
needed to take the material from its current state to a weapons usable metal. The 
processing steps that could be required are fission product removal, chemical 
conversion, enrichment, metallurgy and machining. In addition, IND 
weaponization is always required for any SNM to produce an IND. 
a. Fission product removal, similar to reprocessing in the nuclear fuel cycle, 
is the removal of fission products from nuclear material, typically spent 
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fuel. In 1978, the United States conducted a feasibility study on the 
clandestine production of a crude reprocessing plant by a non-nuclear 
weapons State and concludes that a "quick and simple" reprocessing plant 
could be built in a matter of months and used to produce enough 
plutonium for a nuclear device in a matter of weeks.
63
 A similar type of 
facility would be expected to be used by a terrorist group attempting to 
remove fission products from stolen spent fuel. While the likelihood of a 
sub-state group secretly constructing and using a crude reprocessing 
facility is incredibly low, it is non-zero and is considered in this risk 
assessment.  
b. Chemical conversion is the process of converting uranium into UF6 gas , 
which is capable of being used in enrichment operations.     
c. Enrichment is the process of increasing the weight percentage of U-235 in 
uranium to make it more attractive for use in a weapon. Currently, few 
States have the capability to enrich Uranium, which requires large and 
expensive facilities and some of the world's most sensitive technology. 
As a result, the feasibility of a sub-state group successfully building an 
enrichment facility is essentially zero. Enriching uranium is also a very 
lengthy process and if a sub-state group somehow acquired possession of 
enrichment capabilities, it would be difficult to complete the enrichment 
undetected. This processing step is included in this methodology for 
completeness, as future technology developments may make this process 
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more plausible. In addition, it is useful to know how sensitive risk is to 
this processing step. 
d. Metallurgy is the process of taking various forms of uranium and 
plutonium and converting them to a metallic form.  
e. Machining is the process of taking metallic uranium or plutonium and 
shaping them for use in a weapon. This process would require advanced 
equipment, such as precision calibrated, computer-guided machine tools 
with the ability to produce complex shapes within a very small 
tolerance.
64
  
f. IND Weaponization involves assimilating the weapons usable SNM into 
a crude nuclear weapons design with the other non-nuclear components. 
This step can be completed using the simpler gun-type design or the 
much more technically sophisticated implosion design. 
 
III.B.2.iii. Radiological Material Inputs 
 
This methodology requires the following inputs to characterize radiological materials: 
 
1. Number of items: {  
     The number of individual items of each type of 
radiological material present at a facility under equivalent security and 
safeguards. 
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2. Total Mass Per Item:  {  
     The mass of one item measured in kilograms. 
Typically, radiological sources are stored in shielding containers.  
 
3. Dose Rate Per Item: {      The dose rate from radiological material is the 
quantity of radiation absorbed per unit time. The methodology uses the dose rate 
at 1 meter from the source in units of Sieverts/hour from each individual item of 
radiological material. 
 
4. Activity Per Item: {  
     The total activity of each item in Curies. This input is 
used to determine the relative consequences of various radiological sources. 
 
5. D-value:  {    
     The D-value, or danger value, is a numerical value used to 
categorize the relative severity of health effects per unit activity from different 
radiological sources. The danger value may be applied to accident situations or 
malevolent acts and is based on the amount of activity required from a given 
radiological isotope to deliver an amount of radiation dose that causes serious 
health effects.
65
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III.B.3.iv. Sabotage Inputs 
 
Sabotage is a different fundamental threat than the other threats of nuclear terrorism and 
is therefore modeled independently. Sabotage requires a single act by the adversary 
rather than set of sequential tasks. Also, in  other threats the adversary has a fabricated 
weapon that can then be delivered to a choice of targets. Conversely, sabotage scenarios 
are fixed scenarios, meaning the target is the location of the material itself. Therefore, 
systems and procedures that mitigate consequences can be installed at facilities and 
employed with the transportation of nuclear materials that minimize potential 
consequences. For each sabotage scenario, the following inputs are required: 
 
1. Number of Vital Areas: {   
       Facilities protect against sabotage by 
identifying vital areas, which are defined as areas "inside a protected area 
containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material, the sabotage of 
which could directly or indirectly lead to unacceptable radiological 
consequences."
66
 Each sabotage scenario may have one vital area or multiple 
vital areas, and therefore the methodology treats each sabotage scenario 
separately. The vital areas for each sabotage event are input individually and 
treated as sabotage targets when characterizing the physical security of the 
facility. 
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2. Probability of Consequences Given Vital Area Compromise: {     
      Depending 
on the scenario there is a possibility that destruction of vital areas may not lead to 
a radiological consequence. Therefore, the probability that destruction of vital 
areas leads to the specified consequences must also be defined.  
 
3. Insider Sabotage Mitigation:{    
   } This variable corresponds to the ability of 
installed security systems to prevent employees from executing sabotage threats. 
This may include human reliability programs, but also includes security systems 
that prevent access to vital areas or checks employees for tools that could be used 
in a sabotage event, such as explosives or metallic tools 
 
III.B.3.v. Facility Inputs 
 
Each facility that stores or has the capability to processes nuclear or radiological material 
has security and safeguards functions that are unique to that facility. Additionally, the 
geographic location of the facility within the State may be a significant risk factor based 
on proximity to regions where sub-state groups are known to exist, potentially outside 
the State's control. The inputs required to characterize the State infrastructure are: 
 
1. Geographic Location: The methodology incorporates the location of a facility 
through latitude and longitude coordinates. Distances between two locations are 
calculated using Equation 15. 
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cos⁡(   (    2     1)180)             
    (15) 
  
 where: 
      the distance between two locations in kilometers 
        the latitude for location n in degrees where north is positive  
         the longitude for location n in degrees where east is positive 
        6371 km 
 
The distance calculation requires the location inputs to be in degrees, so the 
longitude of Texas A&M University which is W 96º19'56.71" is -96.3261º. 
Similarly, the longitude of the IAEA, which is E 16º25'01.25", would be  
16.4169º. A State would have the resources to employ graphical information 
systems (GIS) and develop more accurate transportation routes. For the purpose 
of demonstrating this methodology, transportation routes are simplified to 
include straight line distance. 
 
2. Mean Distance Within State: {       In addition to geographic location, the 
methodology uses the average distance from the State border to the facility. This 
is used to determine the relative distance an adversary must travel within the 
State when targeting this facility relative to other facilities. 
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3. Physical Security: The methodology requires the number of security layers at the 
facility, the PN and PI values for each layer, and the targets under each layer. The 
physical security system at a facility defends against an adversary attack 
attempting theft or sabotage. If the State is using IAEA recommendations, the 
facility's physical security system should be designed using a layered approach, 
similar to the facility based methodology presented in Chapter 2 by Garcia. To 
account for multiple targets being under the same layer, the methodology assigns 
a unique number to each material at the facility and then takes the PI and PN 
values of each layer and assigns them to each applicable target. An example of 
the physical security inputs for a facility that has two targets and three unique 
security layers is given in Table 10. 
  
 
Table 10. Example Physical Security Inputs 
Layer Number PI PN Targets Under Layer 
1 0.7 0.8 1,2 
2 0.8 0.8 1,2 
3 0.9 0.8 2 
 
 
 
The corresponding effectiveness values (PE) for each target would then be 0.752 
for target type 1 and 0.795 for target type 2. A target can be either be a theft 
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target or a vital area for sabotage. 1-PE is the probability of the adversary 
successfully defeating the physical protection system and steals each target.  
 
4. Material Accountancy and Containment and Surveillance: The methodology 
requires the effectiveness of material accountancy and containment and 
surveillance (C&S) systems to be defined. These systems defend material against 
covert theft by an insider, a person with access to the facility who may be able to 
bypass physical security functions. If in compliance with IAEA safeguards, the 
State is required to have accountancy measures that can be verified by the IAEA 
to ensure the State is not diverting material. Material accountancy systems 
periodically quantify the amount of material present to ensure none has been 
removed. C&S systems monitor material to ensure it has not been tampered with 
since it was last assayed using cameras, seals and tags. An example of 
containment that a facility could employ is to have an active tamper seal on the 
container where material is stored, which alerts the facility operator whenever 
someone has access to the material. A common surveillance technique is to 
employ a two-person rule, where no facility employee ever has unobserved 
access to material. The probability the adversary successfully diverts material is 
calculated using Equation 16, where     and     are the non-detection 
probabilities for 1 SQ of SNM or 1 item of radiological material of the material 
accountancy and containment and surveillance systems respectively.  
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                       (16) 
 
5. Human Reliability Effectiveness:{   } This value relates to the effectiveness of 
employee vetting employed by the facility and describes the likelihood that an 
employee will attempt to divert material, as a result of financial gain or having 
ideological agreement or association with terrorist groups intent on nuclear 
terrorism. Though the thoroughness of background checks that the State can 
conduct may be limited by national law, the lack of background checks on 
employees is seen as a lapse in security.
67
 This value is used to calculate the 
probability of diversion of material using Equation 17. 
 
  
                    
           (17) 
  
III.B.3.vi. State-Level Inputs 
 
Additional State-level inputs are required to completely characterize the State's nuclear 
infrastructure. These are: 
 
1. Border Crossing Security Effectiveness: {    
        
     The first input considers the 
likelihood that a non-domestic terrorist group can infiltrate the State's border. 
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The second input is based on the likelihood of detecting an adversary leaving the 
State with nuclear or radiological material.  
 
2. Background Probability of Interdiction: {     
   } The mean capture distance by a 
random encounter measured in km. This input considers the State's ability to 
interdict an adversary during transportation of material to complete one of the 
threats. If the adversary acquires material covertly, either through diversion or 
black market purchase, the State may have passive systems in place that could 
potentially detect the illicit material. In addition, there is a non-zero probability 
of the State interdicting the adversary for legal offenses not related to nuclear 
terrorism that may lead to discovery of the illicit material. These probabilities 
make up the background probability of interdiction per unit distance. The 
probability of being interdicted when traveling between two locations is then 
calculated using      from Equation 15 and the background probability of 
interdiction per unit distance  in Equation 18.68   
  
             
 
      
        
     
 
    (18) 
 
3. Active Search Probability of Interdiction: {      
  } The mean capture distance by 
a deliberate search by the State. If an adversary overtly steals material or once a 
covert theft has been discovered, the State can employ additional resources to 
actively search for the adversary. This variable is independent of the background 
  
85 
 
interdiction probability and used in Equation 19 calculate the probability of 
interdiction.
68
 
 
             
 
       
         
        
     
 
                  (19) 
 
For the purpose of this methodology, these probabilities are assumed uniform for 
the entire State. However, realistically these values vary in different locations 
and the State will have the resources and information to more accurately define 
these probabilities.  
 
4. Processing (Dual-Use) Facilities: Some facilities not within the nuclear fuel cycle 
may have the capabilities or only require slight modifications to be used to 
process nuclear or radiological materials. The most obvious examples would be 
industrial metalworking or chemical processing facilities. For each facility of this 
type, the type of processing and likelihood of the State detecting illicit activities 
at that facility should be indicated. The input for the State's probability for 
detecting illicit activity is independent of the probability of detecting the 
adversary as defined in the adversary inputs.  
 
5. Target Locations: Target locations require three inputs, which are consequence 
values, geographic location, and target security effectiveness.  
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a. The first input is the consequence values for Nuclear Weapon, IND and 
RDD threats for each of the four consequence categories. Consequence 
values are numerical values between 0 and 1 that represent the relative 
severity of threats in each consequence category. The consequences are 
defined based on the specific scenarios and are scaled according to 
scenario variations.  
i. For nuclear weapons, consequences are defined for 100 kT 
weapon detonated at the target and scaled based on variations in 
weapon yield. 
ii. For IND's, the consequences are defined based on a the detonation 
of a 10 kT crude nuclear device. 
iii. For RDD's, the consequences are defined for  a dispersion using a 
source with an A/D value of 850 (e.g. 2295 Ci Cs-137, 687 Ci Co-
60, 1150 Ci Cm-244, etc.) and scaled using the A/Dvalue and 
equations in Appendix B. 
iv. Sabotage consequences have already been defined at the facility. 
b. The second input is the geographic location of the target. This input is  
the longitude and latitude of the target and is in the same format as the 
geographic location of the facility. It is used to determine the minimum 
distance required to transport the weapon to the specified target. 
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c. The final input is the effectiveness of security systems employed at the 
target. This input represents the capability to harden certain high-value 
targets to provide a last line of defense against potential attacks. {       } 
 
 
III.C. Utility Functions 
 
Utility functions associated with adversary inputs correspond to how well particular 
threats match with the characteristics of the terrorist group. For material characteristics, 
each utility function corresponds to challenges that a terrorist group would encounter 
when trying to develop one of the nuclear threats based on each input or group of inputs. 
Utility functions are used to rank the relative attractiveness of various pathways to the 
terrorist group being analyzed. The functions introduced in this section are designed so 
that the overall utility of each material is equal to the product of each utility function. 
 
III.C.1. Adversary Utility Functions 
 
The MAUA analysis on motivations and disincentives introduced in the previous section 
is used to determine the relative likelihood of the adversary choosing one of each of the 
four nuclear threats independent of pathway information. The adversary utility functions 
introduced in this section are used to determine the relative likelihood that an adversary 
will choose each pathway. The utility functions incorporate the material attractiveness 
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developed from material inputs, the likelihood of successfully completing the pathway 
which is based on the adversary's capabilities as well as security measures present in the 
State, and the adversary's consequence preferences. The risk attitude of the adversary is 
used to determine how the adversary strategically evaluates the likelihood of success vs. 
consequences.  
 
The probability of success for J tasks on a pathway is calculated by multiplying the 
results from Equation 11 for each j
th 
task, shown in Equation 20. For theft or diversion, 
the value for   
 
is derived from the effectiveness of security systems employed at the 
facility.  
 
  
         
  
        (20) 
 
The net consequence for the path based on the adversary's consequence preferences is  
determined using Equation 21. Because the adversary is attempting to damage the State, 
we assume the consequences suffered by the State are equivalent to the adversary's 
perceived payoff from completing the pathway. 
 
      
      
  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
  
  
     
     
     
      (21) 
 
The risk attitude of the adversary is used to weight the relative attractiveness of various 
scenarios to the adversary. Given three scenario options with the same expected value, 
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an adversary is expected to choose the option based on their perception of risk. An 
example is shown in Table 11, where the relative value of each scenario is shown based 
on risk attitude. The table is populated using Equation 22. The values for a and b are 
derived from Table 9. 
 
                
          
 
   
        
          
 
   
      
           
            (22) 
  
 where: 
   
     is the probability of completing the path, and  
       
         is the benefit the adversary receives upon completing the path 
 
 
Table 11. Pathway Attractiveness Based on Risk Attitude 
Value vs. Risk Attitude Scenario Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
  
        
  0.100 0.300 0.900 
      
          0.900 0.300 0.100 
Extremely Risk Seeking 0.613 0.245 0.098 
Moderately Risk Seeking 0.506 0.222 0.097 
Slightly Risk Seeking 0.285 0.164 0.095 
Risk Neutral 0.090 0.090 0.090 
Slightly Risk Averse 0.095 0.164 0.285 
Moderately Risk Averse 0.097 0.222 0.506 
Extremely Risk Averse 0.098 0.245 0.613 
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Table 11 shows that the risk neutral adversary had no preference between the scenarios, 
which is expected because each scenario has the same expected value. The more risk 
seeking the adversary, the more they prefer the scenario with the highest consequence. 
Conversely the more risk averse the adversary, the more the adversary prefers the 
scenario with the greatest chance of success. To get the relative likelihood each 
adversary will choose each path, the values in Table 11 are normalized across each row, 
shown in Table 12. 
 
 
Table 12. Normalized Values Based on Risk Attitude 
Value vs. Risk Attitude Scenario Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
  
        
  0.100 0.300 0.900 
      
          0.900 0.300 0.100 
Extremely Risk Seeking 0.641 0.257 0.102 
Moderately Risk Seeking 0.613 0.269 0.118 
Slightly Risk Seeking 0.523 0.302 0.174 
Risk Neutral 0.333 0.333 0.333 
Slightly Risk Averse 0.174 0.302 0.523 
Moderately Risk Averse 0.118 0.269 0.613 
Extremely Risk Averse 0.102 0.257 0.641 
 
 
 
The attractiveness of individual pathways is determined by refining Equation 7 to 
include the attractiveness of various materials to the adversary in completing that 
scenario. The material attractiveness is derived from utility functions based on how 
nuclear material inputs affect the difficulty in completing a given scenario. The 
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adversary's utility value for each scenario is then combined with the utility value for 
each material in Equation 23, to yield the utility of each pathway to the adversary. The 
variable     
  is used to distinguish that it is not a probability, but rather a value that 
influences the probability that the adversary will choose pathway  . 
 
    
                                                            (23) 
 
III.C.2. Material Utility Functions 
 
Each material utility function represents the relative difficulty with which each material 
input will complicate the ability of the adversary to complete each threat. These utility 
functions do not indicate the probability of success at various tasks, which is determined 
through adversary capabilities and not material attractiveness.  
 
III.C.2.i. Nuclear Weapons Utility Functions 
 
For nuclear weapons, the attractiveness of weapons are assumed unity. The yield of the 
weapon is incorporated into relative attractiveness through weighting of the 
consequences based on yield, and the effectiveness of engineered controls on the 
weapons are used in the probability of success of completing the pathway. 
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III.C.2.ii. Nuclear Materials Utility Functions 
 
1. Items per SQ: The items per SQ utility function indicates that the more items that an 
adversary must steal, the more difficult the task. The utility function is given in Equation 
24 and displayed in Figure 19 
. 
                  
                 
              (24) 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Graph of Items per SQ Utility Function 
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2. Dose Rate: The dose rate is the dose rate in Sv/Hr measured at 1 meter from one item 
of material. At low dose rates, there is no impact to the adversary. As the dose rate 
increases, the time that the adversary can handle and work with the material before 
experienced adverse health effects decreases. The utility function is given in Equation 25 
and displayed in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20. Graph of Dose Rate Utility Function 
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3. Mass Per SQ: Mass per SQ of material is the amount of material that an adversary 
must acquire to obtain 1 SQ of fissile material. The utility function is derived from 
Giangelli
41 
and is given in Equation 26, where    
    is the minimum weight for an SQ 
of material (e.g. 8 kg for plutonium and 25 kg for uranium). The equation is plotted in 
Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Graph of Items per SQ Utility Function 
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For diversion scenarios, a large item mass is a much more significant factor than in a 
theft scenario. A larger quantity will be much more difficult to divert either because it's 
size makes it difficult to conceal or the number of concealable items the adversary must 
divert provides more detection opportunities for the State.  As a result, the utility factor 
for mass per SQ is modified for diversion scenarios and is given in Equation 27 and 
displayed in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Mass per SQ Utility Function 
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7. Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Quality : The utility function for enrichment and 
quality is derived from the material attractiveness figure of merit (FOM) developed by 
Bathke et al. in Equation 28.
69
 In the equation the four factors that are added together are 
a size factor, stability factor, yield factor and acquisition factor respectively.   
 
             
 
   
 
  
    
 
  
     
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
       
)       (28) 
  
 where: 
                                                  (kg) 
                                            (W/kg)   
                                              (n/s/kg) 
                                 (rad/hr) 
  
As a function of U enrichment and Pu quality, Equation 29 yields the approximate mass 
of a bare critical mass in kilograms, Equation 30 yields the approximate spontaneous 
fission rate in neutrons per second per gram, and Equation 31 yields the approximate 
heating rate in Watts per kilogram.  
 
       
                            
                             
             (29) 
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These are used in Equation 32, which is the utility function for uranium enrichment and 
plutonium quality. They are calculated together so that they are on the same scale. The 
resulting utility values for various enrichments of Uranium and qualities of Plutonium 
calculated using Equation 32 are displayed in Figure 23. These values are used for both 
theft and diversion scenarios.  
 
     
          
    
   
 
        
    
 
        
     
  
     
    (32) 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Utility Values for Various Plutonium Qualities and Uranium Enrichments 
XPu  U(xPu) XU U(xU) 
1 1.000 1 0.858 
0.99 0.862 0.9 0.796 
0.9 0.619 0.8 0.739 
0.8 0.522 0.7 0.686 
0.7 0.457 0.6 0.637 
0.6 0.405 0.5 0.589 
0.5 0.360 0.4 0.542 
0.4 0.319 0.3 0.498 
0.3 0.281 0.2 0.454 
0.2 0.246     
0.1 0.213     
0.05 0.197 
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Figure 23. Utility Functions of Plutonium Quality and Uranium Enrichment 
 
 
 
8. Chemical Reactivity With Air: The values for chemical reactivity with air are either 
"none", "slow", or "fast". The corresponding utility values for material theft determined 
using Equation 33 and utility values for diversion are determined using Equation 34. 
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9. Requires Active Cooling:  This input for this attribute is a Boolean input, having value 
of either true or false. The utility value for this attribute for theft scenarios is given by 
Equation 35, and the utility value for diversion scenarios is given in Equation 36. 
 
        
        
        
      (35) 
 
        
        
         
     (36) 
 
 
III.C.2.iii. Radiological Materials Utility Functions 
 
There are two utility functions for radiological materials. The first is the dose rate in 
Sv/hr at 1 meter from the source, which is identical to the utility function for nuclear 
material in Equation 26. The second utility function is given for theft scenarios in 
Equation 37 and diversion scenarios in Equation 38, where      is the mass per item in 
kg,      is the activity in curies per item, and      is the danger value for the 
radiological isotope. For diversion scenarios, the additional term represents the difficulty 
in diverting extremely strong radiological sources, which require extremely heavy 
shielding. 
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III.C.2.iv. State Utility Functions 
 
The utility functions for the State involve the consequence values. This involves 
normalizing the consequence values to a value between zero and unity that represents the 
degree of the negative effect that the consequence has on the State. An example 
calculation is provided in Appendix B. Each consequence category is determined 
independently of the other categories, and each consequence category is weighted based 
on its relative attractiveness to the State. 
 
III.D. Solution Method 
 
The methodology introduced in this section has been modeled using Microsoft Visual 
Basic for Applications (VBA), using Microsoft Visio as the user interface coupled with 
Microsoft Excel which serves as both the information database and computational tool. 
The first solution step is to calculate the base-line risk, which is the risk of nuclear 
terrorism calculated based on current State and adversary information. This baseline risk 
is then used as the benchmark to assess the effectiveness of various security measures 
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and the impact of changes in adversary characteristics. The second step is modeling 
upgrades to various nuclear security measures or changes in adversary characteristics to 
determine the sensitivity of the State-level risk to various variables. The variables of 
highest sensitivity represent the security measures that the State should focus resources 
on to most effectively decrease risk. The final step is to determine what nuclear security 
measure upgrades can provide a desired degree of risk reduction.     
 
III.D.1. Calculating the Baseline Risk 
 
All of the inputs introduced in this chapter are combined to calculate the baseline State-
level risk. This is a three step process. The first step is determining the pathways for 
each threat, based on the material inputs. The probability of overtly stealing and covertly 
diverting material from each facility is determined using the security parameters 
associated with each material at that facility. The probability of completing all of the 
processing steps in the pathway is then determined by coupling the capability values 
from Table 5 with the associated tasks, using Equation 11 to calculate the probability of 
success along each path. The total distance traveled to complete a pathway is then 
calculated based on longitude and latitude values associated with each location along the 
pathway, which is then incorporated into Equation 18 or Equation 19 to determine the 
probability of successfully transporting the material throughout the entire pathway to the 
target. Finally, the consequences of completing each path at each target is calculated. 
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Once these are compiled, the second step is to calculate the relative attractiveness of 
each material for each pathway. The probability of success along each path and the 
resulting consequences are then combined with the adversary risk attitude and 
consequence preferences to determine the relative probability the adversary attempts 
each path.  
 
Once the pathways and the probability of attack for each pathway are generated, the risk 
for each pathway is calculated for each threat using Equation 39, 
 
   i       
 
              i  
 
          (39) 
 
  where:  i  the risk for pathway i  
     i   the probability that the adversary attempts pathway i 
   m   the  tate s weighted value of conse uence m 
   m i   the value of conse uence m for pathway i  
     i     the probability of adversary success along pathway i  
 
The value of   is specific to each pathway, and represents the total number of tasks 
required to complete that pathway. The final step involves aggregating the risk for each 
pathway and normalizing by the sum of the State's consequence weights, which will 
yield the State-level risk ( ), calculated using Equation 40. 
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      (40)
  
III.D.2. Sensitivity Analysis of State-Level Risk 
 
All pathways within the State are represented by a dynamic network, where the inter-
dependencies of each variable are modeled. Changes to nuclear security measures can 
then be simulated to study the corresponding outcome in risk.  The long form of the risk 
equation is given in Equation 41, where the probability the adversary attacks is given in 
the curly brackets and the risk of each type of nuclear threat is in the standard brackets..   
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  where:   represents the four nuclear threats 
  m represents the four consequence categories 
    represents an individual pathway within each threat 
     = the total number of pathways for each threat 
    
  = the total adversary probability of success for the pathway i 
        
  = the net benefit to the adversary for completing pathway i 
    
    = the relative attractiveness of the material on pathway i 
      
  = is the consequence to the State of the adversary completing pathway i.  
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Upgrades to various security measures throughout the State are simulated by perturbing 
the value of the corresponding variable by a standard amount and observing the change 
this has on the value of  . Most perturbations will directly change the probability of 
success    i  , which will subsequently affect the likelihood the adversary chooses each 
path. In addition to simulating individual variables, sets of variables are also simulated 
so that the effects of risk transfer can be captured. For example, if a State has two sites 
that store HEU, upgrading either one site independently may simply transfer the risk to 
the other site, minimizing the impact on   . However, upgrading both sites may have a 
significant impact on   . Finally, changes such as replacing HEU with LEU will negate 
all pathways associated with those HEU sources and replace them with more complex 
LEU pathways. 
 
The upgrades with the greatest sensitivity (max{  /  }), will be the upgrades that are 
the most effective at reducing State-level risk. These can then be multiplied by the 
corresponding cost functions for each upgrade,  
  
  
 , to yield the most cost-effective 
security measures. 
 
 
III.D.3. Determining Optimal Risk Reduction Strategies 
 
 
The final step is to determine the optimal strategy to reach a desired risk-reduction goal. 
This is accomplished by using the perturbation results from the sensitivity analysis. The 
  /   values are sorted and upgrades to the variable with the maximum sensitivity to 
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risk is simulated. Once upgrades to that variable are simulated, the sensitivity analysis is 
repeated to determine if the risk is now most sensitive to a new variable. This process is 
repeated until the desired risk level is met. 
 
 
Figure 24. Process of Determining Upgrades to Reach Target Risk 
 
 
 
The general process is displayed in Figure 24. The first step is determining the variable 
where 
  
  
    has the maximum value. Upgrades to this variable are then simulated by 
changing that variable by    . The figure shows that based on extrapolating 
  
  
   , the 
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change     is expected to change the risk value to point A'. However, because the 
adversary can change their tactics based on this upgrade, the decrease in risk value will 
likely be less than expected, resulting in a new value for risk   at point A. Sensitivity 
values are then calculated for all variables at this point, where upgrades for the variable 
with maximum value for 
   
  
   are simulated yielding  
 at point B. This process is 
repeated until the new risk value is equal to or less than the target risk value. The process 
can be run by implementing different step sizes for each   . The value of the change to 
   is determined using Equation 42, where   represents the step size. 
 
    
 
                
 
 
 
  
  
 
      (42) 
 
In Figure 24, upgrades are simulated based on the projected change that reduces the risk 
halfway to the target value, meaning  =2. This process can also be accomplished using 
  
  
 values to maximize the cost effectiveness of risk reduction. When applying resources, 
the searching algorithm can search using some number of variables with the highest 
values for 
  
  
, rather than just using the single highest value as displayed in Figure 24.  
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CHAPTER IV 
NUMERICAL TESTS 
 
 
Numerical tests are performed on the computational model developed based on the 
methodology introduced in Chapter III to provide confidence in model results. First, 
verification tests are performed on the VBA code to ensure the code produces results 
that are consistent with the methodology and confirm the absence of programming 
errors. Next, validation tests are performed to confirm that the results are true 
representations of reality. Finally, we conduct a set of behavioral tests to further 
characterize the performance of the code. 
 
IV.A. Verification Tests 
 
Verification tests ensure the conceptual description given in Chapter III and the solution 
of the model are implemented correctly and that the code is free of programming errors. 
The first verification test ensures that the pathways generation function is performing 
adequately.  Next, a sample problem is both manually solved and simulated by the code, 
verifying that the results from the code are accurate for each step. 
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IV.A.1 Pathways Generation Verification 
 
The pathways generation function develops all potential pathways based on the 
properties of the material, which dictate the processing steps required to develop 
weapons usable metal. The network of pathways is then populated with all of the other 
data to determine the risk of each pathway and subsequently, the State-level risk.  The 
pathway generation function is verified by simulating a sufficient variety of materials to 
ensure every potential pathway combination is employed. The results are displayed in 
Table 14 and verify that pathways are generated as expected based on material 
properties. In the table, metallurgy includes any processes, including chemical 
processing, that converts any uranium material into a metal while conversion involves 
converting one chemical form of uranium to another chemical form, such as U3O8 or 
UO2 to UF6.  
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Table 14. SNM Pathway Generation Verification Results 
 
 
 
IV.A.2 Risk Calculation Results Verification 
 
A simple problem is introduced to verify the VBA model's results and confirm the 
absence of programming errors. All inputs used in this calculation are provided in 
Appendix C. The problem involves two facilities; a research reactor with HEU and a 
hospital with two types of radiological sources of concern. The risk calculation analyzes 
a set of two potential targets. 
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Uranium  
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(Pu Path) 
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The first step is calculating the probability of adversary success for each task. Table 15 
shows the results for each task using Equation 11 and adversary capability inputs from 
Table C.3.  
 
Using Equation 12 and Equation 14 with the motivation and disincentive data in Table 
C.2, and accounting for the lack of nuclear weapons in the State, Table 16 gives the 
relative attractiveness of the four nuclear threats. 
 
 
Table 15. Probability of Success for Each Task 
Assessed Likelihoods   
     
Conversion 0.125 
Reprocessing 1E-08 
Enrichment 5E-13 
Machining 0.25 
Metallurgy 0.25 
IND Weaponization: Gun-Type 0.225 
RDD Weaponization 0.67687 
IND Weaponization:  Implosion 0.00025 
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Table 16. MAUA Attractiveness Results 
Nuclear Threat Relative Attractiveness 
Nuclear Weapon 0 
IND 10.81 % 
RDD 46.07 % 
Sabotage 43.12% 
 
 
 
In this example, there are eight unique IND pathways and 16 unique RDD pathways. 
The IND and RDD pathways are displayed in Table 17 and Table 18 respectively. The 
additional RDD pathways come from the irradiated fuel, which makes an attractive RDD 
material. Additionally, the presence of multiple items of radiological material at two of 
the three facilities represent scenarios where the source material can be divided into 
multiple RDD devices and delivered to both targets. One assumption in this analysis is 
that the Cs-137 Blood Irradiator source cannot be split into two RDDs due to the 
incredibly high dose rate of the material when unshielded. This assumption could be 
changed in the model by changing the number of Cs-137 items to two and halving all of 
its material property values. 
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Table 17. IND Pathways 
Material Pathway Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Task 5 Task 6 Task 7 
Fresh HEU 
Fuel 
IND1 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Conversion 
Facility 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
1 
x 
Fresh HEU 
Fuel 
IND2 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Conversion 
Facility 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
2 
x 
Fresh HEU 
Fuel 
IND3 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Conversion 
Facility 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
1 
x 
Fresh HEU 
Fuel 
IND4 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Conversion 
Facility 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
2 
x 
Irradiated 
HEU Fuel 
IND5 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Reprocessing 
Facility 
Remove 
Fission 
Products 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
1 
Irradiated 
HEU Fuel 
IND6 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Reprocessing 
Facility 
Remove 
Fission 
Products 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
2 
Irradiated 
HEU Fuel 
IND7 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Reprocessing 
Facility 
Remove 
Fission 
Products 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
1 
Irradiated 
HEU Fuel 
IND8 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Reprocessing 
Facility 
Remove 
Fission 
Products 
Convert 
to Metal 
Machine 
Metal 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport 
to Target 
2 
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Table 18. RDD Pathways 
Material Pathway Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 3 Task 4 
HDR 
Brachytherapy 
Sources Co-60 
RDD1 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 1 
x 
HDR 
Brachytherapy 
Sources Co-60 
RDD2 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 2 
x 
HDR 
Brachytherapy 
Sources Co-60 
RDD3 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 1 
x 
HDR 
Brachytherapy 
Sources Co-60 
RDD4 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 2 
x 
Blood Irradiator 
Cs-137 
RDD5 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 1 
x 
Blood Irradiator 
Cs-137 
RDD6 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 2 
x 
Blood Irradiator 
Cs-137 
RDD7 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 1 
x 
Blood Irradiator 
Cs-137 
RDD8 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 2 
x 
HDR 
Brachytherapy 
Sources Co-60 
RDD9 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 2 
Weapons 
Transport 
Weapon 1 
to Target 1 
Transport 
Weapon 2 to 
Target 2 
HDR 
Brachytherapy 
Sources Co-60 
RDD10 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 2 
Weapons 
Transport 
Weapon 1 
to Target 1 
Transport 
Weapon 2 to 
Target 2 
Irradiated HEU 
Fuel 
RDD11 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 1 
x 
Irradiated HEU 
Fuel 
RDD12 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 2 
x 
Irradiated HEU 
Fuel 
RDD13 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 1 
x 
Irradiated HEU 
Fuel 
RDD14 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 
Weapon 
Transport to 
Target 2 
x 
Irradiated HEU 
Fuel 
RDD15 
Steal 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 2 
Weapons 
Transport 
Weapon 1 
to Target 1 
Transport 
Weapon 2 to 
Target 2 
Irradiated HEU 
Fuel 
RDD16 
Divert 
Material 
Transport to 
Covert 
Facility 
Develop 2 
Weapons 
Transport 
Weapon 1 
to Target 1 
Transport 
Weapon 2 to 
Target 2 
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Each facility's physical protection system data given in Table C.7 and Table C.8 are used 
to determine the likelihood of stealing each material. In addition, the effectiveness of 
security systems designed to prevent diversion of each material is determined using 
Equation 16. Table 19 and Table 20 give these results for each material. 
 
 
Table 19. Research Reactor Materials PE Values 
Research Reactor Layer # PI-Layer PN-Layer PE-Layer PE Material   
          
Fresh Fuel HEU 1 0.5 0.7 0.35 0.665 0.964 
 
2 0.9 0.7 0.63 
 
 
Spent Fuel HEU 1 0.5 0.7 0.35 0.525 0.9955 
 
2 0.7 0.5 0.35 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Hospital Materials PE Values 
Hospital Layer # PI-Layer PN-Layer PE-Layer PE Material   
          
Brachytherapy 
Sources 
1 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.703 
Blood Irradiator 1 0.7 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.9505 
 
 
 
The material attractiveness values for each material are presented in Table 21 and 
determined using the material inputs from Table C.4 and Table C.5 and Equation 24 - 
Equation 37. The spent fuel has different attractiveness values for both IND and RDD 
pathways. 
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Table 21. Material Attractiveness Value for Each Material 
Material MA-Value 
Fresh Fuel theft 0.24679 
Fresh Fuel diversion 0.04253 
Spent Fuel theft (IND) 0.04530 
Spent Fuel diversion (IND) 0.00758 
Spent HEU theft (RDD) 0.19054 
Spent Fuel diversion (RDD) 0.07396 
Brachytherapy Sources theft 0.99579 
Brachytherapy Sources  diversion 0.44334 
Blood Irradiator theft 0.80440 
Blood Irradiator  diversion 0.03239 
 
 
 
The probability of success for each pathway in Table 18 is determined using the results 
from Table 15, Table 19, and Table 20. The probability of successfully producing two 
RDD's is determined by dividing the resources evenly between both weapons. The 
probability of successfully transporting material is determined by calculating 
transportation distances using Equation 15 and inserting this value into Equation 18 for 
diversion scenarios and Equation 19 for theft scenarios. Table 22 shows the resulting 
probability of success for each task. 
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Table 22. Probability of Success for Each Pathway Task 
Pathway Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Task 5 Task 6 Task 7 
IND1 3.35E-01 7.87E-01 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 4.66E-01 x 
IND2 3.35E-01 7.87E-01 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 3.26E-01 x 
IND3 3.600-02 9.61E-01 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 6.54E-01 x 
IND4 3.600-02 9.61E-01 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 4.66E-01 x 
IND5 4.75E-01 7.87E-01 1.00E-08 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 4.66E-01 
IND6 4.75E-01 7.87E-01 1.00E-08 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 3.26E-01 
IND7 4.500E-3 9.61E-01 1.00E-08 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 6.54E-01 
IND8 4.500E-3 9.61E-01 1.00E-08 4.13E-01 1.13E-01 2.45E-01 4.66E-01 
RDD1 9.50E-01 6.02E-01 8.36E-01 4.66E-01 x x x 
RDD2 9.50E-01 6.02E-01 8.36E-01 3.26E-01 x x x 
RDD3 2.97E-01 9.19E-01 8.36E-01 6.54E-01 x x x 
RDD4 2.97E-01 9.19E-01 8.36E-01 4.66E-01 x x x 
RDD5 9.30E-01 6.02E-01 8.36E-01 4.66E-01 x x x 
RDD6 9.30E-01 6.02E-01 8.36E-01 3.26E-01 x x x 
RDD7 4.95E-02 9.19E-01 8.36E-01 6.54E-01 x x x 
RDD8 4.95E-02 9.19E-01 8.36E-01 4.66E-01 x x x 
RDD9 9.50E-01 6.02E-01 6.90E-01 4.66E-01 3.26E-01 x x 
RDD10 2.97E-01 9.19E-01 6.90E-01 6.54E-01 4.66E-01 x x 
RDD11 4.75E-01 7.87E-01 8.36E-01 4.66E-01 x x x 
RDD12 4.75E-01 7.87E-01 8.36E-01 3.26E-01 x x x 
RDD13 4.500E-3 9.61E-01 8.36E-01 6.54E-01 x x x 
RDD14 4.500E-3 9.61E-01 8.36E-01 4.66E-01 x x x 
RDD15 4.75E-01 7.87E-01 6.90E-01 4.66E-01 3.26E-01 x x 
RDD16 4.500E-3 9.61E-01 6.90E-01 6.54E-01 4.66E-01 x x 
 
 
 
Table 23 gives the consequences for each RDD pathway, calculated using the 
consequence inputs for each target in Table C.10 and scaling these values with 
Equations B3-B6. 
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Table 23. RDD Consequences for Each Pathway 
Pathway     
       
       
      
   
RDD1 5.08E-11 3.64E-06 2.18E-04 4.49E-04 
RDD2 7.26E-11 2.91E-06 3.63E-04 4.49E-04 
RDD3 5.08E-11 3.64E-06 2.18E-04 4.49E-04 
RDD4 7.26E-11 2.91E-06 3.63E-04 4.49E-04 
RDD5 2.13E-10 9.46E-06 3.13E-04 7.25E-04 
RDD6 3.05E-10 7.57E-06 5.22E-04 7.25E-04 
RDD7 2.13E-10 9.46E-06 3.13E-04 7.25E-04 
RDD8 3.05E-10 7.57E-06 5.22E-04 7.25E-04 
RDD9 6.17E-11 4.12E-06 2.90E-04 7.13E-04 
RDD10 6.17E-11 4.12E-06 2.90E-04 7.13E-04 
RDD11 5.27E-09 8.12E-05 7.79E-04 2.12E-03 
RDD12 7.53E-09 6.49E-05 1.30E-03 2.12E-03 
RDD13 5.27E-09 8.12E-05 7.79E-04 2.12E-03 
RDD14 7.53E-09 6.49E-05 1.30E-03 2.12E-03 
RDD15 6.46E-09 9.20E-05 1.43E-03 3.37E-03 
RDD16 6.46E-09 9.20E-05 1.43E-03 3.37E-03 
 
 
In addition to these RDD and IND pathways, there are 8 sabotage pathways. Table 24 
lists each sabotage event and the adversary's corresponding probability of success.  
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Table 24. Sabotage Pathways 
Pathway Target   
     
SAB1 Spent Fuel Pool 0.35625 
SAB2 Spent Fuel Pool - Insider 0.675 
SAB3 Reactor 0.26 
SAB4 Reactor - Insider 0.28 
SAB5 HRD Storage Vault 0.95 
SAB6 HRD Storage Vault - Insider 0.999 
SAB7 Irradiator Room 0.93 
SAB8 Irradiator Room - Insider 0.999 
 
 
 
The probability of success for each IND and RDD pathway is determined by multiplying 
the probability of each successive task in Table 22. These results are presented in Table 
25. In addition, Table 25 shows the adversary's net consequences for each pathway 
calculated using data from Table C.1, Table C.10, and Equation 21. The probability of 
success and net consequences for each path are then combined considering the 
adversary's risk attitude using Equation 22. These values are then multiplied by the 
material attractiveness values in Table 21 to yield the adversary utility value for each 
path (    
 ). These values are then biased to match the adversary's intentions using the 
motivation and disincentive MAUA results from Table 16 to give the net utility of each 
pathway       
   ). The relative probability that the adversary chooses each pathway is 
then determined by dividing the utility of each pathway by the sum of all utilities.  
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Table 25. Probability of Attack Calculations 
Pathway 
  
    
       
         
       
    
 
  
    
 
     
   
      
   
 
IND1 1.40E-03 8.67E-01 3.21E-04 3.47E-05 2.49E-03 
IND2 9.79E-04 9.33E-01 2.33E-04 2.52E-05 1.81E-03 
IND3 2.58E-04 8.67E-01 1.02E-05 1.10E-06 7.92E-05 
IND4 1.83E-04 9.33E-01 7.54E-06 8.15E-07 5.85E-05 
IND5 1.98E-11 8.67E-01 8.35E-13 9.03E-14 6.48E-12 
IND6 1.39E-11 9.33E-01 6.08E-13 6.57E-14 4.72E-12 
IND7 3.22E-13 8.67E-01 2.27E-15 2.46E-16 1.76E-14 
IND8 2.29E-13 9.33E-01 1.68E-15 1.81E-16 1.30E-14 
RDD1 2.23E-01 2.24E-04 3.32E-03 1.53E-03 1.10E-01 
RDD2 1.56E-01 2.72E-04 2.57E-03 1.18E-03 8.49E-02 
RDD3 1.49E-01 2.24E-04 9.90E-04 4.56E-04 3.27E-02 
RDD4 1.06E-01 2.72E-04 7.77E-04 3.58E-04 2.57E-02 
RDD5 2.18E-01 3.49E-04 3.28E-03 1.51E-03 1.09E-01 
RDD6 1.53E-01 4.18E-04 2.52E-03 1.16E-03 8.33E-02 
RDD7 2.49E-02 3.49E-04 1.51E-05 6.95E-06 4.99E-04 
RDD8 1.77E-02 4.18E-04 1.18E-05 5.41E-06 3.89E-04 
RDD9 6.00E-02 3.36E-04 1.10E-03 5.05E-04 3.62E-02 
RDD10 5.74E-02 3.36E-04 4.66E-04 2.15E-04 1.54E-02 
RDD11 1.46E-01 9.95E-04 8.74E-04 4.03E-04 2.89E-02 
RDD12 1.02E-01 1.16E-03 6.63E-04 3.05E-04 2.19E-02 
RDD13 2.37E-03 9.95E-04 5.52E-06 2.54E-06 1.82E-04 
RDD14 1.68E-03 1.16E-03 4.25E-06 1.96E-06 1.40E-04 
RDD15 3.92E-02 1.63E-03 3.01E-04 1.39E-04 9.97E-03 
RDD16 9.09E-04 1.63E-03 2.71E-06 1.25E-06 8.97E-05 
SAB1 3.56E-01 3.33E-05 2.06E-03 8.87E-04 6.37E-02 
SAB2 6.75E-01 3.33E-05 3.90E-03 1.68E-03 1.21E-01 
SAB3 2.60E-01 3.33E-05 1.50E-03 6.47E-04 4.65E-02 
SAB4 2.80E-01 3.33E-05 1.62E-03 6.97E-04 5.01E-02 
SAB5 9.50E-01 1.67E-06 1.23E-03 5.29E-04 3.80E-02 
SAB6 9.99E-01 1.67E-06 1.29E-03 5.56E-04 3.99E-02 
SAB7 9.30E-01 1.70E-06 1.21E-03 5.23E-04 3.76E-02 
SAB8 9.99E-01 1.70E-06 1.30E-03 5.62E-04 4.04E-02 
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Table 26. Pathway Risk Values 
Pathway          %  
IND1 7.31E-06 18.27% 
IND2 4.26E-06 10.65% 
IND3 4.28E-08 0.11% 
IND4 2.57E-08 0.06% 
IND5 2.70E-22 0.00% 
IND6 1.38E-22 0.00% 
IND7 1.36E-26 0.00% 
IND8 7.17E-27 0.00% 
RDD1 3.85E-06 9.64% 
RDD2 3.04E-06 7.60% 
RDD3 7.70E-07 1.93% 
RDD4 6.27E-07 1.57% 
RDD5 5.65E-06 14.14% 
RDD6 4.35E-06 10.87% 
RDD7 2.96E-09 0.01% 
RDD8 2.35E-09 0.01% 
RDD9 4.80E-07 1.20% 
RDD10 1.95E-07 0.49% 
RDD11 2.87E-06 7.19% 
RDD12 2.07E-06 5.18% 
RDD13 2.95E-10 0.00% 
RDD14 2.19E-10 0.00% 
RDD15 4.46E-07 1.12% 
RDD16 9.32E-11 0.00% 
SAB1 6.81E-07 1.70% 
SAB2 2.45E-06 6.12% 
SAB3 3.63E-07 0.91% 
SAB4 4.21E-07 1.05% 
SAB5 1.80E-08 0.05% 
SAB6 1.99E-08 0.05% 
SAB7 1.96E-08 0.05% 
SAB8 2.26E-08 0.06% 
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Applying Equation 39, the PA values in Table 25 are multiplied by the adversary's 
probability of success and the State's weighted consequence values for each pathway. 
Table 26 shows the resulting risk values for each pathway and their relative contribution 
to the overall risk. Applying Equation 40 yields a State-level risk value of 1.538x10
-5
. 
Examining the pathway risk values, pathway IND1 is the largest contributor to risk, 
making up 18.27% of the total State-level risk and four of the 32 total pathways (IND1, 
IND2, RDD5 and RDD6) make up over half (53.93%) of the total State-level risk. The 
pathways IND1 and IND2 correspond to theft of the HEU fuel and RDD5 and RDD6 
correspond to theft of the large Cs-137 irradiator source. Overall, IND pathways make 
up 29.1% of the State risk, RDD pathways make up 60.9% of the risk, and sabotage 
pathways make up the remaining 10%.  
 
IV.B. Validation Tests 
 
Validation tests verify that the results are true representations of reality. Typical 
validation involves comparing real-world data against simulation results. In this case, 
there is no experimental data and therefore the code cannot be traditionally validated. 
For the validation tests in this section, we introduce problems where the solution is 
intuitively obvious to qualitatively validate the results. 
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IV.B.1. MAUA Validation 
 
The MAUA results are used to bias terrorist pathway selection based on their 
motivations and disincentives for the four nuclear threats. The purpose of this validation 
test is to ensure that the methodology assimilates motivations and disincentives properly 
and that the results add value to the solution.  
 
We introduce two groups with different motivation profiles into the verification test 
problem from the previous section. The first group has a motivational profile that is 
expected to prefer INDs and nuclear weapons, while the second group should prefer 
RDD's and sabotage. Using Equation 12 and Equation 14 with the motivation and 
disincentive data in Table 27, and accounting for the lack of nuclear weapons in the 
State, Table 28 gives the relative attractiveness of the four nuclear threats. 
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Table 27. Terrorist Profiles 
Motivations 
  
  
Group 1 
  
  
Group 2 
Prestige of Successful Capabilities  3 0 
Manipulate Adversaries 5 0 
Apocalyptic Beliefs 5 0 
War on Own Nation 0 3 
War on Another Nation 0 0 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 5 0 
Ensure Security 0 0 
Mass Devastation/Chaos 
 
 
                -Deaths 5 0 
                -Other 5 5 
Religious Imperative 0 0 
Manipulate Policy 0 0 
Fascination of Nuclear Weapons  5 0 
Fascination of Radiological  0 0 
Fascination of Sabotage  0 0 
Disincentives   
 
Fear of Retaliation on Base of Support 0 5 
Fear of Attracting Attention 0 3 
Alienation 0 0 
Contradict Goals of Group 
 
 
            -Mass killings 0 5 
 -Contamination of territory or 
environment 
0 0 
Lack of Religious Mandate 0 5 
Internal Group Division 0 0 
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Table 28. MAUA Attractiveness Results 
Nuclear Threat Group 1 Group 2 
Nuclear Weapon 0 0 
IND 99.7 % 0.16% 
RDD 0.07 % 78.49% 
Sabotage 0.23% 21.35% 
 
 
 
The results from Table 25 are recalculated using the results from Table 28. In addition, 
we introduce a third calculation where no MAUA data is used. Table 29 gives the results 
for the probability of choosing each pathway for both groups and for the case where no 
MAUA data is used. The results in Table 29 show what is expected; group 1 is 
significantly more likely to choose IND pathways and group 2 is significantly more 
likely to choose RDD pathways.  
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Table 29. Probabilities of Choosing Paths 
Pathway 
  
    
 
Group 1 
  
    
  
No MAUA 
  
    
 
Group 2 
IND1 3.12E-01 8.47E-03 2.45E-05 
IND2 2.27E-01 6.16E-03 1.78E-05 
IND3 2.38E-01 6.46E-03 1.87E-05 
IND4 1.76E-01 4.77E-03 1.38E-05 
IND5 8.12E-10 2.20E-11 6.39E-14 
IND6 5.91E-10 1.60E-11 4.65E-14 
IND7 4.39E-10 1.19E-11 3.46E-14 
IND8 3.25E-10 8.81E-12 2.55E-14 
RDD1 2.27E-03 8.76E-02 1.24E-01 
RDD2 1.75E-03 6.77E-02 9.62E-02 
RDD3 1.58E-03 6.09E-02 8.66E-02 
RDD4 1.24E-03 4.78E-02 6.80E-02 
RDD5 2.24E-03 8.66E-02 1.23E-01 
RDD6 1.72E-03 6.64E-02 9.45E-02 
RDD7 1.96E-04 7.56E-03 1.07E-02 
RDD8 1.52E-04 5.89E-03 8.37E-03 
RDD9 7.48E-04 2.89E-02 4.11E-02 
RDD10 7.43E-04 2.87E-02 4.08E-02 
RDD11 5.97E-04 2.31E-02 3.28E-02 
RDD12 4.52E-04 1.75E-02 2.48E-02 
RDD13 7.49E-04 2.90E-02 4.12E-02 
RDD14 5.77E-04 2.23E-02 3.17E-02 
RDD15 2.06E-04 7.95E-03 1.13E-02 
RDD16 3.69E-04 1.42E-02 2.02E-02 
SAB1 4.61E-03 5.43E-02 2.10E-02 
SAB2 8.74E-03 1.03E-01 3.98E-02 
SAB3 3.37E-03 3.96E-02 1.53E-02 
SAB4 3.63E-03 4.26E-02 1.65E-02 
SAB5 2.75E-03 3.24E-02 1.25E-02 
SAB6 2.89E-03 3.40E-02 1.32E-02 
SAB7 2.72E-03 3.20E-02 1.24E-02 
SAB8 2.92E-03 3.44E-02 1.33E-02 
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IV.B.2. Probability of Attack Validation   
 
To validate the probability of attack calculations, we simulate various nuclear materials 
that could be found in the nuclear fuel cycle and materials that could be part of nuclear 
weapons programs. The data used for each material was developed to realistically 
represent real world materials and is available in Appendix D. To ensure the probability 
of attack numbers are solely based on nuclear material properties and terrorist 
capabilities, any variables not related to these two groups (e.g. physical security systems, 
safeguards systems, material interdiction, etc.) were eliminated from the calculation. 
Two tests were conducted. The first used a terrorist group (Group A) with a much higher 
probability of producing a gun-type IND than an implosion IND. The second group 
(Group B) is equally likely to produce either a gun-type or implosion based IND 
weapon. Table 30 lists the assessed capabilities of Group A, and Table 31 has the 
material attractiveness calculations and normalized probabilities of attack for each 
material tested. The complete results are available in Table D.1. 
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Table 30. Group A Capability Assessments 
 
Assessed Likelihoods Build Use Undetected Attempts   
     
Conversion 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.125 
Reprocessing 1.00E-03 1.00E-03 1.00E-02 1 1E-08 
Enrichment 1.00E-08 1.00E-03 0.05 1 5E-13 
Machining 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.25 
Metallurgy 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.25 
IND Weaponization 
 Gun-Type 0.9 0.5 0.5 1 0.225 
RDD Weaponization 0.95 0.95 0.75 1 0.67687 
IND Weaponization 
 Implosion 0.075 0.01 0.5 1 3.75E-04 
 
 
 
The Group A adversary should prefer all HEU over plutonium because of the greater 
likelihood of successfully weaponizing it. The results in Table 31 that correspond to 
diversion are indicated with (d) next to the material. The results for each material are as 
expected, with the adversary heavily favoring the HEU metals, a direct-use material. 
HEU metal is chosen 81.25% of the time. The remainder of the HEU materials make up 
the next 18.62%, and the likelihood of choosing plutonium pathways requiring 
implosion IND weaponization is essentially zero. The difference between probability of 
attack values for theft and diversion are based on the material attractiveness values, 
which are lower for diversion indicating the increased difficulty in covertly removing 
material verses overt removal. Because all other security parameters that favor covert 
diversion over overt theft were eliminated for this particular test, the diversion 
likelihoods are lower for each material when compared to theft likelihoods. 
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Table 31. Group A Probabilities of Attack  
Material    
    PS Normalized PA 
Uranium Weapons Grade Metal  3.94E-01 4.33E-03 3.31E-01 
 HEU (21.5%)  metal 3.15E-01 4.33E-03 2.65E-01 
Uranium Weapons Grade Metal (d) 1.92E-01 4.33E-03 1.61E-01 
HEU (21.5%)  metal (d) 6.60E-02 4.33E-03 5.54E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 Cans 7.64E-01 3.61E-04 5.35E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 Cans (d) 7.57E-01 3.61E-04 5.30E-02 
HEU (36%) Research Reactor  Fresh Fuel 
Assembly 
4.24E-01 3.61E-04 2.97E-02 
HEU (36%) Research Reactor Fresh Fuel 
Assembly(d) 
3.26E-01 3.61E-04 2.28E-02 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 Cans 3.11E-01 3.61E-04 2.17E-02 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 cans (d) 7.84E-02 3.61E-04 5.49E-03 
Pu Metal Super Grade  4.18E-01 2.14E-06 1.74E-04 
Pu Metal Weapons Grade  3.77E-01 2.14E-06 1.56E-04 
Pu Metal Fuel Grade 3.34E-01 2.14E-06 1.39E-04 
Pu Metal Reactor Grade  3.31E-01 2.14E-06 1.37E-04 
Super Grade Pu Metal  (d) 3.11E-01 2.14E-06 1.29E-04 
Weapons Grade Pu Metal  (d) 3.01E-01 2.14E-06 1.25E-04 
Fuel Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.65E-01 2.14E-06 1.10E-04 
Reactor Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.49E-01 2.14E-06 1.03E-04 
PuO2 Cans Super Grade  8.35E-01 1.78E-07 2.89E-05 
PuO2 Cans Super Grade (d) 8.35E-01 1.78E-07 2.89E-05 
PuO2 Cans Weapons Grade 7.53E-01 1.78E-07 2.61E-05 
PuO2 Cans Weapons Grade (d) 7.53E-01 1.78E-07 2.61E-05 
PuO2 Cans Fuel Grade 6.61E-01 1.78E-07 2.29E-05 
PuO2 Cans Fuel Grade(d) 6.61E-01 1.78E-07 2.29E-05 
PuO2 Cans Reactor Grade 6.22E-01 1.78E-07 2.15E-05 
PuO2 Cans Reactor Grade (d) 6.22E-01 1.78E-07 2.15E-05 
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Group B's assessed capabilities are presented in Table 32, and match Group A's 
capabilities except the likelihood of completing an implosion based IND is equivalent to 
the likelihood of producing a gun-type IND.  
 
 
 
 
Table 32. Group B Capability Assessments 
 
Assessed Likelihoods Build Use Undetected Attempts   
     
Conversion 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.125 
Reprocessing 1.00E-03 1.00E-03 1.00E-02 1 1E-08 
Enrichment 1.00E-08 1.00E-03 0.05 1 5E-13 
Machining 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.25 
Metallurgy 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.25 
IND Weaponization 
 Gun-Type 0.9 0.5 0.5 1 0.225 
RDD Weaponization 0.95 0.95 0.75 1 0.67687 
IND Weaponization 
 Implosion 0.9 0.5 0.5 1 0.225 
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Table 33. Group B Probabilities of Attack for Various Materials 
Material    
    PS Normalized PA 
Super Grade Pu Metal 4.18E-01 4.33E-03 9.82E-02 
Weapons Grade U Metal 3.94E-01 4.33E-03 9.27E-02 
Weapons Grade Pu Metal 3.77E-01 4.33E-03 8.86E-02 
Super Grade Pu Metal (d) 3.34E-01 4.33E-03 7.86E-02 
Fuel Grade Pu Metal 3.31E-01 4.33E-03 7.78E-02 
Weapons Grade U metal  (d) 3.15E-01 4.33E-03 7.42E-02 
Reactor Grade Pu Metal 3.11E-01 4.33E-03 7.31E-02 
Weapons Grade Pu Metal (d) 3.01E-01 4.33E-03 7.08E-02 
Fuel Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.65E-01 4.33E-03 6.22E-02 
Reactor Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.49E-01 4.33E-03 5.85E-02 
HEU (21.5%) Metal 1.92E-01 4.33E-03 4.50E-02 
Super Grade PuO2  8.35E-01 3.61E-04 1.64E-02 
Super Grade PuO2  (d) 8.35E-01 3.61E-04 1.64E-02 
HEU (21.5%) Metal (d) 6.60E-02 4.33E-03 1.55E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 cans 7.64E-01 3.61E-04 1.50E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 cans (d) 7.57E-01 3.61E-04 1.48E-02 
Weapons Grade PuO2  7.53E-01 3.61E-04 1.48E-02 
Weapons Grade PuO2 (d) 7.53E-01 3.61E-04 1.48E-02 
Fuel Grade PuO2  6.61E-01 3.61E-04 1.30E-02 
Fuel Grade PuO2 (d) 6.61E-01 3.61E-04 1.30E-02 
Reactor Grade PuO2  6.22E-01 3.61E-04 1.22E-02 
Reactor Grade PuO2 (d) 6.22E-01 3.61E-04 1.22E-02 
HEU Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly 4.24E-01 3.61E-04 8.31E-03 
HEU Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly (d) 3.26E-01 3.61E-04 6.39E-03 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 cans 3.11E-01 3.61E-04 6.09E-03 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 cans (d) 7.84E-02 3.61E-04 1.54E-03 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 33 gives Group B's probabilities of choosing each material. The top tier of 
materials is made up of all direct-use weapons materials, with super grade plutonium 
metal being slightly preferred to weapons grade uranium metal. One observation from 
Table 33 is that there is not much difference between the likelihood of choosing super 
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grade plutonium and reactor grade plutonium. A State would certainly prefer super grade 
plutonium over reactor grade plutonium, because a State is much more concerned with 
weapons reliability and maintenance. The degree to which a terrorist group would be 
deterred from lower quality plutonium is likely much less. The reason using higher 
quality plutonium in a weapon is preferred is that lower qualities of plutonium have a 
higher spontaneous fission rate which increases the chance of fizzling due to pre-
initiation.
70
 For most terrorist groups, the fact that the material produced any yield at all 
is likely more important than the actual size of the yield. There is also not a significant 
degradation in expected yield from lower quality plutonium.
f
 Based on a letter from 
Oppenheimer, the neutron source strength effects on the expected yield of a weapon 
assuming an assembly rate twice as fast as the Trinity tests are presented in Table 34. 
Reactor grade plutonium has a neutron emission rate of approximately 6X greater than 
weapons grade plutonium, and based on the data in Table 34, the expected yields from 
weapons grade plutonium and reactor grade plutonium are approximately 17.94 kT and 
13.54 kT respectively.  
 
                                                 
f
 This statement only considers the spontaneous fission neutron rate of the material. If the adversary doesn't have the 
explosives capability to achieve the necessary assembly rate or cannot devise provisions that account for the greater 
heating rate of reactor grade plutonium, the expected yield from an IND made with reactor grade material will be 
significantly less than that of a weapon that uses weapons grade plutonium. These considerations can be captured by 
using a more sophisticated IND consequence model than we were able to apply in this work. 
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Table 34. Probability of Achieving Indicated Yield Based on Neutron Source Strength
70
 
 
 
 
IV.B.3. Sensitivity Analysis Validation   
 
To validate the sensitivity analysis calculations, we introduce a symmetric problem that 
has identical facilities by taking the verification test and replicating each facility so that 
there are three identical hospitals and three identical research reactors. We then conduct 
a sensitivity analysis on each of the security parameters at all facilities to confirm that 
they are identical to each other. The five facility related variables that caused the greatest 
change in risk based on a 10% perturbation in the original value are given in Table 35.  
 
 
Table 35. IND Related Symmetric Sensitivity Results 
 
Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
 
                        
HEU  LEU 1 1.47E-06 1 1.47E-06 1 1.47E-06 
PPS Layer 1 PN 0.07 3.48E-07 0.07 3.48E-07 0.07 3.48E-07 
PPS Layer 3 PN 0.07 2.64E-07 0.07 2.64E-07 0.07 2.64E-07 
PPS Layer 3 PI 0.075 2.09E-07 0.075 2.09E-07 0.075 2.09E-07 
PPS Layer 1 PI 0.05 5.55E-08 0.05 5.55E-08 0.05 5.55E-08 
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The results from Table 35 validate that the sensitivity values for each variable are 
identical. In addition, the five highest sensitivity values correspond to security measures 
associated with HEU fuel, which makes sense considering the results from Table 26 
show this material is the single largest contributor to risk. The first variable represents 
replacing the HEU with LEU fuel and the next four variables are physical protection 
parameters.  
 
The sensitivity for variables related to sabotage at each research reactor are displayed in 
Table 36, and while each variable has the same sensitivity value, the risk sensitivities for 
three variables are negative. This means upgrades to these parameters actually increase 
risk. This occurs because these risk values represent conditional risk, meaning the 
likelihood the adversary chooses to attack is unity. This assumption causes the adversary 
to react to security upgrades on these paths by increasing the relative likelihood of other 
paths. The negative conditional risk change is a result of the differences between the 
relative likelihood of choosing the sabotage pathways associated with the research 
reactor and the relative risk these pathways represent. From the verification test, the 
likelihood of choosing these pathways (pathways SAB1-SAB4) is 28.13%, while these 
pathways only contribute to 9.78% of the total risk. The result is that sabotage upgrades 
cause some of the relative likelihood of choosing the less-risky sabotage paths to be 
redistributed to higher-risk pathways. An increase in conditional risk does not 
necessarily mean the absolute value of risk has increase, because upgrades that cause a 
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conditional risk increase may simultaneously decrease the probability the adversary 
decides to attack. 
 
 
 
Table 36. Sabotage Related Symmetric Sensitivity Results 
 
Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
 
                        
     
    Reactor 0.036 -2.8E-08 0.036 -2.8E-08 0.036 -2.8E-08 
     
    Spent Fuel 
Pool 
0.068 -1.6E-08 0.068 -1.6E-08 0.068 -1.6E-08 
    
    Reactor 0.030 -6.47E-09 0.030 -6.47E-09 0.030 -6.47E-09 
    
    Spent Fuel 0.100 -2.9E-09 0.100 -2.9E-09 0.100 -2.9E-09 
 
 
 
The next validation test checks the behavior of sensitivity values in an non-symmetric 
system. The security parameters (PPS at all layers,     
         
   ) at the first research reactor 
are all degraded, keeping those parameters at the other two facilities the same as the 
symmetric case. This increases the risk along pathways associated with research reactor 
1 relative to the other two research reactors, and as a result the sensitivity to changes 
should also increase relative to the other two research reactors. The results from the 
sensitivity tests for this non-symmetric test are presented in Table 37 and Table 38. 
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Table 37. IND Related Non-Symmetric Sensitivity Results 
 
Research Reactor 1* Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
 
                        
HEU  LEU 1 4.22E-06 1 1.39E-06 1 1.39E-06 
PPS Layer 1 PN 0.0525 3.34E-07 0.07 3.18E-07 0.07 3.18E-07 
PPS Layer 3 PN 0.0525 3.16E-07 0.07 2.50E-07 0.07 2.50E-07 
PPS Layer 3 PI 0.0675 3.16E-07 0.075 1.98E-07 0.075 1.98E-07 
PPS Layer 1 PI 0.0375 1.23E-07 0.05 4.55E-08 0.05 4.55E-08 
 
 
 
Table 38. Sabotage Related Non-Symmetric Sensitivity Results 
 
Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
 
                        
     
    Reactor 0.048 -4.05E-08 0.036 -3.52E-08 0.036 -3.52E-08 
     
    Spent Fuel 
Pool 
0.082 -1.72E-08 0.068 -3.27E-08 0.068 -3.27E-08 
    
    Reactor 0.0225 -6.24E-09 0.030 -8.33E-09 0.030 -8.33E-09 
    
    Spent Fuel 0.075 -5.46E-10 0.100 -1.65E-08 0.100 -1.65E-08 
 
 
 
Degrading security features changes the value of   for the non-symmetric case, and 
because most sensitivity values were calculated by perturbing the variable by 10%, the 
value for      also changes in the non-symmetric case. To compare the sensitivity 
values between the symmetric and non-symmetric cases, Table 39 shows the IND related 
normalized change in risk  
  
 
  for the symmetric case. For the non-symmetric IND 
related case, Table 40 shows the normalized change in risk, compensating for different 
     values for research reactor 1 using  
  
 
 * 
              
                  
 . 
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Table 39. IND Related Symmetric Relative Sensitivity Results 
Variable Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
Replace HEU with LEU 9.56% 9.56% 9.56% 
PPS Layer 1 PN 2.26% 2.26% 2.26% 
PPS Layer 3 PN 1.71% 1.71% 1.71% 
PPS Layer 3 PI 1.36% 1.36% 1.36% 
PPS Layer 1 PI 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 
 
 
 
Table 40. IND Related Non-Symmetric Relative Sensitivity Results 
Variable Research Reactor 1* Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
Replace HEU with LEU 22.70% 7.49% 7.49% 
PPS Layer 1 PN 2.39% 1.71% 1.71% 
PPS Layer 3 PN 2.26% 1.35% 1.35% 
PPS Layer 3 PI 1.89% 1.06% 1.06% 
PPS Layer 1 PI 0.89% 0.24% 0.24% 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Table 39 and Table 40, the relative sensitivity at research reactor 1 increased 
for every IND related security measure in the non-symmetric case, while decreasing at 
the other two research reactors. The relative sensitivity results from the sabotage related 
security measures are displayed in Table 41 and Table 42, and show the same 
relationship.  
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Table 41. Sabotage Related Symmetric Relative Sensitivity Results 
Variable Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
     
    Reactor -0.18% -0.18% -0.18% 
     
    Spent Fuel 
Pool 
-0.11% -0.11% -0.11% 
    
    Reactor -0.042% -0.042% -0.042% 
    
    Spent Fuel -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% 
 
 
 
Table 42. Sabotage Related Non-Symmetric Relative Sensitivity Results 
Variable Research Reactor 1* Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
     
    Reactor -0.16% -0.19% -0.19% 
     
    Spent Fuel 
Pool 
-0.08% -0.18% -0.18% 
    
    Reactor -0.034% -0.045% -0.045% 
    
    Spent Fuel 0.00% -0.09% -0.09% 
 
 
 
To test the assumption that the negative sensitivity values are a result of the sabotage 
pathways being low risk, the same problem is repeated, but the consequence values from 
the verification test are increased at each reactor to the values in Table 43, which 
correspond to a 20-times increase in loss of life, infrastructure loss and economic loss. 
The original set of consequence values assumed the research reactor was in a remote 
location, while the new values may represent the consequences associated with the same 
reactor being near a more populated area.  
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Table 43. Modified Sabotage Consequence Values 
Sabotage Event  
    
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel Pool 1.00E-10 9.00E-05 6.00E-05 5.00E-04 
Reactor 2.00E-07 7.20E-05 2.00E-05 5.00E-04 
 
 
 
Changing these consequence values increases the State-level risk value to 2.42x10
-5
 
from 1.538x10
-5
. The likelihood of choosing each pathway and relative risk of each 
pathway are given in Table 44, which shows a shift from the IND paths being the highest 
risk pathways to the sabotage pathways associated with the research reactors accounting 
for 59.73% of the total risk.  
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Table 44. Relative Likelihood of Choosing and Relative Risk of Each Pathway for Modified 
Sabotage Consequences 
Pathway   
    
 
%  
IND1 1.75E-03 8.16% 
IND2 1.27E-03 4.75% 
IND3 5.56E-05 0.05% 
IND4 4.11E-05 0.03% 
IND5 4.55E-12 0.00% 
IND6 3.31E-12 0.00% 
IND7 1.24E-14 0.00% 
IND8 9.15E-15 0.00% 
RDD1 7.71E-02 4.30% 
RDD2 5.96E-02 3.39% 
RDD3 2.30E-02 0.86% 
RDD4 1.81E-02 0.70% 
RDD5 7.63E-02 6.31% 
RDD6 5.85E-02 4.85% 
RDD7 3.50E-04 0.00% 
RDD8 2.73E-04 0.00% 
RDD9 2.55E-02 0.54% 
RDD10 1.08E-02 0.22% 
RDD11 2.03E-02 3.21% 
RDD12 1.54E-02 2.31% 
RDD13 1.28E-04 0.00% 
RDD14 9.86E-05 0.00% 
RDD15 7.00E-03 0.50% 
RDD16 6.30E-05 0.00% 
SAB1 1.14E-01 10.97% 
SAB2 2.16E-01 39.39% 
SAB3 7.94E-02 4.34% 
SAB4 8.55E-02 5.03% 
SAB5 2.67E-02 0.02% 
SAB6 2.80E-02 0.02% 
SAB7 2.64E-02 0.02% 
SAB8 2.83E-02 0.03% 
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The sensitivity analysis is re-run and the results for the sabotage variables that had 
negative sensitivities in the first problem are presented in Table 45 for the symmetric 
case and Table 46 for the non-symmetric case. These values are converted to relative 
sensitivity values in Table 47 and Table 48 to allow for a direct comparison.  
 
 
 
Table 45. Sabotage Related Symmetric Sensitivity Results for Modified Case 
 
Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
 
                        
     
    Reactor 0.036 1.03E-08 0.036 1.03E-08 0.036 1.03E-08 
     
    Spent Fuel 
Pool 
0.068 4.68E-07 0.068 4.68E-07 0.068 4.68E-07 
    
    Reactor 0.200 1.7E-09 0.200 1.7E-09 0.200 1.7E-09 
    
    Spent Fuel 0.200 8.82E-07 0.200 8.82E-07 0.200 8.82E-07 
 
 
 
 
Table 46.  Sabotage Related Non-Symmetric Sensitivity Results for Modified Case 
 
Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
 
                        
     
    Reactor 0.048 8.67E-08 0.036 -1.2E-08 0.036 -1.2E-08 
     
    Spent Fuel 
Pool 
0.082 8.31E-07 0.068 3.88E-07 0.068 3.88E-07 
    
    Reactor 0.200 7.81E-08 0.200 -3.4E-08 0.200 -3.4E-08 
    
    Spent Fuel 0.200 1.23E-06 0.200 7.44E-07 0.200 7.44E-07 
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Table 47. Sabotage Related Symmetric Relative Sensitivity Results for Modified Case 
Variable Research Reactor 1 Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
     
    Reactor 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 
     
    Spent Fuel Pool 1.93% 1.93% 1.93% 
    
    Reactor 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
    
    Spent Fuel 3.65% 3.65% 3.65% 
 
 
 
 
Table 48. Sabotage Related Non-Symmetric Relative Sensitivity Results for Modified Case 
Variable Research Reactor 1* Research Reactor 2 Research Reactor 3 
     
    Reactor 0.22% -0.04% -0.04% 
     
    Spent Fuel Pool 2.40% 1.34% 1.34% 
    
    Reactor 0.27% -0.12% -0.12% 
    
    Spent Fuel 4.26% 2.57% 2.57% 
 
 
 
From Table 44, pathways SAB1 and SAB2 correspond to the spent fuel pool sabotage 
scenario, which made up over 50% of the total state level risk. As expected, the 
sensitivity for variables associated with these pathways increased significantly from the 
previous case where IND and RDD routes made up a much larger portion of the State-
level risk. Table 47 shows that the sensitivity values are all positive for the modified 
symmetric case, with variables associated with sabotage of the spent fuel pool being 
much more sensitive than the reactor sabotage variables. Table 48 shows the same trend 
as the un-modified case for a non-symmetric system, where variables associated with the 
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degraded research reactor increase relative to their symmetric values, while the 
associated variables at the other two research reactors decrease.   
 
IV.C. Behavioral Tests   
 
Behavioral tests introduce different scenarios into the code to look for unexpected trends 
or behaviors. For these tests we take one facility and replicate it multiple times, 
observing the change in risk value. We then run each case again adding a target that has 
consequence values for each nuclear threat with one one-half those of the first target. 
The data for these tests is available in Appendix E. The results are displayed in Table 49. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 49. Risks for Behavioral Tests Normalized to PA=1 
  1 Target 2 Targets 
1 Facility 2.018E-05 1.694E-05 
2 Facilities 2.018E-05 1.694E-05 
3 Facilities 2.018E-05 1.694E-05 
4 Facilities 2.018E-05 1.694E-05 
5 Facilities 2.018E-05 1.694E-05 
 
 
 
 
 
There are two observations from the results in Table 49. The first is that adding more 
facilities and more materials had no effect on risk. This is due to the normalization of PA 
values to unity, meaning the risk values in Table 49 represent the conditional risk of a 
single nuclear terrorist attack. Based on this assumption, the probability of adversary 
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success and consequences along each pathway stays the same because each facility is 
identical, and the relative likelihood of choosing each path simply decreases 
proportionally to the number of facilities that are added. The second observation is that 
adding a second target decreased the risk value, with all other things the same. This is 
counter-intuitive because the security infrastructure within the State did not change. The 
decrease in risk value is attributed to the fact that in the scenario with a single target, the 
adversary must choose to attack that target. By adding a second target, some of the 
probability of the adversary choosing the higher consequence target is diverted to the 
lower consequence target. Thus, lower consequence pathways are averaged with the 
higher risk pathways. If a representative set consisting of multiple targets is analyzed, 
then this effect should be minimized. However, to ensure that additional variables aren't 
introduced into the analysis when analyzing security measure upgrades, if the number of 
targets a State is analyzing changes, the base-line risk should be recalculated. 
 
The assumption used in this model is the value of     
  from Equation 23 is proportional 
to the actual probability the adversary chooses each pathway. These     
  values are then 
normalized to unity. Normalizing     
  values is required to capture the dynamic 
relationship between security upgrades and terrorist decision making when evaluating 
upgrades within the State. Without normalizing these values, characteristics such as risk 
transfer are not captured by the model. Relating the conditional risk of nuclear terrorism 
calculated by the model to the absolute risk of nuclear terrorism requires information on 
the frequency the adversary chooses nuclear terrorism. This frequency is related to 
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factors outside of nuclear terrorism, such as the attractiveness and likelihood of success 
of other types of terrorism. For this dissertation, we use conditional risk because it is 
independent of other these other factors. A simplified diagram that shows the risk of 
nuclear terrorism as a subset of terrorism risk is provided in Figure 25. It shows all of the 
various factors that contribute to the likelihood an adversary chooses nuclear terrorism.  
 
The model can also be used to calculate the absolute risk of nuclear terrorism. If we take 
the assumption that the likelihood of choosing nuclear terrorism is proportional to the 
value of     
 , the same calculation displayed in Table 49 is repeated without normalizing 
PA values. These results are displayed in Table 50. The values in the first column 
represent the risk to the one target, and the difference in the values in column 1 and 2 
represent the risk to the second, lower consequence target. These un-normalized risk 
values still must be multiplied by the frequency of attack. 
 
 
 
Table 50. Un-normalized Risks for Behavioral Tests 
 
1 Target 2 Targets 
1 Facility 2.242E-10 2.803E-10 
2 Facilities 4.485E-10 5.606E-10 
3 Facilities 6.727E-10 8.409E-10 
4 Facilities 8.970E-10 1.121E-09 
5 Facilities 1.121E-09 1.402E-09 
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Radical Group/Individual Decides to 
Conduct Terrorism
Evaluate Various Terrorism 
Options
Choose CBRN Terrorism
Choose Conventional 
Terrorism
Evaluate CBRN Options
Choose Nuclear/
Radiological Terrorism
Choose Chemical/
Biological Terrorism
Conditional Risk of 
Conventional 
Terrorism
Conditional Risk of 
Chem/Bio Terrorism
Conditional Risk of 
Nuclear/Radiological 
Terrorism
 
Figure 25. The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism is a Subset of Terrorism Risk 
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CHAPTER V 
TEST CASES 
 
 
A number of strategies can be employed to manage State-level risk, and the 
effectiveness of each strategy likely varies based on the complexity of the State's 
infrastructure and threat characteristics faced by that State. In this chapter, we develop 
three fictional States with nuclear infrastructures of varying complexities. Each 
infrastructure was developed to provide a representative sample of nuclear and 
radiological materials that could be present in a real-world State. We then apply the 
methodology in Chapter III to assess different risk reductions strategies and how the 
effectiveness of these strategies may change based on the complexity of the State's 
infrastructure and the characteristics of the adversary. The strategies investigated are: 
 Material Consolidation - consolidating materials from multiple facilities into a 
smaller number of hardened facilities;   
 Material Conversion - converting materials to less attractive categories (e.g. 
replacement of HEU with LEU); and 
 Material Removal - removing material from a State.  
 
In addition, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on all nuclear security measures to 
determine which security measures the State can upgrade to have the maximum risk 
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reduction. We then simulate the set of nuclear security measure upgrades that will 
decrease the risk by 50%.  
 
Finally, we conduct sensitivity analysis on the assessed terrorist capabilities to determine 
how changes in terrorist capabilities affect the State-level risk. These tests serve a couple 
purposes. First, this methodology uses terrorist capabilities as inputs, and it is likely that 
there is a good amount of uncertainty in the assessed likelihoods of the adversary 
completing each task. Observing how the State-level risk of nuclear terrorism changes 
based on changes in terrorist capabilities gives insight into which capabilities the State 
should be concerned with. These concerns can be addressed by applying resources to 
gain confidence in the value or using more conservative values to evaluate the State-
level risk. The second purpose these tests serve to add quantitative data to the discussion 
in Chapter I, where we introduced the lack of consensus between terrorism experts on 
the likelihood that a terrorist could and would produce a nuclear weapon. Because we  
use conditional risk, we assume the terrorist group will conduct nuclear terrorism, 
however these tests show how sensitive the State-level risk is to the answer to "Could 
terrorists produce a nuclear weapon?". 
 
Three adversaries are modeled against each State infrastructure. Each of the three 
adversaries has identical capabilities, but different motivations and disincentives. The 
first group's motivations for nuclear terrorism favor lower consequence threats such as 
RDD and sabotage threats. The second group has no preference between the nuclear 
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threats. The third group's motivations for nuclear terrorism heavily favor higher 
consequence threats, like nuclear weapon theft and IND threats. Details on the 
adversaries modeled in these test cases are available in Appendix F. 
 
V.A. Small State Infrastructure 
 
The small State analyzed in this section does not have commercial nuclear power 
reactors. Their nuclear materials consist of fresh LEU fuel and spent HEU fuel at 
research reactors that are used for research and isotope production. The small State also 
has various industrial and medical isotopes. Compared to the States with more complex 
nuclear infrastructures, the State has less stringent nuclear security measures employed 
at each facility. The details the State infrastructure are available in Appendix F. 
 
V.A.1. Small State Infrastructure Risk Analysis 
Table 51 gives the risk from each nuclear threat for the small State infrastructure. The 
lack of risk from IND is due to the lack of direct-use nuclear material in the State which 
leads to a very low likelihood that either adversary group could acquire weapons usable 
material. The pathways that contribute the most to the State-level risk and their relative 
contribution to risk are presented in Table 52. 
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Table 51. Small Infrastructure Threats Risk  
Threat                            
IND 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
RDD 37.93% 28.99% 20.53% 
Sabotage 51.87% 63.22% 73.95% 
 
 
 
Table 52. Small State Pathway Risk 
Radiological Dispersion Device 
Facility Material                               
Hospital 
Gamma-Knife Co-60 
Source 
14.37% 11.93% 7.63% 
Industrial Source 
Location 1 
Co-60 Industrial 
Radiography Sources 
8.30% 6.36% 4.41% 
Industrial Source 
Location 2 
Co-60 Industrial 
Radiography Sources 
5.17% 3.97% 2.75% 
Industrial Source 
Location 1 
Ir-192 Industrial 
Radiography Sources 
4.94% 3.83% 2.62% 
Hospital HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 4.87% 3.71% 2.59% 
30 MWth Reactor Irradiated LEU Fuel 3.36% 2.96% 1.78% 
2 MWth Reactor Irradiated LEU Fuel 3.44% 2.8% 1.83% 
Sabotage 
Facility Sabotage Target                               
30 MWth Reactor Spent Fuel Pool 27.76% 32.53% 38.84% 
30 MWth Reactor Reactor 19.96% 23.26% 27.92% 
100Wth Reactor Spent Fuel Pool 3.56% 4.14% 4.98% 
100Wth Reactor Reactor 2.34% 2.81% 3.27% 
 
 
 
Based on the results in Table 52, the largest single contributor to risk is the sabotage of 
the 30 MWth reactor, followed by the high activity Co-60 source. The change in 
motivations for group 3 towards higher consequence pathways leads to a higher 
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likelihood of choosing the higher consequence sabotage pathways instead of the RDD 
pathways, which is represented by the greater risk to sabotage targets and lower risk to 
RDD targets.  
 
V.A.2. Small State Infrastructure Risk Reduction Analysis 
 
Applying the methodology from Chapter III, we evaluate three risk reduction strategies 
that this State could employ to address the State-level risk of nuclear terrorism. The first 
option is to remove the spent fuel from on-site storage at each reactor to a location that is 
away from population centers and has better physical security measures in place. The 
details of the facility are given in Appendix F. The second option is to decommission the 
30 MWth reactor and remove the material. The third option is to remove the Co-60 
Gamma Knife source from the hospital. The results for each option are given in Table 
53.  
 
 
Table 53. Small State Risk Reduction Results 
Security Measure                               
Consolidate Spent Fuel 28.79% 31.58% 33.23% 
Remove 30 MWth Reactor 53.79% 60.36% 66.35% 
Remove Gamma Knife 
Source 4.70% 1.86% -0.28% 
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The results from Table 53 must be analyzed in context. Based on the results, removing 
the 30 MWth reactor would be the preferred option. However, the State will lose both 
the research capabilities provided by the reactor and will lose their domestic ability to 
produce radioisotopes for medical applications. Consolidating the spent fuel is an 
attractive option, as it removes spent fuel from all research reactors, some located in 
proximity to cities, to a lower consequence location. Removing the gamma knife source 
has a small risk-reduction benefit compared to its contribution to risk in Table 52. This is 
because there are a number of other potential RDD sources available within the State, 
and removing the gamma knife source transfers a good portion of risk to the other 
sources. For the third group, removing the gamma knife source eliminates that option 
and increases the likelihood they will attempt higher consequence sabotage pathways, 
which increases the State's conditional risk value. Removing the gamma knife source 
may also not be in the State's interest, as it is used to treat cancer patients. If the State 
lacks dependable power, replacing the gamma knife source with a linear accelerator may 
be impractical.  
 
Rather than employ any of these strategies, the State can upgrade various nuclear 
security measures at their existing facilities. Using sensitivity analysis, the security 
measures which have greatest impact on State-level risk are determined for each group. 
The results are displayed in Table 54, Table 55, and Table 56 show the most sensitive 
security measures in the State for each group, the threats addressed by upgrading these 
security measures, and the change in risk based on a 10% improvement to that security 
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measure. The variables that represent the upgraded nuclear security measures are defined 
in Chapter III.  
 
 
 
Table 54. Small State Most Sensitive Security Measures - Group 1 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 5.98% 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 3.76% 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 3.23% 
30 MWth Reactor -  
Layer 1 PN 
30MWth spent fuel sabotage, 30MWth spent fuel 
sabotage, RDD using Spent Fuel 
3.11% 
30 MWth      
    30MWth reactor sabotage 2.59% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 1 PI 
30MWth spent fuel sabotage, 30MWth spent fuel 
sabotage, RDD using Spent Fuel 
2.40% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 2 PI 30MWth spent fuel sabotage,  RDD using Spent Fuel 
0.49% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 2 PN 30MWth spent fuel sabotage,  RDD using Spent Fuel 
0.49% 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PN Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft 
0.42% 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PI Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft 
0.42% 
100W Reactor      
    100 W Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.35% 
100W Reactor      
    100 W Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.30% 
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Table 55. Small State Most Sensitive Security Measures - Group 2 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 7.08% 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 4.47% 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 3.77% 
30 MWth Reactor -  
Layer 1 PN 
30MWth spent fuel sabotage, 30MWth spent fuel 
sabotage, RDD using Spent Fuel 
3.53% 
30 MWth      
    30MWth reactor sabotage 3.06% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 1 PI 
30MWth spent fuel sabotage, 30MWth spent fuel 
sabotage, RDD using Spent Fuel 
2.69% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 2 PI 30MWth spent fuel sabotage,  RDD using Spent Fuel 
0.57% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 2 PN 30MWth spent fuel sabotage,  RDD using Spent Fuel 
0.57% 
100W Reactor      
    100 W Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.36% 
100W Reactor      
    100 W Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.32% 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PN Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft 
0.29% 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PI Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft 
0.29% 
 
 
 
Table 56. Small State Most Sensitive Security Measures - Group 3 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 8.01% 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 5.09% 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 4.16% 
30 MWth Reactor -  
Layer 1 PN 
30MWth spent fuel sabotage, 30MWth spent fuel 
sabotage, RDD using Spent Fuel 
3.89% 
30 MWth      
    30MWth reactor sabotage 3.44% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 1 PI 
30MWth spent fuel sabotage, 30MWth spent fuel 
sabotage, RDD using Spent Fuel 
2.94% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 2 PI 30MWth spent fuel sabotage,  RDD using Spent Fuel 
0.64% 
30 MWth Research Reactor - 
Layer 2 PN 30MWth spent fuel sabotage,  RDD using Spent Fuel 
0.64% 
100W Reactor      
    100 W Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.33% 
100W Reactor      
    100 W Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.29% 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PN Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft 
0.17% 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PI Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft 
0.17% 
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The sensitivity results show that the differences in adversary motivations and 
disincentives between each group do not change which security measures should be 
employed, as the same twelve security measures are the most sensitive for each group. 
The changes correspond to the motivational preferences of each group. Upgrades that 
address the threat of group 1 are more sensitive for RDD pathways and upgrades that 
address the threats posed by group 3 are more sensitive to Sabotage pathways.  
 
Employing these sensitivity results, we simulate the optimal set of upgrades that will 
decrease the State-level risk posed by each group by 50%. The results for group 1 are 
given in Table 57. The upgrades in Table 57 represent a 49.3% decrease in State-level 
risk. Each upgrade is associated with one of the five riskiest pathways. The upgrade 
analysis did not quite reach 50% because the State reached a stable condition, where any 
upgrades or groups of upgrades were off-set by the transfer of risk to other pathways. 
The risk from each material after introducing the proposed security measures in Table 57 
are given in Table 58, and show that many of the pathways have equivalent risk 
contributions.   
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Table 57.  Optimal Security Measures for Small State - Group 1 
Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
Upgraded 
Value 
30 MWth Reactor     
    
30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage 
Sabotage 
0.55 0.9 
30 MWth Reactor      
    
30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage 
Sabotage 
0.75 0.3 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.55 0.8 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.85 0.4 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PN 
Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft and RDD 0.25 0.9 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PI 
Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft and RDD 0.75 0.8 
Industrial Source Location 1 
Layer 1PN 
Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and 
RDD 
0.1 0.9 
Industrial Source Location 1 
Layer 1 PI 
Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and 
RDD 
0.2 0.9 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 2 PN 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Theft and RDD 0.1 0.5 
Industrial Source Location 1 
Layer 2PN 
Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and 
RDD 
0.25 0.75 
Industrial Source Location 1 
Layer 2 PI 
Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and 
RDD 
0.5 0.6 
Industrial Source Location 2 
Layer 1PN 
Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and 
RDD 
0.1 0.5 
Industrial Source Location 2 
Layer 1 PI 
Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and 
RDD 
0.2 0.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
156 
 
Table 58. State-Level Risk Breakdown for Group 1 After Upgrades 
Facility Material %   
Radiological Dispersion Device 
Hospital Gamma-Knife Co-60 Source 5.09% 
Industrial Co-60 Industrial Radiography 10.72% 
Industrial Co-60 Industrial Radiography 7.41% 
Industrial 
Ir-192 Industrial Radiography 
Source 
6.24% 
Hospital HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 9.27% 
30 MWth Reactor Irradiated LEU Fuel 10.00% 
2 MWth Reactor Irradiated LEU Fuel 10.24% 
Sabotage 
30 MWth Reactor Spent Fuel Pool 8.08% 
30 MWth Reactor Reactor 9.64% 
100Wth Reactor Spent Fuel Pool 10.60% 
100Wth Reactor Reactor 6.97% 
 
 
 
The optimal risk upgrades for group 2 are given in Table 59, and represent a 50.01% 
decrease in State-level risk. The upgrades for group 2 required much fewer upgrades 
than group 1, because the risk of the 30 MWth sabotage pathways dominated the State-
level risk. The risk-reduction goal was met by applying security measure upgrades to the 
four riskiest pathways from Table 52. 
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Table 59. Optimal Security Measures for Small State - Group 2 
Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
Upgraded 
Value 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 0.55 0.8 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 0.75 0.35 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.55 0.8 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.85 0.4 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PN Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft and RDD 
0.25 0.6 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PI Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft and RDD 
0.75 0.8 
Industrial Source Location 
1 Layer 1PN Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and RDD 
0.1 0.25 
Industrial Source Location 
1 Layer 1 PI Industrial Radiography Co-60 Theft and RDD 
0.2 0.25 
 
 
Table 60 shows the optimal security measures for group 3 that represent a 51.45% 
decrease in State-level risk. For this case, the sabotage pathways dominated the risk 
relative to group 1 and group 2, so the relative decrease in risk for applying upgrades to 
these pathways for group 3 was greater resulting in fewer total upgrades being applied to 
reach the same risk-reduction. 
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Table 60. Optimal Security Measures for Small State - Group 3 
Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
Upgraded 
Value 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 0.55 0.8 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage 0.75 0.4 
30 MWth Reactor     
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.55 0.8 
30 MWth Reactor      
    30MWth Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.85 0.45 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PN Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft and RDD 
0.25 0.5 
Hospital Cancer Center - 
Layer 3 PI Gamma Knife Co-60 Theft and RDD 
0.75 0.8 
 
 
 
Based on the pathway risks in Table 52, these upgrade results make sense as security 
upgrades are applied to address the most-risky pathways for each case. The differences 
in motivations between the three adversary groups modeled does result in some changes 
in the State level-risk. However, this is expected as the conditional risk of group 3 
should be higher because they are inclined to attempt higher consequence pathways 
relative to groups 1 and 2. 
 
V.A.3. Small State Infrastructure Adversary Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The sensitivity of risk values to the capability assessment made for each group is given 
in Table 61, Table 62, and Table 63 for group 1, group 2 and group 3 respectively. The 
first row gives each task and the second row gives the assessed likelihood of success at 
each path for the adversary.  Group1, group 2 and group 3 were all modeled with the 
same capabilities, so the original likelihood of success for each task is the same for each 
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group.  The table then shows the percent change in risk for the adversary's actual 
likelihood of success at each task. For example, if the State-level risk is based on the 
assessment that the adversary has an 18% chance of successfully machining SNM for 
use in an IND, the machining task column shows the change in State-level risk based on 
changes in this adversary capability. For group 1, the risk is slightly sensitive to the 
adversary's ability to enrich uranium, which we assessed as implausible. For groups 2 
and 3 who have greater motivations for higher consequence nuclear threats, the risk 
values become sensitive to the adversary's capability to enrich or reprocess nuclear 
materials. However, changes in  other capabilities represent negligible changes in risk. 
These results make sense because the small State has no direct-use materials, meaning 
the State-level risk will only increase if the adversary's capability to convert non direct-
use materials into weapons usable materials. 
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Table 61. Small State Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 1 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original   
     
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
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k
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u
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s 
P
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b
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y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.1 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.15 0.00% 0.01% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.2 0.00% 0.02% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.25 0.00% 0.04% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.3 0.00% 0.05% 0.18% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.35 0.00% 0.07% 0.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.4 0.00% 0.10% 0.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.45 0.00% 0.12% 0.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.00% 0.15% 0.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.55 0.00% 0.18% 0.61% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.6 0.00% 0.22% 0.73% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.65 0.00% 0.25% 0.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.7 0.00% 0.29% 0.99% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.75 0.00% 0.34% 1.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.8 0.00% 0.38% 1.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.85 0.00% 0.43% 1.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.9 0.00% 0.48% 1.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.95 0.00% 0.54% 1.81% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1 0.00% 0.60% 2.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Table 62. Small State Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 2 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.05 0.00% 0.02% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.1 0.00% 0.06% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.15 0.00% 0.14% 0.48% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.2 0.00% 0.26% 0.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.25 0.00% 0.40% 1.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.3 0.00% 0.57% 1.92% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.35 0.00% 0.78% 2.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.4 0.00% 1.02% 3.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.45 0.00% 1.28% 4.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.00% 1.58% 5.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.55 0.00% 1.90% 6.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.6 0.00% 2.26% 7.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.65 0.00% 2.64% 8.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.7 0.00% 3.05% 9.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.75 0.00% 3.49% 10.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.8 0.00% 3.95% 12.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.85 0.00% 4.43% 13.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.9 0.00% 4.95% 15.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.95 0.00% 5.48% 16.47% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1 0.00% 6.04% 17.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Table 63. Small State Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 3 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.05 0.00% 0.50% 0.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.1 0.00% 1.12% 1.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.15 0.00% 1.98% 3.71% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.2 0.00% 3.07% 6.42% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.25 0.00% 4.36% 9.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.3 0.00% 5.85% 13.42% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.35 0.00% 7.51% 17.43% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.4 0.00% 9.32% 21.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.45 0.00% 11.27% 25.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.00% 13.32% 30.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.55 0.00% 15.46% 34.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.6 0.00% 17.67% 38.32% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.65 0.00% 19.94% 42.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.7 0.00% 22.23% 45.82% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.75 0.00% 24.55% 49.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.8 0.00% 26.86% 52.48% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.85 0.00% 29.17% 55.49% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.9 0.00% 31.45% 58.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.95 0.00% 33.71% 60.90% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1 0.00% 35.92% 63.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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V.B. Intermediate State Infrastructure 
 
The intermediate State has three commercial LWR reactors that supply 35% of their 
domestic power and two research reactors, one with HEU and one with LEU. The LEU 
research reactor is located at a University in their capital city, so sabotage of this reactor 
represents a significant concern. Their fuel cycle facilities consist of uranium mining and 
milling, uranium conversion and fuel fabrication. They also have a number of medical 
and industrial radiological sources. The majority of the population and economic 
productivity comes from the capital city. Details on the intermediate State nuclear 
infrastructure are available in Appendix F. 
 
V.B.1. Intermediate State Risk Analysis Results 
 
Table 64 gives the risk breakdown from each nuclear threat for the intermediate State 
infrastructure. In this case, the adversary motivations make a significant difference in the 
risk breakdown, with the RDD threat dominating the risk from group 1 and IND threats 
making a large contribution to the risk from group 3. The pathways that contribute the 
most to the State-level risk and their relative contribution to risk are presented in Table 
65.  
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Table 64. Intermediate State Risk by Threat 
Threat                            
IND 0.23% 2.57% 18.63% 
RDD 64.72% 52.34% 33.59% 
Sabotage 35.05% 45.09% 47.79% 
 
 
 
 
Table 65. Intermediate State Pathways Risk 
Improvised Nuclear Device 
Facility Material                               
University HEU Research 
Reactor Fresh HEU Fuel 
0.23% 2.57% 18.63% 
Radiological Dispersion Device 
Facility Material                               
Food Irradiator Facility Co-60 Source  62.88% 50.65% 32.50% 
Hospital Cancer Center 
Co-60 Gamma Knife 
Source 
0.80% 0.63% 0.41% 
Blood Irradiator Facility Cs-137 Source 0.38% 0.36% 0.23% 
University HEU Research 
Reactor Irradiated HEU Fuel 
0.23% 0.26% 0.17% 
University LEU Research 
Reactor Irradiated LEU Fuel 
0.14% 0.19% 0.12% 
Industrial Facility 2 
Am-Be well logging 
sources 
0.13% 0.10% 0.06% 
Sabotage 
Facility Sabotage Event                               
University LEU Research 
Reactor Spent Fuel Pool 
26.91% 34.61% 36.68% 
University LEU Research 
Reactor Reactor 
7.63% 9.82% 10.41% 
University HEU Research 
Reactor Spent Fuel Pool 
0.29% 0.38% 0.40% 
University HEU Research 
Reactor Reactor 
0.11% 0.14% 0.14% 
BWR Reactor Site Spent Fuel Pool 0.10% 0.13% 0.14% 
BWR Reactor Site Reactor 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
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Based on the results, four pathways are contributing to essentially all of the State-level 
risk. The first is the 400,000 Curie Co-60 Blood Irradiator source, which has the highest 
risk value based on IAEA radionuclide categorization. The second is the fresh HEU 
research reactor fuel, which contributes to essentially all of the IND risk. Finally, the 
third high risk event is the sabotage of the LEU research reactor or spent fuel pool, 
which has severe consequences because it is located in the capital city. For the 
intermediate State, the differences in group motivations make a significant difference in 
the risk posed by the IND, but in all cases the Co-60 food irradiation source and the 
reactor sabotage are contributing to a significant amount to the State-level risk.  
 
V.B.2. Intermediate State Risk-Reduction Analysis 
 
Based on the State-infrastructure, the material removal strategies that should be 
investigated are replacing the food irradiator source with a linear accelerator, 
decommissioning the LEU research reactor and removing the material, or 
decommissioning the HEU research reactor and removing the fresh HEU fuel. Material 
replacement could include replacing the HEU research reactor fuel with LEU.  These 
risk reduction strategies are simulated and the results displayed in Table 66. 
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Table 66. Intermediate State Risk Reduction Strategy Results 
Risk-Reduction Strategy           Reduction           Reduction           Reduction 
Replace Co-60  Food 
Irradiator Source  
58.90% 46.07% 27.29% 
Remove LEU Research 
Reactor 
27.09% 34.39% 32.86% 
Remove Spent Fuel From 
LEU Research Reactor 
22.57% 28.31% 27.91% 
Remove HEU Research 
Reactor  
0.22% 2.45% 17.69% 
Replace HEU Research 
Reactor Fuel with LEU 
0.22% 2.45% 17.69% 
 
 
The risk reduction strategies show that replacing the Co-60 Food Irradiator significantly 
reduces risk for each group and would be a worthwhile strategy to investigate. 
Removing the LEU research reactor also creates a significant risk reduction for all 
groups, however removing this reactor will result in the loss of significant research at the 
university. The risk analysis shows that removing the spent fuel from the reactor to 
another storage has a lower risk reduction, but allows the reactor to remain operational. 
The risk analysis results are also based on a snapshot in time of the State, so the regular 
transportation of spent fuel from the research reactor is not captured and should be 
investigated as it could decrease, to some degree, the risk reduction benefits of shipping 
the spent fuel off-site. Strategies at the HEU reactor show that there is no risk-based 
difference between decommissioning the reactor and removing the fuel or simply 
replacing the HEU fuel with LEU. The risk reduction benefits are also highly dependent 
on the motivations of the terrorist group.  
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 Rather than employ any of these strategies, the State can upgrade various nuclear 
security measures at their existing facilities. Using sensitivity analysis, the security 
measures which have greatest impact on State-level risk are determined for each group. 
The results are displayed in Table 67, Table 68, and Table 69 show the most sensitive 
security measures in the State for each group, the threats addressed by upgrading these 
security measures, and the change in risk based on a 10% improvement to that security 
measure. 
 
 
Table 67. Intermediate State Security Measure Risk Sensitivity Results - Group 1 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
Food Irradiator Source  
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
16.14% 
 LEU Research Reactor     
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 5.64% 
Target Security  Capital City       Delivering IND and RDD to Capital City 4.50% 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 4.10% 
Detecting Adversary RDD 
Weaponization  
 
    
  All RDD Pathways 
3.90% 
Food Irradiator Source  
Layer 2 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
2.07% 
Food Irradiator Source  
Layer 2 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
2.07% 
LEU Research Reactor      
    LEU Research Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 1.15% 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.91% 
Transportation Interdiction       
   All IND and RDD  0.90% 
LEU Research Reactor -  
Layer 1 PN 
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel and 
Reactor Sabotage, Spent Fuel Theft and RDD 
0.88% 
LEU Research Reactor -  
Layer 1 PI 
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel and 
Reactor Sabotage, Spent Fuel Theft and RDD 
0.79% 
 
 
 
 
  
168 
 
Table 68. Intermediate State Security Measure Risk Sensitivity Results - Group 2 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
Food Irradiator Source  
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
12.97% 
 LEU Research Reactor     
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 7.23% 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 5.25% 
Target Security  Capital City       Delivering IND and RDD to Capital City 3.72% 
Detecting Adversary RDD 
Weaponization  
 
    
  All RDD Pathways 
2.33% 
Food Irradiator Source  
Layer 2 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
1.67% 
Food Irradiator Source  
Layer 2 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
1.67% 
LEU Research Reactor      
    LEU Research Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 1.41% 
LEU Research Reactor -  
Layer 1 PN 
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel and 
Reactor Sabotage, Spent Fuel Theft and RDD 
1.14% 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 1.12% 
LEU Research Reactor -  
Layer 1 PI 
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel and 
Reactor Sabotage, Spent Fuel Theft and RDD 
1.03% 
Transportation Interdiction       
   All IND and RDD  0.70% 
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Table 69. Intermediate State Security Measure Risk Sensitivity Results - Group 3 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
Food Irradiator Source  
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
8.05% 
LEU Research Reactor     
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 7.30% 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 5.32% 
Detecting Adversary IND 
Metallurgy  
 
    
 All IND Pathways 
4.14% 
Target Security  Capital City       Delivering IND and RDD to Capital City 3.25% 
Detecting Adversary IND Gun-
Type Weaponization  
 
    
 All IND Pathways 
3.13% 
Adversary Capability - IND 
Weaponization Gun Type All IND Pathways 
3.13% 
Adversary Capability - Machining All IND Pathways 3.13% 
Detecting Adversary IND Gun-
Type Weaponization  
 
    
 All IND Pathways 
3.13% 
Adversary Capability - Metallurgy All IND Pathways 2.89% 
 LEU Research Reactor     
    LEU Research Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 1.22% 
LEU Research Reactor -  
Layer 1 PN 
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel and 
Reactor Sabotage, Spent Fuel Theft and RDD 
1.14% 
Food Irradiator Source  
Layer 2 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
1.04% 
Food Irradiator Source  
Layer 2 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
1.04% 
LEU Research Reactor -  
Layer 1 PN 
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel and 
Reactor Sabotage, Spent Fuel Theft and RDD 
1.02% 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.99% 
Transportation Interdiction       
   All IND and RDD  0.74% 
 
 
 
The sensitivity results show that security upgrades to the Co-60 Food Irradiator source 
and upgrades to research reactor sabotage security are preferred for each case. For group 
1, the State-level risk is sensitive to the ability of security at the capital city to detect and 
prevent an adversary attempting to deliver an IND or RDD to the city. In addition, the 
State-level risk is sensitive to the State's ability to the likelihood they can recapture 
stolen material once it is discovered and their ability to detect adversary activity in 
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producing an RDD. For group 2, the State-level risk is most sensitive to the same 
security measures, but the sensitivity to RDD related security measures is less than that 
of group 1, while the sensitivity to sabotage related security measures increase. For 
group 3, the State level-risk is also sensitive to the State's ability to detect an adversary 
attempting to produce an IND and the adversary's assessed capabilities to machine, cast 
and weaponize HEU used in the risk analysis.   
 
Employing these sensitivity results, the optimal set of security measure upgrades to 
reach a 50% reduction in State-level risk are simulated for each group. The results for 
group 1 are displayed in Table 70.  
 
 
 
Table 70. Intermediate State Optimal Security Upgrades for 50% Risk Reduction - Group 1 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
New 
Value 
Food Irradiator Source  
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
LEU Research Reactor     
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.25 0.6 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.5 0.25 
Detecting Adversary RDD 
Weaponization  
 
    
  All RDD Pathways 
0.85 0.75 
LEU Research Reactor     
    LEU Research Reactor - Reactor Sabotage 0.25 0.38 
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Table 70 shows that only a few security measure upgrades were required to reduce the 
risk by 50.18%. For this analysis, PI and PN values were capped at 0.92 which limited the 
upgrades on the Food Irradiator source. A decrease in non-detection probability is 
equivalent to an increase in the State's detection capability. The results from group 2 are 
presented in Table 71 and are similar to group 1, except hardening the target security at 
the capital city is upgraded instead of upgrading the State's RDD weaponization 
detection capabilities. The proposed set of upgrades reduces the State-level risk by 
50.24%. 
 
 
 
Table 71. Intermediate State Optimal Security Upgrades for 50% Risk Reduction - Group 2 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
New 
Value 
Food Irradiator Source  
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
LEU Research Reactor     
    
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel 
Sabotage 
0.25 0.55 
LEU Research Reactor       
    
LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel 
Sabotage 
0.5 0.3 
Target Security  Capital City       
Delivering IND and RDD to Capital 
City 
0.3 0.39 
LEU Research Reactor     
    
LEU Research Reactor - Reactor 
Sabotage 
0.25 0.38 
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The recommended upgrades to address the risk from group 3 are given in Table 72 and 
the set of upgrades represent a 51.32% decrease in State-level risk. The upgrades are 
similar to group 2, but the State's ability to detect the adversary attempting to acquire the 
equipment for casting SNM for an IND is also upgraded.  
 
 
Table 72. Intermediate State Optimal Security Upgrades for 50% Risk Reduction - Group 3 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
New 
Value 
Food Irradiator Source  
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
LEU Research Reactor     
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.25 0.55 
LEU Research Reactor       
    LEU Research Reactor - Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.5 0.3 
Target Security  Capital City       Delivering IND and RDD to Capital City 0.3 0.42 
Detecting Adversary IND 
Metallurgy  
 
    
 All IND Pathways 
0.75 0.64 
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V.B.3. Intermediate State Infrastructure Adversary Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The sensitivity of risk values to the capability assessment made for each group is given 
in Table 73, Table 74, and Table 75 for group 1, group 2, and group 3 respectively. The 
first row gives each task and the second row gives the assessed likelihood of success at 
each path for the adversary. The table then shows the percent change in risk if the for the 
adversary's actual likelihood of success at each task.  Unlike the small State, the 
intermediate State has direct-use SNM, so the State-level risk is sensitive to the 
capabilities of the adversary to produce an IND using this material. For group 1, the risk 
is only slightly sensitive to changes in the group's ability to cast, machine, and 
weaponize HEU. For groups 2 and 3, the risk values become very sensitive to these 
capabilities.  Especially for group 3, errors in the group's capabilities can have a 
significant impact on risk and the State should both investigate how changes in these 
capabilities effect proposed upgrades and could apply additional intelligence resources 
towards gaining confidence in the State's assessment of these capabilities. 
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Table 73. Intermediate State Adversary Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 1 
  Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original 
Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.22% -0.22% -0.22% 0.00% 
0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.20% -0.21% -0.19% 0.00% 
0.1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.15% -0.18% -0.09% 0.00% 
0.15 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.07% -0.12% 0.07% 0.00% 
0.2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% -0.05% 0.29% 0.00% 
0.25 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.21% 0.05% 0.58% 0.00% 
0.3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.39% 0.17% 0.94% 0.00% 
0.35 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.62% 0.31% 1.36% 0.00% 
0.4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.88% 0.47% 1.85% 0.00% 
0.45 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.17% 0.66% 2.40% 0.00% 
0.5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50% 0.86% 3.02% 0.00% 
0.55 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 1.86% 1.09% 3.70% 0.00% 
0.6 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 2.26% 1.34% 4.45% 0.00% 
0.65 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 2.69% 1.62% 5.27% 0.00% 
0.7 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 3.16% 1.91% 6.14% 0.00% 
0.75 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 3.66% 2.23% 7.09% 0.00% 
0.8 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 4.19% 2.57% 8.10% 0.00% 
0.85 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 4.77% 2.93% 9.17% 0.00% 
0.9 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 5.37% 3.31% 10.32% 0.00% 
0.95 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 6.01% 3.72% 11.52% 0.00% 
1 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 6.69% 4.14% 12.79% 0.00% 
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Table 74. Intermediate State Adversary Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 2 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -2.45% -2.45% -2.45% 0.00% 
0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -2.29% -2.35% -2.13% 0.00% 
0.1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -1.73% -2.00% -1.05% 0.00% 
0.15 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.77% -1.40% 0.77% 0.00% 
0.2 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.59% -0.55% 3.33% 0.00% 
0.25 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 2.34% 0.55% 6.64% 0.00% 
0.3 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 4.49% 1.91% 10.69% 0.00% 
0.35 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 7.03% 3.51% 15.48% 0.00% 
0.4 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 9.97% 5.36% 21.02% 0.00% 
0.45 0.00% 0.04% 0.01% 13.30% 7.47% 27.29% 0.00% 
0.5 0.00% 0.05% 0.01% 17.02% 9.82% 34.30% 0.00% 
0.55 0.00% 0.07% 0.01% 21.14% 12.42% 42.04% 0.00% 
0.6 0.00% 0.08% 0.01% 25.65% 15.27% 50.53% 0.00% 
0.65 0.00% 0.09% 0.01% 30.55% 18.38% 59.74% 0.00% 
0.7 0.00% 0.11% 0.02% 35.85% 21.72% 69.70% 0.00% 
0.75 0.00% 0.12% 0.02% 41.54% 25.32% 80.38% 0.00% 
0.8 0.00% 0.14% 0.02% 47.62% 29.17% 91.80% 0.00% 
0.85 0.00% 0.16% 0.03% 54.09% 33.26% 103.95% 0.00% 
0.9 0.00% 0.18% 0.03% 60.95% 37.61% 116.82% 0.00% 
0.95 0.00% 0.20% 0.03% 68.20% 42.20% 130.43% 0.00% 
1 0.00% 0.22% 0.04% 75.84% 47.03% 144.77% 0.00% 
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Table 75. Intermediate State Adversary Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 3 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -17.69% -17.69% -17.69% 0.00% 
0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -16.50% -16.98% -15.33% 0.00% 
0.1 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -12.43% -14.45% -7.56% 0.00% 
0.15 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% -5.51% -10.10% 5.53% 0.00% 
0.2 0.00% 0.05% 0.01% 4.24% -3.95% 23.89% 0.00% 
0.25 0.00% 0.08% 0.01% 16.79% 3.98% 47.44% 0.00% 
0.3 0.00% 0.13% 0.02% 32.11% 13.68% 76.11% 0.00% 
0.35 0.00% 0.18% 0.03% 50.18% 25.14% 109.85% 0.00% 
0.4 0.00% 0.23% 0.04% 70.98% 38.35% 148.58% 0.00% 
0.45 0.00% 0.30% 0.05% 94.47% 53.29% 192.25% 0.00% 
0.5 0.00% 0.38% 0.07% 120.63% 69.95% 240.79% 0.00% 
0.55 0.00% 0.46% 0.08% 149.44% 88.32% 294.13% 0.00% 
0.6 0.00% 0.56% 0.10% 180.87% 108.38% 352.23% 0.00% 
0.65 0.00% 0.66% 0.12% 214.90% 130.12% 415.01% 0.00% 
0.7 0.00% 0.77% 0.14% 251.51% 153.53% 482.43% 0.00% 
0.75 0.00% 0.89% 0.16% 290.66% 178.59% 554.42% 0.00% 
0.8 0.00% 1.01% 0.18% 332.34% 205.30% 630.93% 0.00% 
0.85 0.00% 1.15% 0.21% 376.52% 233.65% 711.90% 0.00% 
0.9 0.00% 1.29% 0.24% 423.19% 263.61% 797.27% 0.00% 
0.95 0.00% 1.44% 0.26% 472.31% 295.18% 887.00% 0.00% 
1 0.00% 1.60% 0.29% 523.87% 328.35% 981.03% 0.00% 
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V.C. Complex State Infrastructure 
 
The complex State has five commercial LWR nuclear reactors which supply 20% of the 
State's power requirements. The State has a gas centrifuge enrichment facility which 
supplies civilian LEU, co-located conversion and fuel fabrication facility facilities, and a 
reprocessing and waste storage facility. The complex State also has a nuclear weapons 
program. The nuclear weapons complex includes: 
 a super prompt critical reactor with HEU fuel to test materials under neutron 
burst environments;  
 a nuclear weapon assembly, disassembly and servicing facility;  
 A MAGNOX plutonium production reactor and reprocessing facility; 
 Nuclear weapon component production facility; and 
 nuclear weapons are designed at 2 mega-tons and are deployed at military and 
naval bases. 
In addition, the complex State has more industrial and medical radiological materials 
than the small or intermediate States. The complex State employs much more stringent 
security measures on nuclear facilities compared to the small and intermediate States, 
and even higher levels of security to protect nuclear weapons. The security employed on 
radiological materials is not as stringent as those employed on nuclear materials.  Full 
details of the State infrastructure are available in Appendix F. Facilities that are part of 
the nuclear weapons program are designated with NWC for nuclear weapons complex.  
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V.C.1. Complex  State Infrastructure Risk Analysis 
 
Table 76 gives the risk breakdown from each nuclear threat for the complex State. The 
analysis shows that the State-level risk is dominated by the risk from RDD and sabotage. 
Due to the strict security measures on nuclear weapons, the State-level risk from the 
analyzed threats is non-existent, as the groups are much more likely to choose paths with 
greater chances of success.  The pathways that contribute the most to the State-level risk 
and their relative contributions to risk are presented in Table 77.   
 
 
 
Table 76. Complex State Risk by Threat 
Threat                            
Nuclear Weapons 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
IND 0.10% 1.10% 8.30% 
RDD 52.27% 40.30% 26.94% 
Sabotage 47.63% 58.60% 64.76% 
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Table 77. Complex State Pathways Risk 
Improvised Nuclear Device 
Facility Material                               
(NWC) Super Prompt Critical 
Reactor Fresh HEU Fuel 
0.06% 0.65% 4.84% 
(NWC) HEU Research Reactor Fresh HEU Fuel 0.04% 0.44% 3.26% 
(NWC) Nuclear Weapon 
Assembly Facility Pu Machined Metal 
0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 
(NWC) Weapon Component 
Production Pu Metal Product 
0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
Radiological Dispersion Device 
Facility Material                               
Industrial Source Location 6 Food Irradiator 6 21.11% 16.25% 10.75% 
Industrial Source Location 2 Food Irradiator 20.31% 15.63% 10.34% 
Industrial Source Location 1 Blood/Tissue Irradiator 5.91% 4.55% 3.01% 
Industrial Source Location 3 Co Radiography 1.56% 1.20% 0.79% 
Industrial Source Location 3 Industrial Rad Ir 3 1.07% 0.82% 0.54% 
Industrial Source Location 4 Well Logging Am-Be 4 0.81% 0.63% 0.41% 
Industrial Source Location 5 Well Logging Am-Be 5 0.77% 0.59% 0.39% 
Hospital 4 Gamma Knife Multi-Beam 0.24% 0.19% 0.12% 
Hospital 3 Gamma Knife Multi-Beam 0.22% 0.17% 0.11% 
Hospital 1 Gamma Knife Multi-Beam 0.19% 0.14% 0.09% 
Sabotage 
Facility Sabotage Event                               
PWR Site 2 Spent Fuel Pool PWR2 7.64% 9.38% 10.25% 
PWR Site 1 Spent Fuel Pool PWR1 5.90% 7.24% 7.91% 
BWR Site 1 Spent Fuel Pool BWR 1 5.78% 7.10% 7.76% 
BWR Site 2 Spent Fuel Pool BWR 2 5.78% 7.10% 7.76% 
PWR Site 3 Spent Fuel Pool PWR3 5.78% 7.10% 7.76% 
(NWC) MAGNOX Pu 
Production Complex Reactor 
4.01% 4.92% 5.38% 
(NWC) Military Reprocessing Spent Fuel Pin Storage 3.51% 4.31% 4.71% 
(NWC) HEU Research Reactor Spent Fuel Sabotage 3.45% 4.24% 4.63% 
(NWC) Super Prompt Critical 
Reactor Spent Fuel Storage 
1.92% 2.36% 2.58% 
Commercial Reprocessing and 
Waste Storage Spent Fuel Storage 
2.02% 2.48% 2.71% 
(NWC) HEU Research Reactor Reactor 0.98% 1.21% 1.32% 
(NWC) Super Prompt Critical 
Reactor Reactor 
0.79% 0.97% 1.06% 
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The results in Table 77 show that the two four-million Curie Co-60 food irradiator 
sources present the majority of the RDD risk, followed by the twelve-thousand Curie Cs-
137 blood and tissue irradiator source. The two Co-60 sources are the largest contributor 
to risk for each group. The sabotage risk is dominated by the commercial reactor, with 
PWR site 1 representing the highest risk because of its proximity to the capital city. IND 
risks are relatively low, based on the strict security measures and the low assessed 
likelihood of the adversary producing an implosion based IND using plutonium.  
 
V.C.2. Complex  State Infrastructure Risk Reduction Results 
 
Two risk reduction strategies were investigated for the complex State. The first was to 
consolidate the spent fuel from the commercial reactors to a highly secured location 
away from population areas. The second strategy involves replacing the high activity 
Co-60 and Cs-137 sources with linear accelerators. The results are given in Table 78.  
 
The results from Table 78 show that removing the spent fuel from all commercial 
reactors and consolidating it at a central location provides a significant risk reduction, as 
it simultaneously addresses the five highest consequence sabotage pathways. Replacing 
either Co-60 also provides significant risk reduction by eliminating a majority of the risk 
posed by that source. Replacing both Co-60 sources with accelerators yield slightly 
greater risk reduction than the sum of the risk reduction from replacing either one 
independently. This is due to the fact that upgrading one source transfers some of the 
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risk to the other Co-60 source, which is eliminated when eliminating both. The results 
for replacing the Cs-137 blood and tissue irradiator source are much lower, which 
indicates only upgrading this source transfers risk to the higher risk Co-60 pathways. For 
group 3, the risk transfer to the higher consequence sources is greater than the risk 
reduction received from removing the Cs-137 source.  
 
Rather than employ any of these strategies, the State can upgrade various nuclear 
security measures at their existing facilities. Using sensitivity analysis, the security 
measures which have greatest impact on State-level risk are determined for each group. 
The results are displayed in Table 79, Table 80, and Table 81 show the most sensitive 
security measures in the State for each group, the threats addressed by upgrading these 
security measures, and the change in risk based on a 10% improvement to that security 
measure. 
 
 
Table 78. Complex State Risk Reduction Strategy Results 
 Risk Reduction Strategy          Reduction          Reduction          Reduction 
Consolidate Spent Fuel 29.46% 35.92% 38.43% 
Replace Co-60 Food Irradiator 
at Location 6 With Accelerator 
18.78% 13.85% 8.34% 
Replace Co-60 Food Irradiator 
at Location 1 With Accelerator 
18.00% 13.26% 7.97% 
Replace Both Co-60 Food 
Irradiators With Accelerators 
37.89% 27.90% 16.75% 
Replace Cs-137 Blood/Tissue 
Irradiator with Accelerator 
1.87% 0.56% -0.81% 
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Table 79. Complex State Security Measure Risk Sensitivity Results - Group 1 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
Transportation Interdiction       
   All IND, RDD, and Nuclear Weapon Theft 11.68% 
Food Irradiator Co-60 Source 6 
 Layer 1 PN  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
5.45% 
Food Irradiator Co-60 Source 2 
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
5.23% 
Food Irradiator Co-60 Source 6 
 Layer 1 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
4.01% 
Food Irradiator Co-60 Source 2 
 Layer 1 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
3.85% 
Target Security  Capital City       
Delivering Nuclear Weapon, IND or RDD to 
Capital City 
3.70% 
PWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN  
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.33% 
PWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
2.55% 
PWR Site 3 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
2.50% 
BWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
2.50% 
BWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
2.50% 
Transportation Interdiction       
     
All IND, RDD, and Nuclear Weapon Theft and 
Diversion 
1.41% 
 
PWR Site 2       
    PWR Site 2 Spent Fuel Sabotage 1.29% 
PWR Site 1       
   
 PWR Site 1 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.99% 
PWR Site 3       
    PWR Site 3 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.97% 
BWR Site 2       
    BWR Site 2 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.97% 
BWR Site 1       
    BWR Site 1 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.97% 
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Table 80. Complex State Security Measure Risk Sensitivity Results - Group 2 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
Transportation Interdiction       
   All IND, RDD, and Nuclear Weapon Theft 8.06% 
Food Irradiator Co-60 Source 6 
 Layer 1 PN  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
4.11% 
PWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN  
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
4.05% 
Food Irradiator Co-60 Source 2 
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
3.94% 
PWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.09% 
PWR Site 3 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.03% 
BWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.03% 
BWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.03% 
Target Security  Capital City       
Delivering Nuclear Weapon, IND or RDD to 
Capital City 
3.02% 
(NWC) Super-Prompt Critical 
Reactor - Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, HEU 
Theft for IND, Irradiated Fuel theft for RDD 
2.90% 
Commercial Reprocessing and 
Waste Storage - Layer 1 PN 
Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, Irradiated Fuel 
theft for RDD, PuO2 Theft for RDD or IND 
2.73% 
PWR Site 2     
    Reactor Sabotage 2.53% 
(NWC) Military Reprocessing - 
Layer 1 PN 
Spent Fuel Sabotage, Spent Fuel Pins theft for 
RDD, Weapons Grade PuO2 for IND or RDD 
1.85% 
PWR Site 2       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 1.63% 
PWR Site 1       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 1.62% 
PWR Site 3       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 1.62% 
BWR Site 2       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 1.57% 
BWR Site 1       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 1.20% 
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Table 81. Complex State Security Measure Risk Sensitivity Results - Group 3 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed    
Transportation Interdiction       
   All IND, RDD, and Nuclear Weapon Theft 5.89% 
(NWC) Super-Prompt Critical 
Reactor - Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, HEU 
Theft for IND, Irradiated Fuel theft for RDD 
5.32% 
PWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN  
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD 
4.33% 
(NWC) HEU Research Reactor - 
Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, HEU 
Theft for IND, Irradiated Fuel theft for RDD 
3.93% 
PWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.29% 
PWR Site 3 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.22% 
BWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.22% 
BWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
3.22% 
Food Irradiator Source 6 
 Layer 1 PN  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
2.60% 
Food Irradiator Source 2 
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
2.49% 
Commercial Reprocessing and 
Waste Storage - Layer 1 PN 
Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, Irradiated Fuel 
theft for RDD, PuO2 Theft for RDD or IND 
1.98% 
Food Irradiator Co-60 Source 6 
 Layer 1 PI  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
1.91% 
Food Irradiator Co60 Source 2 
 Layer 1 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
1.84% 
Detecting Adversary IND 
Metallurgy  
 
    
 All IND Pathways 
1.83% 
Target Security  Capital City       
Delivering Nuclear Weapon, IND or RDD to 
Capital City 
1.78% 
(NWC) Military Reprocessing - 
Layer 1 PN 
Spent Fuel Sabotage, Spent Fuel Pins theft for 
RDD, Weapons Grade PuO2 for IND or RDD 
1.72% 
PWR Site 2       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 1.69% 
PWR Site 2     
    Reactor Sabotage 1.65% 
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As in the other cases, the State-level risk is sensitive to security measures along the high-
risk pathways, such as the two Co-60 food irradiator sources. In addition, many of the 
most sensitive security measures address numerous pathways. For each group, the State's 
ability to successfully recapture stolen material is the most sensitive security measure 
and addresses all RDD and IND theft scenarios. This is likely because the State-level 
risk is distributed among a larger number of pathways than the small and intermediate 
cases.  
 
Employing these sensitivity values, the optimal set of upgrades to reduce the State-level 
risk by 50% are determined for each group. For each facility, PI and PN values were 
capped at 0.92. The recommended security upgrades to address the threat from group 1 
are given in Table 82 and represent a 50.28% reduction in State-level risk. There are a 
significantly larger number of upgrades to reach a 50% risk for the complex State 
compared to the small and intermediate States, due to many physical security measures 
being maxed out at 0.92, and the larger number of pathways. For group 1, the upgrades 
consist of improving physical security at both Co-60 food irradiation source locations 
and all commercial nuclear reactors. In addition, the State should improve their ability to 
recapture stolen materials, harden the security at the capital city, and add additional 
features to prevent sabotage of the spent fuel at each commercial reactor.  
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The recommended security upgrades to address the threat from group 2 are given in 
Table 83 and represent a 50.2% reduction in State-level risk. Many of the security 
upgrades for group 2 are similar as for group 1 with slight differences in the degree of 
upgrades. In addition, upgrades are recommended at both reprocessing facilities and the 
Super-Prompt Critical Reactor.  
 
The recommended security upgrades to address the threat from group 3 are given in 
Table 84 and represent a 50.01% reduction in State-level risk. In addition to the 
upgrades recommended for group 2,  sabotage mitigation at both reprocessing and the 
Super-Prompt Critical Reactor are recommended. In addition, the upgrade options also 
recommend the State improve their ability to detect adversary attempts to cast SNM into 
a shape suitable for a crude nuclear device.  
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Table 82. Complex State Optimal Security Upgrades for 50% Risk Reduction - Group 1 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
Upgraded 
Value 
Transportation Interdiction       
   
All IND, RDD, and Nuclear Weapon 
Theft 
0.001 0.0012 
Food Irradiator Source 6 
 Layer 1 PN  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
Food Irradiator Source 2 
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
Food Irradiator Source 6 
 Layer 1 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.7 0.84 
Food Irradiator Source 2 
 Layer 1 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.7 0.82 
Target Security  Capital City 
      
Delivering Nuclear Weapon, IND or RDD 
to Capital City 
0.3 0.43 
PWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN  
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, 
Irradiated Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for 
IND 
0.9 0.92 
PWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, 
Irradiated Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for 
IND 
0.9 0.92 
PWR Site 3 
 Layer 1 PI 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, 
Irradiated Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for 
IND 
0.9 0.92 
BWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, 
Irradiated Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for 
IND 
0.9 0.92 
BWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, 
Irradiated Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for 
IND 
0.9 0.92 
PWR Site 2       
    PWR Site 2 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
PWR Site 1       
   
 PWR Site 1 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.17 
PWR Site 3       
    PWR Site 3 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.17 
BWR Site 2       
    BWR Site 2 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.17 
BWR Site 1       
    BWR Site 1 Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.17 
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Table 83. Complex State Optimal Security Upgrades for 50% Risk Reduction - Group 2 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
Upgraded 
Value 
Transportation Interdiction 
      
   All IND, RDD, and Nuclear Weapon Theft 
0.001 0.00136 
Food Irradiator Source 6 
 Layer 1 PN  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
PWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN  
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
Food Irradiator Source 2 
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
PWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
PWR Site 3 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
BWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
BWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
Target Security  Capital City 
      
Delivering Nuclear Weapon, IND or RDD to 
Capital City 
0.3 0.42 
(NWC) Super-Prompt Critical 
Reactor - Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, 
HEU Theft for IND, Irradiated Fuel theft for 
RDD 
0.9 .92 
Commercial Reprocessing and 
Waste Storage - Layer 1 PN 
Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, Irradiated Fuel 
theft for RDD, PuO2 Theft for RDD or IND 
0.9 .92 
(NWC) Military Reprocessing 
-      
   
 Spent Fuel Sabotage 
0.2 0.15 
PWR Site 2       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.11 
PWR Site 1       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
PWR Site 3       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
BWR Site 2       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
BWR Site 1       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
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Table 84. Complex State Optimal Security Upgrades for 50% Risk Reduction - Group 3 
Nuclear Security Measure Threat Addressed 
Original 
Value 
Upgraded 
Value 
Transportation Interdiction 
      
   All IND, RDD, and Nuclear Weapon Theft 
0.001 0.00126 
(NWC) Super-Prompt Critical 
Reactor - Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, 
HEU Theft for IND, Irradiated Fuel theft for 
RDD 
0.9 0.92 
PWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN  
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD 
0.9 0.92 
(NWC) HEU Research Reactor 
- Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, 
HEU Theft for IND, Irradiated Fuel theft for 
RDD 
0.9 0.92 
PWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
PWR Site 3 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
BWR Site 2 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
BWR Site 1 
 Layer 1 PN 
Reactor and Spent Fuel Sabotage, Irradiated 
Fuel for RDD, Fresh Fuel for IND 
0.9 0.92 
Food Irradiator Source 6 
 Layer 1 PN  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
Food Irradiator Source 2 
 Layer 1 PN Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.8 0.92 
Commercial Reprocessing and 
Waste Storage - Layer 1 PN 
Spent Fuel Storage Sabotage, Irradiated Fuel 
theft for RDD, PuO2 Theft for RDD or IND 
0.9 0.92 
Food Irradiator Source 6 
 Layer 1 PI  Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.7 0.81 
Food Irradiator Source 2 
 Layer 1 PI Food Irradiator Theft and RDD 
0.7 0.79 
PWR Site 2       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.12 
PWR Site 1       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
PWR Site 3       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
BWR Site 2       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
BWR Site 1       
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 0.2 0.14 
(NWC) Military Reprocessing 
-      
   
 Spent Fuel Sabotage 
0.2 0.15 
Commercial Reprocessing and 
Storage -      
   
 Spent Fuel Sabotage 
0.2 0.16 
Detecting Adversary IND 
Metallurgy  
 
    
 All IND Pathways 
0.75 0.7 
(NWC) Super Prompt Critical 
Reactor      
    Spent Fuel Sabotage 
0.2 0.16 
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V.C.3. Complex State Infrastructure Adversary Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The sensitivity of risk values to the capability assessment made for each group is given 
in Table 85, Table 86, Table 87. The first row gives each task and the second row gives 
the assessed likelihood of success at each path for the adversary. The results show that 
even for terrorist groups with low motivations to conduct IND attacks, the State-level 
risk is highly sensitive to the group's capability to produce an implosion based weapon. 
This is due to the large amount of separated plutonium in the State. As the terrorist 
groups motivations shift towards favoring IND threats, the sensitivity to all 
weaponization capabilities become large. This is especially true for group 2's ability to 
produce an implosion based weapon and even more so for group 3's ability to fabricate 
either a gun-type or implosion based IND.  To address these sensitivities, the State 
should deploy more resources to gain confidence in their assessment of the adversary's 
capability. In addition, eliminating separated plutonium and HEU will significantly 
reduce the State's sensitivity to these capabilities. 
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Table 85. Complex State Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 1 
 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% 0.00% 
0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.09% -0.09% -0.08% 5.83% 
0.1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.07% -0.08% -0.04% 23.34% 
0.15 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03% -0.06% 0.03% 52.53% 
0.2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% -0.02% 0.13% 93.39% 
0.25 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 0.26% 145.92% 
0.3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.07% 0.42% 210.11% 
0.35 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.14% 0.61% 285.97% 
0.4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.39% 0.21% 0.82% 373.47% 
0.45 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.52% 0.29% 1.07% 472.62% 
0.5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.67% 0.39% 1.34% 583.42% 
0.55 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.83% 0.49% 1.65% 705.85% 
0.6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.01% 0.60% 1.98% 839.92% 
0.65 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 1.20% 0.72% 2.34% 985.61% 
0.7 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 1.41% 0.85% 2.73% 1142.93% 
0.75 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 1.63% 0.99% 3.15% 1311.86% 
0.8 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 1.87% 1.14% 3.60% 1492.41% 
0.85 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 2.12% 1.30% 4.08% 1684.57% 
0.9 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 2.39% 1.47% 4.58% 1888.32% 
0.95 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 2.68% 1.65% 5.12% 2103.68% 
1 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 2.98% 1.84% 5.68% 2330.63% 
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Table 86. Complex State Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 2 
 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -1.06% -1.06% -1.06% -0.03% 
0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.98% -1.01% -0.91% 63.17% 
0.1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.74% -0.86% -0.45% 252.66% 
0.15 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.33% -0.60% 0.33% 567.71% 
0.2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% -0.23% 1.42% 1007.58% 
0.25 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 1.00% 0.24% 2.83% 1571.53% 
0.3 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 1.91% 0.81% 4.55% 2258.83% 
0.35 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 3.00% 1.50% 6.58% 3068.77% 
0.4 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 4.25% 2.28% 8.93% 4000.63% 
0.45 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 5.67% 3.18% 11.60% 5053.71% 
0.5 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% 7.25% 4.18% 14.58% 6227.28% 
0.55 0.00% 0.03% 0.04% 9.00% 5.28% 17.87% 7520.67% 
0.6 0.00% 0.04% 0.05% 10.92% 6.49% 21.47% 8933.17% 
0.65 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 13.01% 7.81% 25.39% 10464.10% 
0.7 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 15.27% 9.23% 29.63% 12112.77% 
0.75 0.00% 0.06% 0.07% 17.69% 10.76% 34.18% 13878.51% 
0.8 0.00% 0.07% 0.08% 20.28% 12.40% 39.04% 15760.65% 
0.85 0.00% 0.08% 0.09% 23.03% 14.14% 44.21% 17758.51% 
0.9 0.00% 0.09% 0.11% 25.96% 15.98% 49.70% 19871.44% 
0.95 0.00% 0.10% 0.12% 29.05% 17.93% 55.50% 22098.77% 
1 0.00% 0.11% 0.13% 32.31% 19.99% 61.61% 24439.86% 
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Table 87. Complex State Capability Assessment Risk Sensitivity - Group 3 
  
Task Conversion Reprocessing Enrichment Machining Metallurgy 
IND 
Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
IND 
Weaponization 
Implosion 
  
Original Ps 
0.479391 1E-08 0 0.18 0.226318 0.13125 0.00125 
A
ct
u
al
 T
as
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -7.85% -7.84% -7.85% -0.24% 
0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -7.30% -7.51% -6.77% 462.49% 
0.1 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% -5.49% -6.37% -3.33% 1817.34% 
0.15 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% -2.43% -4.45% 2.44% 4011.38% 
0.2 0.00% 0.03% 0.04% 1.87% -1.74% 10.55% 6995.76% 
0.25 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 7.42% 1.75% 20.99% 10725.36% 
0.3 0.00% 0.07% 0.08% 14.21% 6.04% 33.75% 15158.42% 
0.35 0.00% 0.09% 0.11% 22.24% 11.11% 48.82% 20256.27% 
0.4 0.00% 0.12% 0.15% 31.51% 16.96% 66.20% 25982.99% 
0.45 0.00% 0.16% 0.19% 42.01% 23.59% 85.88% 32305.22% 
0.5 0.00% 0.20% 0.24% 53.74% 31.00% 107.85% 39191.91% 
0.55 0.00% 0.24% 0.29% 66.69% 39.19% 132.11% 46614.15% 
0.6 0.00% 0.29% 0.35% 80.87% 48.16% 158.65% 54544.95% 
0.65 0.00% 0.34% 0.41% 96.28% 57.90% 187.45% 62959.11% 
0.7 0.00% 0.40% 0.47% 112.89% 68.42% 218.52% 71833.08% 
0.75 0.00% 0.46% 0.54% 130.73% 79.71% 251.85% 81144.80% 
0.8 0.00% 0.52% 0.62% 149.77% 91.77% 287.43% 90873.59% 
0.85 0.00% 0.59% 0.70% 170.03% 104.61% 325.24% 101000.09% 
0.9 0.00% 0.66% 0.79% 191.49% 118.21% 365.30% 111506.08% 
0.95 0.00% 0.74% 0.88% 214.16% 132.58% 407.58% 122374.46% 
1 0.00% 0.82% 0.97% 238.03% 147.71% 452.09% 133589.14% 
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V.C.4. Complex State Failure Risk Analysis 
 
The complex State results showed that the contribution to State-level risk from nuclear 
weapons was essentially negligible because of the extremely robust security employed 
on these weapons. Table 88 shows the risk breakdown from the four threats of nuclear 
terrorism in the event that the complex State fails. These results assume that in the event 
of a State failure, the security measures employed on nuclear weapons are negated.  
 
 
Table 88. Failed Complex State Risk Analysis 
Threat                            
Nuclear Weapons 98.59% 99.88% 99.98% 
IND 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
RDD 0.74% 0.05% 0.00% 
Sabotage 0.67% 0.07% 0.01% 
 
 
 
The results from Table 88 show that if the State's control of nuclear weapons is lost, the 
State's risk profile shifts entirely to the nuclear weapon threat.  Table 89 shows the 
relative likelihood that each adversary group chooses each nuclear threat. 
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Table 89. Failed Complex State Relative Probability of Choosing Threats 
Threat          
           
           
  
Nuclear Weapons 6.00% 48.90% 90.47% 
IND 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 
RDD 89.98% 47.69% 8.50% 
Sabotage 4.01% 3.39% 1.00% 
 
 
The combined results from Table 88 and Table 89 show that adversary motivations have 
a very slight impact on the risk from nuclear weapons in the event of State failure. The 
consequences from the loss of control of one nuclear weapon far outweigh those of the 
other threats, so even if the adversary has a small relative likelihood of choosing to 
exploit this opportunity, the risk from the nuclear weapon threat far outweighs the other 
nuclear terrorism threats. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
VI.A. Summary of Results  
 
In this work, we have demonstrated a risk-based methodology to evaluate State-level 
risk that can be used to recommend security upgrades. The methodology accounts for 
adversary motivations and disincentives, adversary capabilities, all of the materials and 
security measures currently present in the State, and the relative consequences of each 
threat to that State. The methodology employs MAUA to bias adversary decision making 
based on their motivations and disincentives for nuclear terrorism. Utility functions that 
relate to the physical, material and radiological properties of materials are employed to 
represent the decisions of a strategic adversary. Pathways analysis is used to develop the 
pathways an adversary can take to execute each nuclear threat based on the material 
properties of each nuclear and radiological material being analyzed. Game-theory is used 
to replicate the strategic decision making of the adversary intent on executing threats that 
maximize their benefit, including the ability to change tactics in response to security 
upgrades by the State. Finally, decision theory is employed to determine the nuclear 
security measure upgrades the State  should employ.  
 
To test the methodology, a VBA code was developed in Microsoft Visio utilizing 
Microsoft Excel as a database. To verify the code's pathways generation function we 
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tested a variety of materials to ensure that every possible pathway was populated 
properly. We then developed a verification problem and worked it out manually and ran 
the same problem in the Visio code. We then compared the result from every step to 
ensure the code performs as expected and to verify the absence of any programming 
errors.  
 
Due to the lack of data on real-world security problems from the State level, the code 
was validated qualitatively rather than quantitatively.  We validated the MAUA portion 
of the code, which takes the adversary's motivations and disincentives and biases their 
decisions to align with their intentions. We then validated the material utility functions 
for IND materials by simulating a variety of real world materials and assessing the 
results. We then validated the sensitivity analysis function by presenting the code with 
symmetric and non-symmetric cases where the results were intuitively obvious.  
 
We then developed three test cases involving States with varying levels of nuclear 
infrastructure complexity. We tested the code against three different adversaries to 
observe how adversary motivations affect the State strategy to address the risk from 
nuclear terrorism. For the State that did not have direct-use material, the risk from IND's 
was negligible compared to the RDD and sabotage risk. For the States that possessed 
direct-use material, the threat of IND was highly dependent on adversary motivations. In 
cases where there were a small number of pathways contributing to the State-level risk, 
the analysis prioritized the State's security upgrades to address these pathways. When a 
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large number of pathways existed, the analysis recommended upgrading those security 
measures that address multiple threats. For each State, the analysis of risk reduction 
strategies provides information that could be utilized by decision makers to understand 
how upgrades improve the security risk of the State. For situations where reducing State-
level risk by removing material causes the loss of benefits provided by that material, 
such as cancer treatment or research capabilities, the code can provide security measure 
upgrades that provide equivalent levels of risk-reduction while keeping that material in 
the State.  
 
Sensitivity analysis on the assessed capabilities of terrorist groups showed varying 
results. For States without nuclear materials, the risk results are insensitive to terrorist 
capabilities to produce IND. For States with direct-use material, the State-level risk is 
highly sensitive to the adversary's capability to produce an IND. To address this 
sensitivity, States can eliminate direct-use nuclear materials or gain confidence in their 
assessments of terrorist capabilities by spending resources on intelligence information. 
This sensitivity also shows that if the State chooses to use conservative values in risk 
assessments, these assumptions can have a significant impact on the perceived risk level, 
and subsequently the resources the State must devote to nuclear security. 
 
While States should apply a risk methodology to determine the optimum set of upgrades, 
the results from the State-level risk analyses produce a some general conclusions: 
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1. States that have a small number of nuclear and radiological materials or have a 
small number of targets contributing to the majority of the State-level risk, 
improving security measures associated with these security measures is an 
effective way to address risk. These security measures will be effective 
regardless of adversary motivation.  
2. States with a large inventory of nuclear and radiological materials or that have a 
risk profile that is spread among several targets should consider second-line of 
defense measures, such as trafficking interdiction, in addition to securing the 
materials at their source. 
3. As a State's ability to recover and recapture material improves, sabotage becomes 
the nuclear terrorism risk of greatest concern.  
4. For States with high-consequence targets, security measures that serve as a last 
line of defense at these targets are viable security investments. 
5. The risk to States that don't possess direct-use materials is insensitive to 
adversary capabilities to produce an IND.  
6. The risk to States that have substantial quantities of direct-use materials is 
incredibly sensitive to the ability of adversaries to produce an IND. These States 
should devote resources to improve their confidence in adversary capabilities to 
produce IND to ensure optimal investments in security. Alternatively, reducing 
the amount of direct-use material will decrease the State sensitivity to adversary 
capability.  
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7. Even if adversaries are highly motivated to pursue nuclear weapon or IND 
threats, the State's risk from RDD and sabotage threats may be greater.  
8. In instances where risk reduction approaches such as material removal also 
results in the loss of benefit from that material, alternative approaches exist that 
can provide equivalent levels of risk reduction.    
 
VI.B. Recommendations for Future Work  
 
 
Within the defined scope of this dissertation, the methodology performed very well. 
However, a number of assumptions were made that may be further investigated in future 
work. In addition, this work introduces the capability to perform a State-level risk 
analysis which could be further applied to other areas besides nuclear terrorism. The 
recommendations for future work are: 
1. Consequence estimation were based on crude models developed from open-
source literature. States or the IAEA likely have much better information on the 
possible consequences of an RDD and IND attack which could be employed 
when conducting this analysis on a real-world State.  
2. For IND cases, the adversary only stole 1 SQ of material to produce 1 IND. 
Further work may want to characterize the likelihood that the adversary will steal 
multiple SQ's and produce multiple IND's. This assumption was based on the 
combination of our crude consequence models and the very low likelihood of this 
scenario. 
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3. For RDD cases, the adversary stole all material and delivered it to the maximum 
number of cities possible, based on the number of targets analyzed and the 
adversary's resources. Future work may want to add optimization to the amount 
of material the adversary steals based on the trade-offs between the increased 
probability of detection and difficulty in handling the material  versus the 
increase in RDD consequences. Based on our RDD consequence models, 
employing an optimization strategy had negligible effects on the results. 
4. We employed a simple longitude and latitude based transportation model. States 
and the IAEA likely have more advanced transportation models which can be 
employed and the results incorporated into this model.  
5. The methodology developed in this dissertation could be compared to Safeguards 
and Safety risk analyses to better address the risk from nuclear and radiological 
materials and facilities. 
6. While the model was developed to incorporate cost into the analysis, because of 
the lack of real world cost vs. benefit information for nuclear security measures, 
the results focused on risk reduction. Adding real-world security measure costs to 
the analysis may produce some different results than a pure risk-reduction 
analysis. 
7. This model focuses specifically on the risk of nuclear terrorism. The general 
framework introduced in this methodology should be applied to biological and 
chemical terrorism to develop a comprehensive understanding of WMD risk. 
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8. This model focuses on the risk at the State level. The next step would be to 
develop a multi-State risk model that could be used to best allocate resources 
internationally rather than at the State-level. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Nuclear Terrorism Motivations and Disincentives  
 Kristen Childress 
 Texas A&M University 
The Bush School of Government and Public Service 
 
 
A.1. Motivations for Sub-state Groups to Pursue the Nuclear Threat 
 
1. Prestige of Successful Capabilities (Peaceful):  Possessing the capability for 
terrorism demonstrates an organization’s viability and legitimacy. The group 
believes that simply possessing the ability to successfully complete a nuclear 
terrorist threat will achieve its goals, and finds the actual event to be unnecessary. 
It is also possible that the group may detonate a weapon as a show of strength in 
a non-populated area. 
 Al Qaeda – “Osama bin Laden would… think in terms of how best to 
leverage possession of a nuclear weapon to serve the longer term goal of an 
Islamic revival and restoration.” “too valuable to detonate.. used as blackmail 
or deterrent”g 
 
2. Prestige of Successful Capabilities (Non-Peaceful): Possessing the capability for 
terrorism demonstrates an organization’s viability and legitimacy. The group 
clearly has no problem using nuclear terrorism to achieve their goals. 
                                                 
g Dunn, Lewis. “Can Al Qaeda be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?” Center for the Study of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper 3. July 2005. 
<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occassional_Papers/CSWMD/OP3.pdf> p.18. 
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 Al Qaeda – “the mere possession of one nuclear weapon would make bin 
Laden’s little army of exiles a force to be reckoned with.”h  
 
3. Manipulate Adversaries: A group pursues nuclear terrorism to use as leverage 
against or to demonstrate a weakness in other organizations or nations. 
 Al Qaeda – Remove U.S. presence from Saudi Arabia and Middle Easti 
o Also establish Palestinian statej 
o Demonstrate weakness – sabotage 
 Ramzi Yousef – punish  merican people for the U. . Government’s 
support of Israel – convince the people to force the government to stop 
supporting Israel.
k
 
  hechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev’s personal archive. The archive 
contained a detailed plan to hijack a Russian atomic submarine, calling 
for seven Slavic-looking fighters to seize a submarine from the Russian 
Navy’s  acific Fleet sometime in 1995 or 1996 and coerce Moscow into 
withdrawing troops from  hechnya.7 Dudayev’s archive also contained 
plans to blow up installations at nuclear power stations 
                                                 
h
 Jenkins, Brian Michael. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2008: 93.  
Note: pre-1996, so maybe this changed when his organization switched to mainly religious motives? 
i
 Hayes  Laura  Borgna Brunner  and Beth  owan. “ l Qaeda: Osama bin Laden’s Network of Terror.” 
2007. Infoplease. 25 March 2009. <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/al-qaeda-terrorism.html>. 
j
 Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006: 82. 
k
  arachini  John. “ omparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving 
 onventional and Unconventional eapons.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Sept.-Oct. 2001, 
p.389-406. 
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4. Apocalyptic Beliefs: The organization believes that the end of the world is near 
and is motivated to take an active role in promoting the event.  
 Aum Shinrikyo – members would be the only ones to survive the 
apocalypse
l 
5. War on Own Nation: Separatist or nationalist group that wants to use nuclear 
terrorism to combat, overthrow, or undermine the current government of a 
country. 
 Nationalist – FARCm 
 Separatist – ETAn  
 Separatist – LTTEo   
 Separatist – PKK/Kongra Gelp  
 Timothy McVeigh – Oklahoma City bombing to incite a new American 
revolution against the U.S. Government
q
 
                                                 
l
 Aum Shinrikyo. 28 May 2008. Council on Foreign Relations. 25 March 25, 2009. 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9238/aum_shinrikyo_japan_cultists.html>. 
m
 “ olombia: The Multi-faceted Motivation of the F    and  rospects of  eace.” Political Affairs 
Magazine. 11 October 2007. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 25 March 2009. 
<http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/5981/1/289/>. 
n
 - http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8864/ingle.htm (1995) 
Basque Democratic Alternative. 1995. 25 March 2009. 
<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8864/ingle.htm>. 
o
 Tamil Tiger “Martyrs": Regenerating Divine Potency? -Michael Roberts p.495 – (2005) - 
http://texasamcolstattx.library.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/uter/2005/00000028/000000
06/art00003 
p
 Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party. 17 October 2007. Council on Foreign Relations. 25 March 2009. 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/14576/inside_the_kurdistan_workers_party_pkk.html>. 
q
  arachini  John. “ omparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass  asualty Terrorism Involving 
 onventional and Unconventional eapons.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Sept.-Oct. 2001, 
p.389-406. 
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6. War on Another Nation: The organization has a deep hatred for a particular 
people or nation and they feel compelled to use nuclear terrorism to combat or 
enact revenge upon their adversary. 
 Al Qaeda – “is dedicated to such broad goals as the overthrow of all 
corrupt Muslim governments..”   “… bin Laden supplemented his 
publicly declared war on the United  tates… with a fatwa.”r 
 Hezbollah – on Israels 
 
7. Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry: An organization has a finite amount 
of people and resources to combat a nation, and seeks to use nuclear terrorism to 
redress this imbalance.  
 Al Qaeda – Does not have the same access to resources and population as 
U.S. so has to use other means 
 
8. Ensure Security: A group pursues nuclear terrorism in order to protect 
citizens/members of a certain group (religious, political, ethnic, etc.) from attack 
or persecution. The “guarantor of security.” 
 Hamas – Israel has nuclear weapons, so Hamas needs weapons to protect 
the Palestinian Muslims
t
  
                                                 
r
 Hoffman  Bruce. “Terrorism and eapons of Mass Destruction:  n  nalysis of Trends and 
Motivations.”   ND. 1999. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2007/ 8039-1.pdf> p.32. 
s
  harp  Jeremy. “Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah  onflict.”  ongressional  esearch Service 
Report. 15 September 2006. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33566.pdf>. 
t
 Hamas. 7 January 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. 20 March 2009. 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/>. 
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 Lashkar-e-Toiba – Protect the people of Kashmir and Jammu from Indian 
rule – and more generally protect Muslims under non-Muslim ruleu  
 Al Qaeda – “ e have the [chemical and nuclear] weapons as deterrent”  
“I wish to declare that if  merica used chemical or nuclear weapons 
against us  then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons.” deter 
attack from US on Muslims/Al Qaeda
v
 
 Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh – domestic US terrorist group wanting to 
“levy war against the government of the U  through terrorism ” and 
indicate that the planned incidents are part of a “plight to defend and 
propagate traditional Islam in its purity” – 2006w   
 
9. Mass Devastation/Chaos: The group is motivated to wreck economic, political 
and/or psychological havoc on a population  and thus devastate the nation’s 
infrastructure or population by nuclear terrorism. In this case, the violence is the 
end in itself. 
 Economic: Al Qaeda – “we will also aim to continue  by permission of 
 llah  the destruction of the  merican economy.”  l-Zawahirix    
                                                 
u
 Lashkar-e-Toiba. 2006. South Asia Terrorism Portal. 25 March 2009. 
<http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm>. 
v
 Daly   arah  John  arachini  and illiam  osenau. “ um  hinrikyo   l Qaeda  and the Kinshasa 
Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism.” RAND (2005): 
26. 
w
 Mrozek  Thom. “Man ho Formed Terrorist Group that  lotted  ttacks on Military and Jewish 
Facilities  entenced to 16 Years in Federal  rison.” 6 March 2009. Department of Justice. 26 
March 2009. < http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/la030609ausa.htm>. 
x
 “Implementing the National  trategy.” U. .  ongressional  eport. 15 December 2002. RAND. 26 
March 2009. <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf>. 
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 Psychological: 1995 - Chechen rebels planting dirty bomb in Moscow, 
calling media but not detonating – creating fear/psychological response 
from Russian population.
y
  
 Psychological: Al Qaeda – as seen in the proliferation of analysts 
evaluating every recent threat in the media, and the shift in government 
policies as a result of these threats – “they want to see us sweat”z  
 
10. Religious Imperative: Religious extremists that believe they have been given a 
religious mandate or imperative to pursue the nuclear threat. 
 “ eligious Duty” – Al Qaeda (Bin Laden)  aa 
11. Manipulate Policy: A group seeks to use the nuclear threat to bring attention to 
and/or change a specific policy (political, economic, religious, etc) that it does 
not agree with. 
 Economic/political – FARCbb  
 Political/social – ETAcc  
 Political/religious – Jamaat al-Islamiyyadd  
                                                 
y
 Jenkins, Brian Michael. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2008: 125. 
z
 Jenkins, Brian Michael. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2008: 126-129. 
aa
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm (1998), McCloud, Kimberly, and Matthew Osborne. 
“WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden.” 20 November 2001. James Martin Center for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation. 26 March 2009. <http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm>. Also in Hoffman 
– “Inside Terrorism” p. 82 (2006) 
And Al Qaeda – “The United States is the world’s biggest terrorist and rogue, and it is the duty of every 
Muslim to struggle for its annihilation.” – Daly RAND article –p.25 – 
bb
 http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/5981/1/289/ (2007) 
cc
 - http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8864/ingle.htm (1995) 
dd
 - http://www.cfr.org/publication/9156/ (2008) 
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 Political religious – Lashkar-e-Taibaee 
 Political/economic – ELF ff 
 
12. Fascination With Nuclear Threat: Group leaders are fascinated by the threat of 
nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, or sabotage, or specific effects related to 
a threat, such as radiation  
 Asahara - Aum Shrinkyo's nuclear and chemical acquisition attempts 
were partially due to Asahara's fascination with poisons and the nuclear 
holocaust 
 
A.2. Motivational Disincentives for Sub-state Groups to Pursue the Nuclear Threat 
 
1. Fear of Retaliation on a Base of Support: Nuclear terrorism creates a fear of 
retribution on the group’s perceived constituents.  Usually more than likely 
applies to a group that has a well defined geographic territory or population. 
(Jenkins p.104) 
a. Hamas – Retribution on Palestinians 
b. Nationalist/Separatistsgg – as a general group 
 
                                                 
ee
 – establish an Islamic state in India – advocate Islam worldwide 
http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm (2006) 
ff
  “a campaign of property destruction to cause economic damage to institutions responsible for practices 
harmful to the environment  and to destroy e uipment being used in those activities.” – Jeff Luers 
– “Extreme  ction” 3/27/02 -http://www.freefreenow.org/jw_writings.html#extreme 
gg
 Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism p.19 
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2. Concern for Personnel Safety: Difficulty in protecting group members from 
exposure to radiation and difficulty of preventing radiation accidents deteriorates 
group’s motivation to attempt nuclear terrorism. 
 
3. Fear of Attracting Attention: Any news or hint of the group pursuing nuclear 
terrorism will put an international target on the group, making movement and 
success more difficult and threatening security. 
 
a. Provisional IRA – the discovery of IRA seeking nuclear material would 
bring out a severe crackdown from the British government and jeopardize 
the fragile peace process
hh
 
 
4. Alienation: A display of nuclear terrorism would alienate the group’s real or 
perceived base of support or actual financial supporters. (Jenkins p.103) 
a. Al Qaeda  - Ackerman –“Nuclear Terrorism…” p.8 
i. Al Qaeda - “ an  l Qaeda be deterred from using nuclear 
weapons?” alienate the wider range of Muslims Osama bin Laden 
intends to use for his Islamic caliphate
ii
 
b. Nationalist/Separatists 
i. Tamil Tigersjj  
                                                 
hh
  arachini  John. “ utting MD Terrorism Into  erspective.” Washington Quarterly. Autumn 2003. 
vol26:issue 4. P. 37. 
ii
 Dunn  Lewis. “ an  l Qaeda be Deterred from Using Nuclear eapons?” Center for the Study of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper 3. July 2005. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ 
Occassional_Papers/CSWMD/OP3.pdf> p.1. 
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c. Chechen Rebelskk  
 
5. Contradict Goals of Group: Nuclear terrorism would contradict or directly 
prevent the fulfillment of the group’s aims. (e.g. environmental groups) 
i. Hamas using nuclear weapons to defeat Israel would prevent it 
from being able to take over the then-contaminated land 
ii. Hamas leader Abu Shannab, for one, stated that the use of poison 
was contrary to Islamic teachings.22 Although Hamas is a 
religiously based organization, its struggle to establish a 
Palestinian state on Israeli territory and to eliminate Israel as a 
state is decidedly political.  " Putting WMD Terrorism into 
Perspective" 
b. Moral code: It would violate the group’s moral code to carry out such an 
indiscriminate and mass-casualty attack. 
i. FARC 
 
6. Prohibitively Expensive or Difficult: The extreme difficulty and expense of 
obtaining a weapon or material would prohibit the group from taking other 
desired actions. The relative cost of attempting nuclear terrorism is too high. 
                                                                                                                                                
jj
 Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism p.19 
kk
 “The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism in Europe” New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European 
Affairs. 
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a. Ramzi Yousef – did not use a WMD in the 1993 world trade center attack 
because it was too difficult and too expensive – thought about using it in 
another attack
ll
 
 
7. Risk-aversion: Nuclear terrorism does not have a high enough probability of 
success – group is not willing to risk a failure because it would hurt the 
credibility of its future threats. (Jenkins p.104) 
 
8. Lack of religious mandate: A religiously-motivated group does not feel it has the 
necessary divine permission to carry out nuclear terrorism. 
 
9. Internal Group Division: The group has divided opinions on the benefits of 
attempting nuclear terrorism, so progressing further would fracture group 
cohesion and significantly weaken the group. (Jenkins p. 103) 
 
10. Current Security Adaquate: Group has confidence in current security situation 
because it has guaranteed protection from another state or entity whose “nuclear 
umbrella” will cover this group  and thus does not need nuclear weapons of its 
own. 
a. Hezbollah, Hamas - if Iran had nukes. 
                                                 
ll
 John Parachini – “ omparing motives and outcomes of mass casualty terrorism involving conventional 
and unconventional weapons.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Sept.-Oct. 2001, p.389-406. 
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b. Pakistani militants in Kashmir – Council on Foreign Relations 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
CONSEQUENCE UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND CALCULATIONS 
 
 
 
 
Consequences of a terrorist attack are incredibly difficult to calculate because of the 
number of factors about the terrorist group that are unknown, which effect the reliability 
of any weapon they may attempt to detonate as well as the delivery method and locations 
they may target with the weapon. In addition a variety of unpredictable variables at the 
time of attack, such as weather patterns like wind direction and precipitation, can have a 
dramatic impact on the consequences. States have the resources to run detailed scenarios 
and determine the consequences of various attacks at potential target locations. These 
types of calculations are beyond the scope of this work.  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, we are more concerned with relative consequences 
between nuclear threats than absolute consequences. The worst case consequences for 
each consequence category for the State are set to unity, and the relative consequences of 
other threats are set to a value proportional to this consequence. The ratio of 
consequences between various threat scenarios are based on the State's utility function 
for that consequence category. The utility function determines the degree of loss each 
State feels based on the consequence. Table B.1 shows the economic loss in dollars from 
four threat scenarios and the corresponding utility value. A linear utility value assumes 
every dollar is equal, so a ten-thousand dollar loss is one-thousand times worse than a 
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one-hundred dollar loss, a ten-million dollar loss is one-thousand times worse than a ten-
thousand dollar loss, etc. However, over a the large range of consequence values 
presented in Table B.1, it is unlikely that the State's utility function will be linear. 
Examining the economic losses more closely, the loss of one-hundred dollars is 
essentially negligible to a State. Based on data from the CIA world fact book
mm
, the 
yearly expenditures of many countries is on the order of billions of dollars. An annual 
expenditure of one-billion dollars equates to approximately 3 million dollars per day. In 
this context, one-hundred dollars accounts for a mere three-thousandths of one-percent 
of daily expenditures by the State. The consequences of Scenario 2 are more significant, 
but still only account for 3% of daily expenditures. Scenario 3 results in an economic 
loss equivalent to 10% of annual expenditures, which likely has a tangible negative 
effect on the State. Finally, the economic consequences from Scenario 4 are equivalent 
to one-hundred years worth of spending, which has the potential to economically cripple 
the State. In this situation, the utility of the threat scenarios may be more accurately 
portrayed by a non-linear utility function. 
    
 
Table B.1. Example Utility Values for Various Scenarios 
  Economic Loss ($) U(linear) U(non-linear) 
Threat Scenario 1 1.00E+02 1.00E-09 1.00E-40 
Threat Scenario 2 1.00E+05 1.00E-06 1.00E-20 
Threat Scenario 3 1.00E+08 1.00E-03 1.00E-06 
Threat Scenario 4 1.00E+11 1 1 
 
                                                 
mm
 The Central Intellegence Agency. "The World Factbook".  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2056.html 
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 The utility values for each consequence category will vary based on the threat, weapon 
materials, target location, etc. To capture these variables in this work, we define the 
consequences for a nuclear terrorism event at each target location based on a 100 kT 
weapon for nuclear weapons, a 10 kT weapon for INDs, and an A/D value of 850 (which 
corresponds to 2295 Ci Cs-137, 687 Ci Co-60, 1380 Ci Am-241, or 1150 Ci Cm-244). 
These consequence utility values are then scaled based on the materials used in each 
specific scenario. For IND and Nuclear Weapon scenarios, the consequences are scaled 
based on destruction areas which are related to various overpressure ranges.
nn
 These 
overpressure ranges are related to yield based on Equation B1, 
 
                         
                                            (B1) 
 
 where:  
       = the distance of overpressure X from the blast epicenter; and 
    = the yield of the weapon in kT. 
  
Using the relationship between overpressure distances in Equation B1, the relationship 
between yield and destruction area is given in Equation B2.   
 
                 
         (B2) 
 
 
                                                 
nn
 Harney, Robert C. "Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons Effects and Possible Adverse Influences 
on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness". Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. V, No. 3, 1-19. (2009). 
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For nuclear weapons or INDs with different yields than the 10 kT or 100 kT defined 
consequence values, utility functions are scaled using Equation C2 assuming that the 
State's utility for consequences within the range of the scaling change is linear. For 
INDs, this assumption is used because the likely range of IND yields is less than 20 kT, 
corresponding to a scaling factor value near unity. The proportional scaling factor from a 
10 kT yield IND to a 1 kT yield is 0.215 and from a 10 kT yield to a 20 kT yield is 
1.587. For nuclear weapons, the linear utility scaling assumption is applied because the 
weapon yield must exceed 3 MT to cause a scaling factor increase of one order of 
magnitude from a 100 kT yield. This scaling factor is applied to all four consequence 
categories. 
 
 
Scaling the consequences from IND and nuclear weapon scenarios is relatively straight 
forward because the consequences from these events are on the extreme end of the 
spectrum, capable of causing hundreds of thousands of deaths and hundreds of billions 
in economic losses. For RDD events, the consequences can range across the spectrum 
from relatively insignificant to severe. To scale RDD consequence categories, scaling 
functions were developed using A/D values and are given in Equations B3 to B6.  
 
 
       
   
 
       
                         
                 
 
                  
 
        
      
       
         
      
     
        
      
 (B3) 
 
 
 
 
  
225 
 
 
       
          
    
      
   
 
   
       (B4) 
 
  
 
 
       
   
 
 
        
   
      
   
       
    
       
    
               
                
       
        
         
    
       (B5) 
 
 
 
       
          
    
      
   
 
   
    (B6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
226 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
 
VERIFICATION TESTS INPUT DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
C.1. Terrorist Inputs 
 
The terrorist group modeled in the verification test has a slightly risk averse risk attitude 
and is known to have operated at approximately 30.283995º N and 97.7244533 º W. The 
terrorist group has a strong disincentive for causing mass casualties, so it would follow 
that their perceived benefit from completing a pathway would not include loss of life. 
They are not expected to have a preference between the other three consequence 
categories, as shown by their consequence weighting factors in Table C.1. The 
motivations and disincentive weighting factors are given in Table C.2. 
 
 
 
 
Table C.1. Terrorist Consequence Weights  
   
     
      
      
    
0 1 1 1 
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Table C.2. Terrorist Motivation and Disincentive Weights  
Motivations    
  
Prestige of Successful Capabilities  3 
Manipulate Adversaries 5 
Apocalyptic Beliefs 0 
War on Own Nation 3 
War on Another Nation 0 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 0 
Ensure Security 0 
Mass Devastation/Chaos 
                 -Deaths 0 
                -Other 5 
Religious Imperative 0 
Manipulate Policy 5 
Fascination of Nuclear Weapons  0 
Fascination of Radiological  0 
Fascination of Sabotage  0 
Disincentives  
 Fear of Retaliation on Base of Support 3 
Fear of Attracting Attention 0 
Alienation 0 
Contradict Goals of Group 
             -Mass killings 5 
 -Contamination of territory or 
environment 0 
Lack of Religious Mandate 0 
Internal Group Division 0 
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The final adversary inputs are the assessed capabilities for each task, which are given in 
Table C.3. 
 
 
Table C.3. Adversary Task Capabilities 
Assessed Capabilities   
       
       
    
       
Conversion 0.5 0.5 0.9 3 
Reprocessing 1.00E-04 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 1 
Enrichment 1.00E-09 1.00E-03 0.05 0 
Machining 0.25 0.5 0.9 1 
Metallurgy 0.5 0.75 0.75 2 
IND Weaponization 
Gun-Type 0.7 0.7 0.5 1 
RDD Weaponization 0.95 0.95 0.85 4 
IND Weaponization 
Implosion 0.05 0.05 0.3 1 
 
 
 
C.2. State Inputs 
 
There are two facilities in the state that use nuclear and radiological materials. The first 
is a research reactor and the second is a hospital. The research reactor uses HEU fuel, 
and stores fresh fuel and spent fuel on site. The two sources analyzed at the hospital are 
a number of Cobalt-60 high dose rate (HDR) brachytherapy sources and the Cesium-137 
blood irradiator. The  inputs for the materials at each facility are given in Table C.4 and 
Table C.5.  
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Table C.4. Research Reactor Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
Table C.5. Hospital Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Research Reactor Location: 30.621609° N , 96.332141° W      300     0.1   
SNM Material Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Fresh Fuel  Uranium 1 225 0.9584 3.1E-4 1.60E-07 0.36 NONE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.05 
Spent Fuel  Uranium 1.96 450 0.9584 625 4.00       0.34 NONE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
Facility Name: Hospital 
Location: 31.1752681° N 
                   95.175211° W 
     350     0.01 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
HDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Co-60 0.03 50 7 10 2.1E-6 0.9762 1 
Blood Irradiator Cs-137 0.1 1 2200 7000 1.2E-6 1 0.05 
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The sabotage data for each facility is given in Table C.6 and Table C.7.  
 
 
 
 
Table C.6. Research Reactor Sabotage Inputs 
Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Containment 0.75 0.1 5.0E-12 4.50E-06 3.0E-06 5.0E-04 
Reactor 
Containment, Coolant 
Pump 1,  Coolant 
Pump 2  0.4 0.3 1.0E-08 3.60E-06 1.0E-06 5.0E-04 
 
 
 
 
Table C.7. Hospital Sabotage Inputs 
Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Source Storage 
Vault HDR Source Vault 1 0.001 0 1.0E-10 1.0E-10 5.0E-06 
Irradiator 
Room Lead Shielding 1 0.001 0 1.0E-08 1.0E-07 5.0E-06 
 
 
 
 
The physical security system data at each facility is given in Table C.8 and Table C.9.  
 
 
 
 
Table C.8. Research Reactor Physical Security System Inputs 
Research 
Reactor PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.5 0.7 
Fresh Fuel, Spent Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool, 
Containment, Coolant Pump 1, Coolant 
Pump 2 
Layer 2 0.7 0.5 Spent Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.9 0.7 Fresh Fuel Vault 
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Table C.9. Hospital Physical Security System Inputs 
Hospital PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.5 0.1 1,3 
Layer 2 0.7 0.1 2,4 
 
 
 
 
 
In this problem, we analyze two potential targets. These are the capital city and the city 
with the highest population. The inputs corresponding to these target locations are given 
in Table C.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.10. Target Inputs 
Name Location  
  
          
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
   
Capital 
City 
31.29733 ° N, 
95.55902 ° W 0.3 0.7 1 0.6 1 7.0E-11 4.5E-06 3.0E-4 5.0E-4 
Populous 
City 
28.72913 ° N, 
95.91065 ° W 0.5 1 0.8 1 1 1.0E-10 3.6E-06 5.0E-4 5.0E-4 
 
 
 
 
 
The State consequence weights are given in Table C.11.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.11. State Consequence Weights  
   
     
      
      
    
1 1 0.5 0.1 
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The last data needed are the interdiction probabilities, which are given in table C.12. 
 
 
 
 
Table C.12. State Interdiction Inputs  
      
         
    
0.0002 0.001 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
VALIDATION TESTS DATA 
 
 
 
 
The SNM material data used in probability of attack validation tests are presented in 
Table D.1. The plutonium and uranium activity values are calculated using specific 
activity data.
oo,pp
 Plutonium isotopics for each grade of material are derived from Mark 
et al.
qq
 Uranium dose rates were estimated using an online calculator,
rr
  and plutonium 
dose rates were calculated using specific dose rate data from Kang and von Hippel.
ss
 
Research reactor assembly information was based on information from Bretscher et al.
tt
 
Dose rate information for spent fuel was estimated based on data in Lloyd et al. 
uu
  
 
The normalized probability of attack results for the probability of attack validation tests 
are presented in Table D.2. for Group A and Table D.3 for Group B.  
 
 
 
                                                 
oo
 Argonne National Laboratory. "Plutonium". Human Health Fact Sheet (2005) 
pp
 U.S. Department of Energy. "Characteristics of Uranium and Its Compounds". Depleted Uranium 
Hexafluoride Fact Sheet (2001). 
qq
 Mark, J. Carson, Hippel, Frank von, Lyman, Edward. "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade 
Plutonium". Science and Global Security, 17 (2009) 270-285. 
rr
 Uranium Radiation Individual Dose Calculator, http://www.wise-uranium.org/rdcu.html 
ss
 Kang, Jungmin, von Hippel, Frank. "Limited Proliferation Resistance Benefits from Recycling 
Unseperated Transuranics and Lanthanides from Light-Water Reactor Spent Fuel". Science and Global 
Security ,  
tt
 Bretscher, M. M., Hanan, N.A., Matos, J.E. Neutronic Performance of Several LEU Fuel Assembly 
Designs for the WWR-SM Research Reactor in Uzbekistan". 2002 International Meeting on Reduced 
Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors. (2002)  
uu
 Lloyd, W.R., Sheaffer, M.K., Sutcliffe, W.G. "Dose Rate Estimates from Irradiated Light Water Reactor 
Fuel Assemblies in Air". Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. UCRL-ID-115199. (1994) 
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Table D.1  Material Properties  
 
SNM Material Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach. 
Super Grade Pu 
Metal 
Plutonium 1 2 5 340 5.14E-06 0.97 Slow FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
Weapons Grade Pu 
Metal 
Plutonium 1 2 5 373 6.66E-06 0.93 Slow FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
Fuel Grade Pu Metal 
Plutonium 1 2 5 440 9.70E-06 0.85 Slow FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
Reactor Grade Pu 
Metal 
Plutonium 1 2 5 482 1.16E-05 0.8 Slow FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
U WG metal 
Uranium 1 3 10 2.07E-02 1.50E-05 0.93 Slow FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
U HEU  metal 
Uranium 1 12 10 7.32E-03 3.57E-06 0.215 Slow FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
U LEU  metal 
Uranium 1 39 10 6.95E-03 3.26E-06 0.195 Slow FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
BWR assembly 
Uranium 1 12 320 0.187 1.25E-05 0.035 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
PWR assembly 
Uranium 1 5 657 0.0725 3.45E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
LEU rsch rx 
assembly 
Uranium 1 207 1.97 2.54E-04 5.70E-07 0.197 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
HEU rsch rx 
assembly 
Uranium 1 82 0.96 3.10E-04 1.60E-07 0.36 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 
Super Grade PU 
Oxide 
Plutonium 1 2 7 300 4.53E-06 0.97 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 
Weapons Grade Pu 
Oxide 
Plutonium 1 2 7 330 5.87E-06 0.93 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 
Fuel Grade Pu Oxide 
Plutonium 1 2 7 388 8.55E-06 0.85 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 
Reactor Grade Pu 
Oxide 
Plutonium 1 2 7 425 1.02E-05 0.8 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 
Weapons Grade UO2 
cans 
Uranium 1 7 7 9.11E-03 5.80E-06 0.93 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 
cans 
Uranium 1 24 7 3.22E-03 1.39E-06 0.215 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 
LEU (19.5%) UO2 
cans 
Uranium 1 77 7 3.06E-03 1.26E-06 0.195 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
LEU (5%)  UO2 cans 
Uranium 1 300 7 1.86E-03 3.88E-07 0.05 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
Natural (0.72%) UO2 
Cans 
Uranium 1 2384 7 1.51E-03 9.46E-08 0.0072 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 
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Table D.2. Group A Probabilities of Attack for Various Materials 
Material    
    PS PA 
Uranium Weapons Grade Metal  3.94E-01 4.33E-03 3.31E-01 
 HEU (21.5%)  metal 3.15E-01 4.33E-03 2.65E-01 
Uranium Weapons Grade Metal (d) 1.92E-01 4.33E-03 1.61E-01 
HEU (21.5%)  metal (d) 6.60E-02 4.33E-03 5.54E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 Cans 7.64E-01 3.61E-04 5.35E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 Cans (d) 7.57E-01 3.61E-04 5.30E-02 
HEU (36%) Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly 4.24E-01 3.61E-04 2.97E-02 
HEU (36%) Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly(d) 3.26E-01 3.61E-04 2.28E-02 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 Cans 3.11E-01 3.61E-04 2.17E-02 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 cans (d) 7.84E-02 3.61E-04 5.49E-03 
Pu Metal Super Grade  4.18E-01 2.14E-06 1.74E-04 
Pu Metal Weapons Grade  3.77E-01 2.14E-06 1.56E-04 
Pu Metal Fuel Grade 3.34E-01 2.14E-06 1.39E-04 
Pu Metal Reactor Grade  3.31E-01 2.14E-06 1.37E-04 
Super Grade Pu Metal  (d) 3.11E-01 2.14E-06 1.29E-04 
Weapons Grade Pu Metal  (d) 3.01E-01 2.14E-06 1.25E-04 
Fuel Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.65E-01 2.14E-06 1.10E-04 
Reactor Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.49E-01 2.14E-06 1.03E-04 
PuO2 Cans Super Grade  8.35E-01 1.78E-07 2.89E-05 
PuO2 Cans Super Grade (d) 8.35E-01 1.78E-07 2.89E-05 
PuO2 Cans Weapons Grade 7.53E-01 1.78E-07 2.61E-05 
PuO2 Cans Weapons Grade (d) 7.53E-01 1.78E-07 2.61E-05 
PuO2 Cans Fuel Grade 6.61E-01 1.78E-07 2.29E-05 
PuO2 Cans Fuel Grade(d) 6.61E-01 1.78E-07 2.29E-05 
PuO2 Cans Reactor Grade 6.22E-01 1.78E-07 2.15E-05 
PuO2 Cans Reactor Grade (d) 6.22E-01 1.78E-07 2.15E-05 
Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly LEU (19.5%) 1.08E-01 1.69E-27 3.56E-26 
LEU (19.5%) UO2 cans 8.20E-02 1.69E-27 2.69E-26 
LEU (5%)  UO2 cans 9.07E-03 1.69E-27 2.98E-27 
LEU (19.5%) Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly(d) 7.91E-03 1.69E-27 2.60E-27 
PWR Fresh Fuel assembly 6.04E-03 1.69E-27 1.98E-27 
BWR Fresh Fuel assembly 4.59E-03 1.69E-27 1.51E-27 
LEU (19.5%) UO2 cans (d) 4.27E-03 1.69E-27 1.40E-27 
Natural (0.72%) UO2 Cans 3.70E-04 1.69E-27 1.22E-28 
LEU (5%)  UO2 cans 1.10E-04 1.69E-27 3.61E-29 
PWR Fresh Fuel assembly (d) 4.63E-05 1.69E-27 1.52E-29 
BWR Fresh Fuel assembly (d) 3.01E-05 1.69E-27 9.88E-30 
Natural (0.72%) UO2 Cans (d) 6.35E-07 1.69E-27 2.09E-31 
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Table D.3. Group B Probabilities of Attack for Various Materials 
 
Material    
    PS 
Normalized 
PA 
Super Grade Pu Metal 4.18E-01 4.33E-03 9.82E-02 
Weapons Grade U Metal 3.94E-01 4.33E-03 9.27E-02 
Weapons Grade Pu Metal 3.77E-01 4.33E-03 8.86E-02 
Super Grade Pu Metal (d) 3.34E-01 4.33E-03 7.86E-02 
Fuel Grade Pu Metal 3.31E-01 4.33E-03 7.78E-02 
Weapons Grade U metal  (d) 3.15E-01 4.33E-03 7.42E-02 
Reactor Grade Pu Metal 3.11E-01 4.33E-03 7.31E-02 
Weapons Grade Pu Metal (d) 3.01E-01 4.33E-03 7.08E-02 
Fuel Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.65E-01 4.33E-03 6.22E-02 
Reactor Grade Pu Metal  (d) 2.49E-01 4.33E-03 5.85E-02 
HEU (21.5%) Metal 1.92E-01 4.33E-03 4.50E-02 
Super Grade PuO2  8.35E-01 3.61E-04 1.64E-02 
Super Grade PuO2  (d) 8.35E-01 3.61E-04 1.64E-02 
HEU (21.5%) Metal (d) 6.60E-02 4.33E-03 1.55E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 cans 7.64E-01 3.61E-04 1.50E-02 
Weapons Grade UO2 cans (d) 7.57E-01 3.61E-04 1.48E-02 
Weapons Grade PuO2  7.53E-01 3.61E-04 1.48E-02 
Weapons Grade PuO2 (d) 7.53E-01 3.61E-04 1.48E-02 
Fuel Grade PuO2  6.61E-01 3.61E-04 1.30E-02 
Fuel Grade PuO2 (d) 6.61E-01 3.61E-04 1.30E-02 
Reactor Grade PuO2  6.22E-01 3.61E-04 1.22E-02 
Reactor Grade PuO2 (d) 6.22E-01 3.61E-04 1.22E-02 
HEU Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly 4.24E-01 3.61E-04 8.31E-03 
HEU Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly (d) 3.26E-01 3.61E-04 6.39E-03 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 cans 3.11E-01 3.61E-04 6.09E-03 
HEU (21.5%) UO2 cans (d) 7.84E-02 3.61E-04 1.54E-03 
LEU Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly  1.08E-01 1.69E-27 9.97E-27 
LEU (19.5%) UO2 cans 8.20E-02 1.69E-27 7.55E-27 
LEU (5%)  UO2 cans 9.07E-03 1.69E-27 8.35E-28 
LEU Research Reactor Fresh Fuel Assembly (d) 7.91E-03 1.69E-27 7.28E-28 
PWR Fresh Fuel Assembly 6.04E-03 1.69E-27 5.55E-28 
BWR Fresh Fuel Assembly 4.59E-03 1.69E-27 4.22E-28 
LEU (5%)  UO2 cans  (d) 4.27E-03 1.69E-27 3.93E-28 
Natural (0.72%) UO2 Cans 3.70E-04 1.69E-27 3.41E-29 
LEU (5%)  UO2 cans  (d) 1.10E-04 1.69E-27 1.01E-29 
PWR Fresh Fuel Assembly  (d) 4.63E-05 1.69E-27 4.26E-30 
BWR Fresh Fuel Assembly  (d) 3.01E-05 1.69E-27 2.77E-30 
Natural (0.72%) UO2 Cans (d) 6.35E-07 1.69E-27 5.84E-32 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
BEHAVIORAL TESTS DATA 
 
 
 
 
Table E.1. Terrorist Consequence Weights  
   
     
      
      
    
1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Table E.2. Adversary Task Capabilities 
Assessed Capabilities   
       
       
    
       
Conversion 0.6 0.8 0.95 1 
Reprocessing 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 1.00E-02 1 
Enrichment 1.00E-09 1.00E-09 0.05 1 
Machining 0.5 0.5 0.9 1 
Metallurgy 0.2 0.2 0.2 5 
IND Weaponization 
Gun-Type 
0.9 0.1 0.3 2 
RDD Weaponization 0.95 0.95 0.75 3 
IND Weaponization 
Implosion 
0.45 0.05 0.15 2 
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Table E.3. Terrorist Motivation and Disincentive Weights  
Motivations    
  
Prestige of Successful Capabilities  3 
Manipulate Adversaries 5 
Apocalyptic Beliefs 0 
War on Own Nation 5 
War on Another Nation 0 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 0 
Ensure Security 5 
Mass Devastation/Chaos 
                 -Deaths 0 
                -Other 5 
Religious Imperative 0 
Manipulate Policy 5 
Fascination of Nuclear Weapons  0 
Fascination of Radiological  0 
Fascination of Sabotage  0 
Disincentives  
 Fear of Retaliation on Base of Support 3 
Fear of Attracting Attention 0 
Alienation 0 
Contradict Goals of Group 
             -Mass killings 3 
 -Contamination of territory or 
environment 0 
Lack of Religious Mandate 0 
Internal Group Division 0 
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Table E.4. Research Reactor Sabotage Inputs 
Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.05 0.5 1.0E-08 3.6E-06 1.0E-06 5.0E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2  0.05 0.5 1.0E-08 5.0E-12 4.5E-06 3.0E-06 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E.5. One Target Case Target Inputs 
Name Location  
  
          
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
   
Target 
1 
40 ° N, 
40 ° E 0.5 1 1 1 1 7.0E-11 4.5E-06 3.0E-4 5.0E-4 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E.6 Two Target Case Target Inputs 
Name Location  
  
          
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
   
Target 
1 
40 ° N, 
40 ° E 0.5 1 1 1 1 7.0E-11 4.5E-06 3.0E-4 5.0E-4 
Target 
2 
40 ° N, 
40 ° E 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.5E-11 2.25E-6 1.5-4 2.5E-4 
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Table E.7. Research Reactor Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
Table E.8. State Consequence Weights  
   
     
      
      
    
1 1 0.5 0.05 
 
 
 
 
Table E.9. Interdiction Inputs  
      
         
    
0.0001 0.00025 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Research Reactor Location: 45° N , 45° W      150     0.5   
SNM 
Material 
Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Fresh Fuel  Uranium 1.5 5 30 3.1E-4 5E-06 0.9 NONE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.2 0.35 
Spent Fuel  Uranium 4.0 50 30 625 4.00       0.89 SLOW TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.2 0.35 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
TEST CASES 
 
 
F. 1. Adversary Inputs for Test Cases 
 
 
Risk Attitude - Extremely Risk Averse 
 
 
 
 
Table F.1. Terrorist Capabilities for Test Cases 
 
Assessed Capabilities   
       
       
    
       
Conversion 0.5 0.5 0.9 3 
Reprocessing 1.00E-04 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 1 
Enrichment 1.00E-09 1.00E-03 0.05 0 
Machining 0.4 0.5 0.9 1 
Metallurgy 0.25 0.75 0.75 2 
IND Weaponization 
Gun-Type 0.35 0.5 0.75 1 
RDD Weaponization 0.95 0.95 0.85 4 
IND Weaponization 
Implosion 0.05 0.05 0.5 1 
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Table F.2 Terrorist Location for Test Cases 
Latitude Longitude 
37.37619 -105.9228 
 
 
 
Table F.3 Terrorist Consequence Weights for Test Cases 
   
     
      
      
    
0.5 1 1 1 
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Table F.4 Terrorist Consequence Weights for Test Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivations/Disincentives       
Prestige of Successful Capabilities 1 1 
Manipulate Adversaries 5 5 
Apocalyptic Beliefs 0 0 
War on Own Nation 3 3 
War on Another Nation 0 0 
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 0 0 
Ensure Security 0 0 
Mass Devastation/Chaos 
 
 
-Deaths 0 5 
-Other 5 3 
Religious Imperative 0 0 
Manipulate Policy 5 5 
Fascination of Nuclear Weapons 0 0 
Fascination of Radiological 0 0 
Fascination of Sabotage 0 0 
Fear of Retaliation on Base of Support 3 1 
Fear of Attracting Attention 1 1 
Alienation 0 0 
Contradict Goals of Group 
 
 
                  -Mass killings 3 0 
-Contamination of territory or environment 0 0 
Lack of Religious Mandate 0 0 
Internal Group Division 3 3 
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F.2. Small State Infrastructure 
 
 
State  Boundaries: 41
o
00'48.62"N  109
o
22'22.04" W, 36
o
59'44.15"N  109
o
22'22.04" W, 41
o
00'48.62"N  102
o
03'41.69" W, 36
o
59'44.15"N  102
o
03'41.69" W 
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Table F.5 30 MWth Research Reactor Facility Inputs 
 
Table F.6 30 MWth Research Reactor Sabotage  Inputs 
Facility Name: 30 MWth Research Reactor 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.75 0.55 6.00E-09 1.00E-06 5.0E-05 9.50E-03 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2  0.85 0.55 1.0E-09 2.0E-07 3.0E-05 3.0E-03 
 
Table F.7 30 MWth Research Reactor PPS Inputs 
30 MWth 
Research 
Reactor PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.6 0.6 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.5 0.5 
Irradiated LEU  Fuel, Irradiated HEU 
Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.5 0.35 Fresh LEU Fuel 
Layer 4 0.1 0.1 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: 30 MWth Research Reactor Location: 39o51'37.79" N, 104o44'10.27" W       256     0.2   
SNM 
Material 
Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated 
LEU Fuel 
Plutonium 1.00 301 2.4 625 4.24 0.6 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.9 0.25 
Fresh LEU 
Fuel 
Uranium 1.01 144 2.4 2.5E-04 5.70E-07 0.197 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.95 0.25 
Irradiated 
HEU Fuel 
Uranium 1.02 47 0.9584 450 4.00 0.34 SLOW TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.5 0.25 
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Table F.8 2 MWth Research Reactor Facility Inputs 
 
 
Table F.9 2 MWth Research Reactor Sabotage Inputs 
Facility Name: 2 MWth Research Reactor 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool  
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.9 0.15 1.0E-11 1.00E-08 5.0E-07 1.20E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2  0.72 0.15 2.0E-12 2.0E-09 3.0E-07 3.0E-06 
 
 
Table F.10 2 MWth Research Reactor PPS Inputs 
2 MWth 
Research 
Reactor PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.7 0.25 Irradiated LEU Fuel and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.4 0.2 Irradiated LEU  Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.1 0.1 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
 
 
 
Facility Name: 2 MWth Research Reactor Location: 38O37'22.72" N, 106O08'41.29" W       263     0.05   
SNM 
Material 
Type                       
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated 
LEU Fuel 
Plutonium 0.4 56 1.7 530 3.64 0.61 Slow True TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.98 0.25 
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Table F.11 100 W Research Reactor Facility Inputs 
 
 
Table F.12 100 W Research Reactor Sabotage Inputs 
Facility Name: 100 W University Research Reactor  
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool  
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.9 0.05 5.0E-10 1.00E-08 5.0E-06 4.50E-06 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2  0.92 0.05 1.0E-10 2.0E-07 3.0E-06 7.2E-06 
 
 
 
Table F.13 100 W Research Reactor Facility Inputs 
100 W 
Research 
Reactor PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.4 0.3 Irradiated LEU Fuel and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.1 0.1 Irradiated LEU  Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.1 0.1 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
 
Facility Name: 100 W Research Reactor Location:  38°18'2.20"N, 103°57'36.38"W       261     0.01  
 
SNM Material Type                       
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated LEU 
Fuel 
Uranium 0.25 35 0.85 265 3.55 0.65 Slow True TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.98 0.25 
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Table F.14 Isotope Production Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.15 Isotope Production Facility PPS Inputs 
Isotope 
Production 
Facility PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.25 0.25 Moly-99 
Layer 2 0.1 0.1 Moly-99 
 
 
Table F.16 Hospital Cancer Center Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Isotope 
Production Facility 
Location: 39
o
51'37.79" N, 
104
o
44'10.27" W 
     256     0.02 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Mo-99 Product Mo-99 0.3 5 6 50 1.2e-4 0.8 0.95 
Facility Name: Hospital 
Cancer Center 
Location:  38°46'37.17"N, 
103°42'19.61"W 
 
     262     0.02 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 7 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 3 6 4.2e-7 1 0.995 
Gamma Knife Multi-Beam Co-60 0.03 1 3500 7000 1.2e-6 1 0.05 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1e-6 1 0.95 
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Table F.17 Hospital Cancer Center PPS Inputs 
Hospital 
Cancer 
Center PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.75 0.25 Gamma Knife Source 
Layer 4 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
 
Table F.18 Fertilizer Plant 1 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.19 Fertilizer Plant 1 PPS Inputs 
Fertilizer 
Plant 1 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.1 0.01 Phosphygypsum 1 
 
 
Facility Name: 
 Fertilizer Plant 1 
Location:  40° 0'11.08"N, 
104°27'15.79"W 
 
     248     0.0001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Phosphogypsum 1 Ra-226  0.04 1 2000 2.7e-8 1.7e-10 1 1 
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Table F.20 Fertilizer Plant 2 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.21 Fertilizer Plant 2 PPS Inputs 
Fertilizer 
Plant 2 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.1 0.01 Phosphygypsum 2 
 
 
 
Table F.22 Industrial Site 1 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name:  
Fertilizer Plant 2 
Location: Isolated Area 
38°27'2.39"N, 106° 3'30.31"W 
     254     0.0001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Phosphogypsum 2 Ra-226   0.04 1 5000 2.7e-8 1.7e-10 1 1 
Facility Name: Industrial 1 
Location:  
37°43'29.79"N, 108° 3'10.28"W 
     260     0.001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Industrial Radiography Co 1 Co-60 0.03 5 4 60 1.2e-5 1 0.95 
Industrial Radiography Ir Ir-192 0.08 4 2 100 1.3e-5 1 0.95 
  
251 
 
 
Table F.23 Industrial Site 1 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 1 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 Co Sources, Ir Sources 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Co Sources 
 
 
 
Table F.24 Industrial Site 2 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.25 Industrial Site 2 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 2 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 Co Sources, Tm Sources 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Co Sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 2 
Location: Isolated Area 
39°27'2.39"N, 107° 3'30.31"W 
     251     0.001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Industrial Radiography Co 2 Co-60 0.03 5 4 60 1.2e-5 1 0.75 
Industrial Radiography Tm Tm-170 20 8 1 150 1.4e-6 1 0.8 
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Table F.26 Target Locations Inputs 
Name Location  
  
          
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
   
Target 1 - Capital City 
38°33'24.19"N, 
103°44'16.80"W 0.2 1.00 0.60 0.50 1.00 1.00E-11 6.00E-09 5.00E-07 1.00E-04 
Target 2 - Industrial City 
40° 0'11.08"N, 
104°27'15.79"W 0.1 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.95 6.00E-12 1.00E-08 1.00E-06 9.50E-05 
Target 3- City 3 
40°23'54.52"N, 
106°10'16.81"W 0.02 0.16 0.12 0.30 0.50 1.60E-12 1.20E-09 3.00E-07 5.00E-05 
Target 4 - City 4 
37°26'58.41"N, 
108° 7'34.14"W 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.25 0.40 7.50E-13 5.00E-10 2.50E-07 4.00E-05 
 
 
 
  
Table F.27 Small State Consequence Weights  
   
     
      
      
    
1 1 1 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table F.28 Small State Interdiction Inputs  
      
         
    
5.00E-06 1.50E-05 
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Table F.29 Small State Consolidated Spent Fuel Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.30 Small State Consolidated Spent Fuel Facility Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: Consolidated Spent Fuel Facility 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool  
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 
0.5 0.5 6.00E-11 1.00E-07 5.00E-06 1.00E-05 
 
 
 
Table F.31 Small State Consolidated Spent Fuel Facility PPS Inputs  
Consolidated 
Spent Fuel 
Facility 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.75 0.75 All materials and vital areas 
Layer 2 0.75 0.75 All materials and vital areas 
 
Facility Name: Consolidated Spent Fuel Facility Location: 38O37'22.72" N, 106O08'41.29" W       263     0.05   
SNM Material Type                       
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated LEU Fuel 
30 MWth 
Plutonium 1.00 301 2.4 625 4.24 0.6 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.9 0.25 
Irradiated HEU Fuel 
30 MWth 
Uranium 1.02 47 0.9584 450 4.00 0.34 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.5 0.25 
Irradiated LEU Fuel 2 
MWth 
Plutonium 0.4 56 1.7 530 3.64 0.61 Slow True TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.98 0.25 
Irradiated LEU Fuel 
100W 
Plutonium 0.25 35 0.85 265 3.55 0.65 Slow True TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.98 0.25 
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F.3. Intermediate State Infrastructure 
 
State Borders - 40°59'38.70"N 111° 3'22.44"W, 40°59'38.70"N 111° 3'22.44"W, 44°59'36.84"N 104° 3'23.80"W, 44°59'36.84"N 104° 3'23.80"W 
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Table F.32 BWR Reactor Site Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.33 BWR Reactor Site Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: BWR Reactor Site   
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.15 0.85 1.00E-07 5.00E-04 1.00E-03 9.00E-03 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 0.05 0.92 5.00E-08 1.00E-04 5.00E-04 8.00E-03 
 
 
Table F.34 BWR Reactor Site PPS Inputs  
BWR Reactor 
Site  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: BWR Reactor Site   Location:  44°22'17.77"N, 105°43'50.57"W       250     0.5   
SNM Material Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated Fuel Plutonium 1.13 5 3.2E06 8.1E04 22 0.65 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh LEU 
Fuel 
Uranium 1.02 12 320 2.5E-04 1.2E-05 0.03 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
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Table F.35 PWR Reactor Site 1 Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.36 PWR Reactor Site 1 Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: PWR Reactor Site  1 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.15 0.85 1.00E-9 2.00E-07 5.00E-05 1.00E-04 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 0.05 0.92 5.00E-10 1.00E-07 9.00E-06 8.00E-05 
 
 
Table F.37 PWR Reactor Site 1 PPS Inputs  
PWR Reactor 
Site  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: PWR  Reactor Site 1   Location:   42° 0'59.30"N, 106° 1'39.65"W       262     0.5   
SNM Material Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated PWR 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.15 2 657 4.1E05 45 0.60 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh PWR Fuel Uranium 1.23 5 657 2.5E-04 3.5E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
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Table F.38 PWR Reactor Site 2 Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.39 PWR Reactor Site 2 Facility Inputs  
Facility Name: PWR Reactor Site 2    
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.15 0.85 4.00E-12 1.00E-08 8.00E-06 1.00E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 0.05 0.92 1.00E-12 4.00E-09 1.00E-06 8.00E-06 
 
 
Table F.40 PWR Reactor Site 2 PPS Inputs  
PWR Reactor 
Site 2 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: PWR  Reactor Site 2  Location:     41°45'37.63"N,   109°46'49.19"W       262     0.5   
SNM 
Material 
Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1 2 657 4.1E05 45 0.60 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh LEU 
Fuel 
Uranium 1.5 5 657 2.5E-04 3.5E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.05 
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Table F.41 Uranium Mining & Milling Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.42 Uranium Mining & Milling PPS Inputs  
Uranium 
Mine PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.1 0.05 Uranium Ore and U3O8 
 
Table F.43 Uranium Conversion Facility Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.44 Uranium Conversion PPS Inputs  
Uranium 
Conversion PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.1 0.05 48Y and  U3O8 
Facility Name: Uranium Mine & Milling Location: 43° 6'17.06"N ,  109°34'0.31"W             262     0.001   
SNM Material Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Uranium ore 
(0.2% grade) 
Uranium 0.02 1 1.0E5 1.4E-05 4.1E-05 0.0072 None False FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 1 1 
U3O8 Uranium 1 1 14000 7E-3 4.2E-04 0.0072 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 1 0.05 
Facility Name: Uranium Conversion  Location:  43°20'27.38"N,  104°44'52.13"W       249     0.1   
SNM 
Material 
Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
U3O8 Uranium 1 1 14000 3.2 4.2E-04 0.0072 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 1 0.05 
  UF6 48Y 
Cylinders 
Uranium 1.3 2 9500 2.75 5.8E-04 0.0072 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
  
259 
 
 
 
Table F.45 Fuel Fabrication Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.46 Fuel Fabrication PPS Inputs  
Fuel 
Fabrication 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.7 0.5 All Materials 
Layer 2 0.8 0.4 BWR Assembly, PWR Assembly 
 
 
 
Table F.47 Uranium HEU Research Reactor Facility Inputs  
Facility Name: Fuel Fabrication  Location:   42°26'53.73"N,  106°11'26.59"W       255     0.1   
SNM 
Material 
Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
UF6 30B 
Cylinder 
Uranium 1.6 2 2200 0.61 5.6E-06 0.04 Slow TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
BWR 
Assembly 
Uranium 1.02 12 320 2.5E-04 1.2E-05 0.03 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
PWR 
Assembly 
Uranium 1.5 5 657 2.5E-04 3.5E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
Facility Name: University HEU Research Reactor Location:  41°55'17.43"N, 106°25'0.87"W       267     0.15   
SNM 
Material 
Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Fresh HEU 
Fuel  
Uranium 1.03 46 0.9584 3.1E-4 1.60E-07 0.36 NONE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.98 0.98 
Spent HEU 
Fuel  
Uranium 1.02 47 0.9584 450 4.00       0.34 SLOW TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.98 0.98 
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Table F.48 University HEU Research Reactor Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: University HEU Research Reactor     
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.5 0.25 5.00E-11 5.00E-07 1.00E-05 5.00E-04 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 0.375 0.25 1.20E-11 1.00E-07 5.00E-06 4.50E-04 
 
 
Table F.49 University HEU Research Reactor PPS Inputs  
PWR Reactor 
Site 2 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.35 0.35 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.2 0.2 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.01 0.01 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
 
 
Table F.50 University LEU Research Reactor Facility Inputs  
Facility Name: University LEU Research Reactor Location:  43°48'53.16"N, 105° 1'18.30"W       255     0.1   
SNM Material Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated LEU 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.00 301 2.4 625 4.24 0.6 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.99 0.99 
Fresh LEU Fuel Uranium 1.01 144 2.4 2.5E-04 5.70E-07 0.197 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.99 0.99 
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Table F.51 University LEU Research Reactor Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: University LEU  Research Reactor 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.5 0.25 1.00E-08 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 5.00E-03 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 0.375 0.25 1.20E-08 1.00E-05 5.00E-04 4.50E-03 
 
Table F.52 University LEU Research Reactor PPS Inputs  
PWR Reactor 
Site 2 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.5 0.5 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.25 0.25 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.01 0.01 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.01 0.01 Coolant Pump 2 
 
Table F.53 Hospital Cancer Center Facility Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Hospital 
Cancer Center  
Location:   43°45'20.39"N, 
104°53'46.57"W 
 
     254     0.1 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 3 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 7 6 4.2E-6 1 0.995 
Gamma Knife Multi-Beam Co-60 0.03 1 3500 7000 1.2E-6 1 0.05 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1E-6 1 0.95 
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Table F.54 Hospital Cancer Center Facility Inputs  
Hospital 
Cancer 
Center PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.75 0.25 Gamma Knife Source 
Layer 4 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
Table F.55 Hospital 2 Facility Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.56 Hospital 2 Facility Inputs  
Hospital 2 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
Facility Name: Hospital 2  
Location:    41°59'25.77"N 
106°25'0.87"W 
 
     254     0.1 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 3 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 7 6 4.2E-6 1 0.995 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1E-6 1 0.95 
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Table F.57 Hospital 3 Facility Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.58 Hospital 3 Facility Inputs  
Hospital 3 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Hospital 3  
Location:     42°12'54.69"N  110° 
2'39.65"W 
     254     0.1 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 3 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 7 6 4.2E-6 1 0.995 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1E-6 1 0.95 
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Table F.59 Industrial 1 Facility Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.60 Industrial 1 PPS Inputs  
Industrial 1 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 Co Sources, Ir Sources 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Co Sources 
 
 
 
Table F.61 Industrial 2 Facility Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 1 
Location:  
44° 1'30.54"N,  105°53'25.17"W 
     260     0.001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Industrial Radiography Co 1 Co-60 0.03 5 4 60 1.2e-5 1 0.85 
Industrial Radiography Ir Ir-192 0.08 4 2 100 1.3e-5 1 0.85 
Facility Name: Industrial 2 
Location:  
43°51'46.66"N  109°14'23.00"W      
260     0.001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Well Logging Am-Be 
Am-
241/Be 
0.06 5 4 20 1.2e-5 1 0.95 
Well Logging Cf Cf-252 0.02 4 3 0.08 5.3e-5 1 0.95 
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Table F.62 Industrial 2 PPS Inputs  
Industrial 2 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.3 Am-Be sources, Cf sources 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Cf sources 
 
 
Table F.63 Industrial 3 PPS Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.64 Industrial 3 PPS Inputs  
Industrial 3 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.7 0.8 Food Irradiator 
Layer 2 0.45 0.5 Food Irradiator 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 3 
Location:  
41°46'1.95"N ,  109°16'26.32"W      
248     0.25 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Food Irradiator Co-60 0.03 1 5500 4.0E06 1.5E-05 1 0.005 
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Table F.65 Industrial 4 Facility Inputs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.66 Industrial 4 PPS Inputs  
Industrial  4 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.5 0.5 Blood Irradiator 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Blood Irradiator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 4 
Location:  42°15'12.98"N 
106°45'16.59"W 
     255     0.1 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Blood Irradiator Cs-137 0.1 1 2200 7000 1.2E-6 1 0.05 
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Table F.67 Intermediate State Target Inputs  
Name Location  
  
          
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
   
Target 1 - Capital City 
43°51'48.62"N, 
105° 8'10.74"W 0.3 1 1 1 1 5.00E-12 5.00E-08 5.00E-05 1.00E-04 
Target 2 - City 2 
44° 0'53.49"N, 
108°28'12.78"W 0.1 0.35 0.01 0.05 0.7 1.65E-12 5.00E-10 2.50E-07 7.00E-05 
Target 3- City 3 
41°53'9.67"N 
106°25'0.87"W 0.05 0.15 0.001 0.005 0.3 7.2 E-13 5.00E-11 2.50E-08 3.00E-05 
Target 4 - City 4 
42°16'30.37"N, 
110° 2'39.65"W 0.05 0.10 0.001 0.005 0.2 7.2 E-13 5.00E-11 2.50E-08 3.00E-05 
 
 
Table F.68 State Interdiction Inputs  
      
         
    
5.00-05 1.50E-04 
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F.4. Complex State Infrastructure 
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Table F.69 BWR Reactor Site 1 Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.70 BWR Reactor Site 1 Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: BWR Reactor Site  1 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 0.2 0.9 1.00E-08 5.00E-05 6.20E-05 1.00E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 0.01 0.95 5.00E-09 5.00E-05 4.50E-05 1.00E-05 
 
 
Table F.71 BWR Reactor Site 1 PPS Inputs  
BWR Reactor 
Site  1 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.93 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.9 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.9 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 2 
 
Facility Name: BWR Reactor Site  1 Location:   48°15'14.87"N,  119°55'8.89"W       336     0.8   
SNM Material Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated BWR 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.13 5 320 8.1E04 22 0.65 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh LEU Fuel Uranium 1.02 12 320 2.5E-04 1.2E-05 0.03 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
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Table F.72 BWR Reactor Site 2 Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.73 BWR Reactor Site 2 Facility Inputs  
Facility Name: BWR Reactor Site  2 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 
0.2 0.9 1.00E-08 5.00E-05 6.20E-05 1.00E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 
0.01 0.95 5.00E-09 5.00E-05 4.50E-05 1.00E-05 
 
 
Table F.74 BWR Reactor Site 2 PPS Inputs  
BWR Reactor 
Site 2 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: BWR Reactor Site  2 Location:   43°21'55.75"N 122°32'11.43"W       341     0.8   
SNM 
Material 
Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated Fuel Plutonium 1.13 5 320 8.1E04 22 0.65 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh LEU 
Fuel 
Uranium 1.02 12 320 2.5E-04 1.2E-05 0.03 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
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Table F.75 PWR Reactor Site 1 Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.76 PWR Reactor Site 1 Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: PWR Reactor Site 1 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 
0.2 0.9 1.00E-08 5.00E-05 6.20E-05 2.50E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 
0.01 0.95 5.00E-09 5.00E-05 4.50E-05 2.50E-05 
 
 
Table F.77 PWR Reactor Site 1 PPS Inputs  
PWR Reactor 
Site 1 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: PWR  Reactor Site 1   Location 45°28'19.71"N  123°49'13.30"W       303     0.8   
SNM Material Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated PWR 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.15 2 657 4.1E05 45 0.60 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh PWR Fuel Uranium 1.23 5 657 2.5E-04 3.5E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
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Table F.78 PWR Reactor Site 2 Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.79 PWR Reactor Site 2 Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: PWR Reactor Site   
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 
0.2 0.9 5.00E-08 9.00E-05 6.20E-05 3.50E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 
0.01 0.95 9.00E-09 8.00E-05 4.50E-05 3.50E-05 
 
 
Table F.80 PWR Reactor Site 2 PPS Inputs  
PWR Reactor 
Site  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: PWR Reactor Site 2   Location:    48° 5'36.14"N 124° 9'35.46"W       317     0.8   
SNM Material Type                     /    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated PWR 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.15 2 657 4.1E05 45 0.60 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh PWR 
Fuel 
Uranium 1.23 5 657 2.5E-04 3.5E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
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Table F.81 PWR Reactor Site 3 Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.82 PWR Reactor Site 3 Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: PWR Reactor Site  3 
    Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 
0.2 0.9 1.00E-08 5.00E-05 6.20E-05 1.00E-05 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1,  
Coolant Pump 2, 
Containment 
0.01 0.95 5.00E-09 5.00E-05 4.50E-05 1.00E-05 
 
 
Table F.83 PWR Reactor Site 3 PPS Inputs  
PWR Reactor 
Site  3 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 5 0.75 0.75 Coolant Pump 2 
Facility Name: PWR  Reactor Site 3   Location:    45°36'44.90"N  117°32'41.62"W       328     0.8   
SNM Material Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated PWR 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.15 2 657 4.1E05 45 0.60 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
 Fresh PWR 
Fuel 
Uranium 1.23 5 657 2.5E-04 3.5E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
  
274 
 
 
 
Table F.84 (NWC) Military Reprocessing Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.85 (NWC) Military Reprocessing Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: (NWC) Military Reprocessing   
   Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel Pin 
Storage Spent Fuel Shielding 
0.2 0.9 1.00E-09 9.00E-06 5.00E-05 5.00E-06 
 
 
Table F.86 (NWC) Military Reprocessing PPS Inputs  
(NWC) Military 
Reprocessing   
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.75 0.75 Spent Fuel Pins, Spent Fuel Shielding  
Layer 3 0.75 0.75 Spent Fuel Shielding 
Layer 4 0.9 0.9 Plutonium Oxide Cans 
Layer 5 0.85 0.88 Plutonium Oxide Cans 
 
 
Facility Name: (NWC) Military Reprocessing Location:    42°50'44.73"N  124°18'21.71"W       349     0.95   
SNM Material Type                     /    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Spent Pu Fuel Pin Plutonium 10 4000 3 1200 24 0.93 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.99 0.005 
Plutonium Oxide 
Weapons Grade Cans 
Plutonium 18.2 10 7 300 4.2E-06 0.93 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.5 0.005 
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Table F.87 Commercial Reprocessing and Waste Storage Facility Inputs  
 
Table F.88 Commercial Reprocessing and Waste Storage Facility Inputs  
Facility Name: Commercial Reprocessing and Waste Storage   
   Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Storage 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump 1 
0.2 0.9 1.00E-08 6.00E-06 6.20E-05 1.00E-05 
 
Table F.89 Commercial Reprocessing and Waste Storage Facility Inputs  
Commercial 
Reprocessing 
and Waste 
Storage  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuels, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.9 0.9 PuO2 Cans 
Layer 5 0.9 0.85 PuO2 Cans 
Facility Name: Commercial Reprocessing and Waste 
Storage   
Location:  42°48'54.74"N  124°19'10.43"W       328     0.85   
SNM Material Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Irradiated PWR 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.15 2 657 4.1E05 45 0.60 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
Irradiated BWR 
Fuel 
Plutonium 1.13 5 320 8.1E04 22 0.65 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
PuO2 Cans 
Reactor Grade 
Plutonium 25 45 7 425 1.02E-05 0.62 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.2 0.005 
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Table F.90 (NWC) MAGNOX Pu Production Reactor Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.91 (NWC) MAGNOX Pu Production Reactor Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: (NWC) MAGNOX Pu Production Reactor 
   Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Reactor 
Containment, Coolant 
Pump 1, Coolant 
Pump 2 
0.2 0.95 4.20E-10 5.50E-05 5.00E-06 5.00E-06 
 
 
Table F.92 (NWC) MAGNOX Pu Production Reactor PPS Inputs  
MAGNOX 
Reactor PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.94 0.92 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.92 0.9 Spent Fuel Pins 
Layer 3 0.9 0.9 Coolant Pump 1 
Layer 4 0.9 0.9 Coolant Pump 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: (NWC) MAGNOX Pu Production 
Reactor  
Location:    42°50'44.73"N  124°18'21.71"W       349     0.95   
SNM Material Type                     /    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Spent Pu Production 
Fuel Pin 
Plutonium 2 800 3 1200 24 0.93 Slow TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.99 0.005 
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Table F.93 (NWC) HEU Research Reactor Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.94 (NWC) HEU Research Reactor Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: (NWC) HEU Research Reactor   
   Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Storage 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump  0.2 0.9 4.20E-10 5.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-06 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1, 
Coolant Pump 2 0.1 0.9 3.00E-10 5.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-06 
 
 
Table F.95 (NWC) HEU Research Reactor PPS Inputs  
(NWC) HEU 
Research 
Reactor  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump  
Layer 4 0.9 0.9 Fresh HEU Fuel 
Layer 5 0.9 0.85 Coolant Pumps 
 
Facility Name: (NWC) HEU Research Reactor   Location:   46° 5'11.79"N  121° 4'58.01"W       329     0.85   
SNM 
Material 
Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Fresh HEU 
Fuel  
Uranium 1.03 46 0.9584 3.1E-4 1.60E-07 0.36 NONE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
Spent HEU 
Fuel  
Uranium 1.02 47 0.9584 450 4.00       0.34 SLOW TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
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Table F.96 (NWC) Weapon Component Production Inputs  
 
 
Table F.97 (NWC) Weapon Component PPS Inputs  
(NWC) Weapon 
Component Production   
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials  
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 All Materials 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 PuO2 
Layer 4 0.9 0.85 Pu Metal Product 
Layer 5 0.9 0.9 Pu Machined Metal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: (NWC) Weapon Component Production   Location:    45°35'3.28"N  119°59'17.27"W       334     0.95   
SNM Material Type                       
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Plutonium Oxide 
Weapons Grade Cans 
Plutonium 18.2 10 7 300 4.2E-06 0.93 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.5 0.005 
Pu Metal Product  Plutonium 25 100 2.0 149 2.66E-06 0.93 SLOW FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE 0.5 0.005 
Pu Machined Metal Plutonium 50 100 4.0 299 5.33E-06 0.93 SLOW FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 0.5 0.005 
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Table F.98 (NWC) Super Prompt Critical Reactor Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.99 (NWC) Super Prompt Critical Reactor Sabotage Inputs  
Facility Name: (NWC) HEU Research Reactor   
   Sabotage 
Event  Vital Areas 
     
        
        
       
       
       
   
Spent Fuel 
Storage 
Spent Fuel Pool, 
Circulation Pump  
0.2 0.9 2.20E-10 1.50E-05 5.00E-05 1.00E-06 
Reactor 
Coolant Pump 1, 
Coolant Pump 2 
0.1 0.9 2.20E-10 1.50E-05 5.00E-05 1.00E-06 
 
 
Table F.100 (NWC) Super Prompt Critical Reactor PPS Inputs  
(NWC) HEU 
Research 
Reactor  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.9 All Materials and Vital Areas 
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Irradiated Fuel, Spent Fuel Pool 
Layer 3 0.8 0.75 Circulation Pump  
Layer 4 0.9 0.9 Fresh HEU Fuel 
Layer 5 0.9 0.85 Coolant Pumps 
 
 
Facility Name: (NWC) Super Prompt Critical Reactor   Location:   46° 5'11.79"N  121° 4'58.01"W       332     0.9   
SNM 
Material 
Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Fresh HEU 
Fuel  
Uranium 1.003 59 0.9584 3.1E-4 1.60E-07 0.85 NONE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
Irradiated 
HEU Fuel  
Uranium 1.008 60 0.9584 450 4.00 0.84 SLOW TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
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Table F.101 (NWC) Nuclear Weapon Assembly Facility Inputs  
 
 
Table F.102 (NWC) Nuclear Weapon Assembly Nuclear Weapons Inputs  
Facility Name: (NWC) Nuclear Weapon Assembly Facility     
# Nuclear Weapons  YE  (kT) 
    
           
25 2000 0.005 0.25 0.001 
 
 
Table F.103 (NWC) Nuclear Weapon Assembly PPS Inputs  
(NWC) Nuclear 
Weapon Assembly 
Facility   
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.9 0.94 All Materials  
Layer 2 0.9 0.8 Pu Machined Metal 
Layer 3 0.9 0.9 Nuclear Weapons 
Layer 4 0.9 0.85 Nuclear Weapons 
Layer 5 0.9 0.85 Nuclear Weapons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: (NWC) Nuclear Weapon Assembly 
Facility   
Location:    45° 3'10.55"N 122°43'38.76"W       332     0.95   
SNM 
Material 
Type                   
  /
    
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
Pu Machined 
Metal 
Plutonium 50 100 4.0 300 5.33E-06       0.93 SLOW FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 0.5 0.005 
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Table F.104 (NWC) Military Air Base Inputs  
Facility Name: (NWC) Military Air Base       0.95 
Location: 44° 2'15.61"N 120° 0'55.52"W 
 
  
# Nuclear Weapons  YE  (kT) 
    
           
30 2000 0.005 0.25 0.001 
 
 
Table F.105 (NWC) Military Air Base PPS Inputs  
(NWC) 
Military Air 
Base  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.95 0.95 Nuclear Weapons 
Layer 2 0.95 0.95 Nuclear Weapons 
 
 
Table F.106 (NWC) Nuclear Naval Base Nuclear Weapons Inputs  
Facility Name: (NWC) Nuclear Naval Base       0.95 
Location: 47°54'48.38"N 124°33'5.02"W 
 
  
# Nuclear Weapons  YE  (kT) 
    
           
30 2000 0.005 0.25 0.001 
 
 
Table F.107 (NWC) Nuclear Naval Base PPS Inputs  
(NWC) Nuclear 
Naval Base  PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.7 0.5 All Materials 
Layer 2 0.8 0.4 BWR Assembly, PWR Assembly 
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Table F.108 Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication Facility Inputs 
 
 
Table F.109 Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication Facility Inputs 
Uranium Conversion and 
Fuel Fabrication PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.7 0.5 All Materials 
Layer 2 0.8 0.4 BWR Assembly, PWR Assembly 
 
 
Table F.110 Uranium Enrichment Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Uranium Conversion and Fuel 
Fabrication 
Location:    47°12'21.27"N ,   121°16'27.76"W       332     0.1   
SNM Material Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling 
FP 
Rem. 
Conv. Metal. Mach.         
U3O8 Uranium 1 1 14000 3.2 4.2E-04 0.0072 None FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 1 0.05 
UF6 30B Cylinder Uranium 1.6 2 2200 0.61 5.6E-06 0.04 Slow FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE 1 0.05 
BWR Assembly Uranium 1.02 12 320 2.5E-04 1.2E-05 0.03 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
PWR Assembly Uranium 1.5 5 657 2.5E-04 3.5E-05 0.04 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 0.8 0.005 
Facility Name: Uranium Enrichment Location:     46°58'28.68"N,   120°33'33.85"W       329     0.1   
SNM Material Type                      
Chemical   
Reactivity 
Cooling FP Rem. Conv. Metal. Mach.         
  UF6 48Y 
Cylinders 
Uranium 1.3 2 9500 2.75 5.8E-04 0.0072 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
UF6 30B 
Cylinder 
Uranium 1.6 2 2200 0.61 5.6E-06 0.04 None FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE 1 0.005 
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Table F.111 Uranium Enrichment PPS Inputs 
Uranium Enrichment PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.75 0.75 All Materials 
 
 
Table F.112 Hospital 1 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.113 Hospital 1 PPS Inputs 
Hospital 1 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.75 0.25 Gamma Knife Source 
Layer 4 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Hospital 1  
Location:    47°32'22.55"N 
123°39'48.85"W 
 
     317     0.05 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 3 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 7 6 4.2E-6 1 0.995 
Gamma Knife Multi-Beam Co-60 0.03 1 3500 7000 1.2E-6 1 0.05 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1E-6 1 0.95 
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Table F.114 Hospital 2 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.115 Hospital 2 PPS Inputs 
Hospital 1 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Hospital 2  
Location:     48°26'40.42"N  
117°32'32.27"W 
 
     322     0.05 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 3 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 7 6 4.2E-6 1 0.995 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1E-6 1 0.95 
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Table F.116 Hospital 3 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.117 Hospital 3 PPS Inputs 
Hospital 3 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.75 0.25 Gamma Knife Source 
Layer 4 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Hospital 3  
Location:     43°15'17.43"N  
123°48'23.56"W 
 
     323     0.05 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 3 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 7 6 4.2E-6 1 0.995 
Gamma Knife Multi-Beam Co-60 0.03 1 3500 7000 1.2E-6 1 0.05 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1E-6 1 0.95 
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Table F.118 Hospital 4 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.119 Hospital 4 PPS Inputs 
Hospital 4 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 LDR Brachytherapy Seeds  
Layer 2 0.5 0.1 HDR Brachytherapy Seeds 
Layer 3 0.75 0.25 Gamma Knife Source 
Layer 4 0.3 0.1 Mo-99/Tc-99 
 
 
Table F.120 Industrial 1 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Hospital 4 
Location:      45°51'23.72"N  
123°43'9.78"W 
 
     321     0.05 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
LDR  Brachytherapy Seeds Ra-226 0.04 1750 3 0.015 2.1E-6 1 0.99999 
HDR Brachytherapy Seeds Ir-192 0.08 200 7 6 4.2E-6 1 0.995 
Gamma Knife Multi-Beam Co-60 0.03 1 3500 7000 1.2E-6 1 0.05 
Nuclear Medicine Imaging 
Mo-99/ 
Tc-99 
0.3 1 20 75 1.1E-6 1 0.95 
Facility Name: Industrial 1 
Location:  
47°49'29.89"N,   121°57'58.21"W      
325     0.01 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Blood/Tissue Irradiator Cs-137 0.1 4 3500 3.0E06 5.1e-6 1 0.05 
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Table F.121 Industrial 1 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 1 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.5 0.5 Blood/Tissue Irradiator 
Layer 2 0.5 0.5 Blood/Tissue Irradiator 
 
Table F.122 Industrial 2 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.123 Industrial 2 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 2 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.7 0.8 Food Irradiator 
Layer 2 0.45 0.5 Food Irradiator 
 
 
Table F.124 Industrial 3 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 2 
Location:  
46°28'6.23"N,  123°12'58.41"W 
     322     0.01 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Food Irradiator Co-60 0.03 2 5500 4.0E06 1.5E-05 1 0.005 
Facility Name: Industrial 3 
Location:  
42°27'2.90"N,  122°38'37.00"W 
     322     0.001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Industrial Radiography Co 1 Co-60 0.03 5 4 60 1.2e-5 1 0.85 
Industrial Radiography Ir Ir-192 0.08 4 2 100 1.3e-5 1 0.85 
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Table F.125 Industrial 3 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 3 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.1 Co Sources, Ir Sources 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Co Sources 
 
Table F.126 Industrial 4 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.127 Industrial 5 Facility Inputs 
Industrial 4 PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.3 Am-Be sources, Cf sources 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Cf sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 4 
Location:  
43°18'15.16"N,  117°54'24.23"W      
318     0.001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Well Logging Am-Be 
Am-
241/Be 
0.06 5 4 20 1.2e-5 1 0.95 
Well Logging Cf Cf-252 0.02 4 3 0.08 5.3e-5 1 0.95 
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Table F.128 Industrial 5 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.129 Industrial 5 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 5 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.2 0.3 Am-Be sources, Cf sources 
Layer 2 0.5 0.25 Cf sources 
 
 
Table F.130 Industrial 6 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 5 
Location:  
42°38'51.88"N,   118°54'35.09"W      
322     0.001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Well Logging Am-Be 
Am-
241/Be 
0.06 5 4 20 1.2e-5 1 0.95 
Well Logging Cf Cf-252 0.02 4 3 0.08 5.3e-5 1 0.95 
Facility Name: Industrial 6 
Location:  
43°48'29.26"N,  123°20'10.80"W      
331     0.01 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Food Irradiator Co-60 0.03 2 5500 4.0E06 1.5E-05 1 0.005 
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Table F.131 Industrial 6 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 6 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.7 0.8 Food Irradiator 
Layer 2 0.45 0.5 Food Irradiator 
 
 
Table F.132 Industrial 7 Facility Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.133 Industrial 7 PPS Inputs 
Industrial 7 
PPS 
  
     
   
     
 
Targets Under Layer 
Layer 1 0.001 0.001 Radio-thermo Generator 
Layer 2 0.001 0.001 Radio-thermo Generator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Industrial 7 
Location:  
43°31'43.91"N,   119° 7'36.30"W      
324     0.0001 
Radiological Material Type       
            
                 
Radio-thermo Generator Sr-90 1 2 6600 2.0E04 1E-02 1 0.99 
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Table F.134 Complex State Targets Inputs 
Name Location  
  
         
      
      
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
   
Target 1 - 
Capital City 
43°51'48.62"N, 
105° 8'10.74"W 0.3 1 1 1 1 2.15E-01 2.15E-01 2.15E-01 2.15E-01 1.08E-12 1.08E-08 1.08E-05 2.15E-05 
Target 2 - 
City 2 
44° 0'53.49"N, 
108°28'12.78"W 0.1 0.35 0.01 0.05 0.7 7.54E-02 2.15E-03 1.08E-02 1.51E-01 8.89E-14 1.08E-12 2.69E-09 1.06E-05 
Target 3- 
City 3 
41°53'9.67"N 
106°25'0.87"W 0.05 0.15 0.001 0.005 0.3 3.23E-02 2.15E-04 1.08E-03 6.50E-02 1.55E-14 1.08E-14 2.69E-11 1.94E-06 
Target 4 - 
City 4 
42°16'30.37"N, 
110° 2'39.65"W 0.05 0.10 0.001 0.005 0.2 2.15E-02 2.15E-04 1.08E-03 4.30E-02 1.55E-14 1.08E-14 2.69E-11 1.29E-06 
Target 4 - 
City 4 
46°38'18.18"N 
119°50'9.57"W 0.05 0.10 0.001 0.005 0.2 2.15E-02 2.15E-04 1.08E-03 4.31E-02 1.55E-14 1.08E-14 2.69E-11 1.29E-06 
 
